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Abstract 
 
This thesis seeks to understand the nature of and relation between science and 
philosophy articulated in the early work (1953-1968) of the French philosopher 
Gilles Deleuze. It seeks to challenge the view that Deleuze’s metaphysical and 
metaphilosophical position is in important part an attempt to respond to twentieth-
century developments in the natural sciences, claiming that this is not a plausible 
interpretation of Deleuze’s early thought. 
 The central problem identified with such readings is that they provide an 
insufficient explanation of the nature of philosophy’s contribution to the encounter 
between philosophy and science that they discern in Deleuze’s work. The 
philosophical, as opposed to scientific, dimension of the position attributed to 
Deleuze remains obscure. In chapter 1, it is demonstrated that this question of 
philosophy’s contribution to intellectual life and of how to differentiate philosophy 
from the sciences is a live one in Deleuze’s early thought. An alternative, less 
anachronistic interpretation of the parameters of Deleuze’s early project is offered. 
The remaining chapters of the thesis examine the early Deleuze’s 
understanding of the divergence between philosophy and science. Chapter 2 gives an 
account of Deleuze’s metaphilosophy, alongside a reconstruction of his largely 
implicit early understanding of science. The divergent intellectual processes and 
motivating concerns that account for Deleuze’s understanding of the differentiation 
of science and philosophy are thus clarified. In chapter 3, Deleuze’s use of 
mathematical and physical concepts is examined. It is argued that these concepts are 
used metaphorically. In chapter 4, the association between modern science and the 
Deleuzian concept of immanence that has been proposed by some Deleuze scholars 
is examined and ultimately challenged. 
The thesis concludes with some reflections on the significance of Deleuze’s 
early work for contemporary debates concerning the future of continental philosophy 
and the nature of philosophy more generally. 
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Introduction 
Science and Scientism in Anglophone 
Deleuze Scholarship 
 
 
 
The following thesis will investigate the status of science in the early work of the 
twentieth-century French philosopher, Gilles Deleuze, and his understanding of the 
relation between science and philosophy.   
 In this introduction, I will be concerned with the following: 
  
(i) I will first clarify the above formulation of the problematic of the 
project and its parameters;  
(ii) I will outline briefly the position (or family of positions) in 
Anglophone Deleuze scholarship that I will seek to question in the 
present thesis, its development and the problems with it that motivate 
the project;  
(iii) By way of some methodological reflections, I will consider the status 
of the present thesis as a study in the history of philosophy in relation 
to Deleuze’s own concerns regarding the history of philosophy; 
(iv) Finally, I will outline the structure of the thesis. 
  
Before I can begin to explore in more detail the motivations, aims and 
approach of this project, then, I will need to clarify some more basic, terminological 
points.   
 2 
 
In speaking of Deleuze’s ‘early’ work, I mean to indicate the line of thought 
that he follows (roughly) from the early 1950s to the late 1960s. The published 
works that I will take to define the outer limits of the period with which I am 
concerned are Empiricism and Subjectivity (1953) and Difference and Repetition 
(1968). The consistency of the viewpoint articulated in the various works composed 
by Deleuze in the course of this fifteen-year period is a point of contention in the 
literature, especially when it is a question of the relation between his early historical 
studies and his primary doctoral thesis, published as Difference and Repetition.
1
 
Deleuze himself has somewhat muddied the waters here by positing a 
philosophically significant break between his early historical studies and Difference 
and Repetition, despite the readily apparent continuities of concern and often of 
material. ‘There is’, Deleuze claims, 
 
a great difference between writing history of philosophy and writing philosophy. 
[…] After I had studied Hume, Spinoza, Nietzsche and Proust, […] Difference and 
Repetition was the first book in which I tried to ‘do philosophy’.  
(DR, p. xv [from the preface to the English translation])  
 
Part of what has made this remark so troublesome is that the distinction between 
history of philosophy and ‘first-order’ philosophising as Deleuze understands it is 
not going to easily map onto the way such a distinction has been understood in 
recent English-speaking philosophy. Viewing Deleuze’s remark through the lens of 
                                                 
1
 Brian Massumi (1992), for example, embraces a narrative (Deleuze’s own narrative, if perhaps an 
exaggerated form of it) whereby Deleuze’s early historical studies represent a cage from which the 
‘first major statements written in his own voice’ (p. 2) were an attempt to escape. Levi Bryant (2008) 
too insists on a distinction between ‘the works explicating [Deleuze’s] own philosophy’ and 
‘Deleuze’s studies of other philosophers’ (p. xi). Meanwhile, other commentators doubt the coherence 
of studying Deleuze’s ‘own’ philosophy in isolation from its evolution out of his studies of historical 
thinkers: see, for example, Boundas (1996, esp. p. 82), Smith (2012a, esp. pp. 29-30) and Tally 
(2010). 
 3 
 
the assumptions we have inherited from ‘classical’ analytic philosophy’s anti-
historical stance threatens to obscure the fact that it is a particular way of doing the 
history of philosophy that is being distinguished from ‘doing philosophy’, and not 
history of philosophy tout court.
2
 But whatever Deleuze’s own view on the personal 
significance for his own intellectual development of this first attempt to ‘speak in 
[his] own name’ (DR, p. xv [preface to the English translation]), to treat the early 
historical studies as belonging to a distinct period of Deleuze’s oeuvre to the doctoral 
work seems artificial. The view taken in this thesis will be that, even if not 
everything written in the works of these periods can be seen to articulate a single 
coherent position, there is such a position being developed. This is the position that 
comes to fruition in Difference and Repetition. The readings of figures from the 
history of philosophy developed in Deleuze’s earlier historical studies make, in 
places, crucial contributions to the conceptual scaffolding of this position.  
This periodisation will exclude work that can be regarded as Deleuze’s 
‘juvenilia’ – the various essays he published as a student in the 1940s – and likewise 
the 1969 work, Logic of Sense. Although it continues and develops a number of 
themes and ideas found in the earlier work, the latter is a transitional work in which 
Deleuze begins to formulate new ideas and approaches, some of which will be taken 
up in the markedly new phase of his work that begins with his collaboration with 
Félix Guattari, some of which will be abruptly terminated by this same encounter.
3
 
Likewise with the juvenilia: while there are undoubtedly points of communication 
                                                 
2
 I will say a little more on this below.  
3
 On the differences between Difference and Repetition and Logic of Sense, see Deleuze (2006a, p. 
65). On the differences between Logic of Sense and Deleuze’s subsequent work with Guattari, see his 
comments in the discussion following his presentation at the Cerisy conference on Nietzsche in 1972 
(DI, p. 364/p. 261). 
 4 
 
and continuity between Deleuze’s first published attempts at philosophising and the 
work that will occupy him in the subsequent two decades, this work of the 1940s 
seems to me to belong to a different phase, to be motivated by different problems, a 
different philosophical atmosphere.
4
   
The work of the ’50s and ’60s, at least up to the ’68 publications, by contrast, 
displays a remarkable continuity of concerns and problems. This is perhaps 
ultimately unsurprising: the two major publications of 1968 which bring this period 
of Deleuze’s thought to a close, Difference and Repetition and Spinoza and the 
Problem of Expression, were the products of doctoral research with which he had 
been occupied throughout this period.
5
 Furthermore, the thematic commonalities 
between the various works in the history of philosophy Deleuze published in the 
course of the 1950s and ’60s are apparent to any reader of his work; the readings of 
various figures he develops in those studies are loadbearing components of the 
position he puts forward in Difference and Repetition. In Deleuze’s work – as in the 
work of many thinkers educated in the French university system – the idea of a 
stable distinction between ‘first-order’ philosophising and the history of philosophy 
is effectively absent. And while Deleuze disparages ‘scholarliness’ in philosophical 
historiography (a point to which I will return in the course of this introduction), it is 
clear that this in no way constitutes a dismissal of the prevailing notion of 
philosophy in France as informed by and engaged with its history. The sort of anti-
                                                 
4
 On Deleuze’s juvenilia, see Faulkner (2002) and Van de Wiel (2008). 
5
 According to Deleuze’s biographer, François Dosse (2010), ‘his secondary thesis on Spinoza’, 
which would be published in 1968 as Spinoza and the Problem of Expression, ‘was practically 
finished in the late 1950s’ (p. 118); whilst Difference and Repetition reprises at various points lines of 
interpretation and inquiry that can already be seen expressed in historical studies published across the 
span of the two decades in question. 
 5 
 
historical stance espoused by many influential analytic philosophers at the highest 
pitch of that movement’s revolutionary fervour is quite alien to Deleuze, whatever 
aspersions he may have cast on a subjugation of philosophical creativity to the 
intellectual demands of an accurate scholarly representation of philosophy’s past. 
I will, as I have said, focus on the status of science in Deleuze’s early work in 
particular. I do this for three reasons. Firstly, although Deleuze clearly engages with 
material drawn from the natural and social sciences in this work, he fails to articulate 
any clear philosophy of science, or to reflect explicitly on the nature of science or of 
his engagement with it. In this respect, a study of the status of science in Deleuze’s 
early thought is in a position to make a contribution to our understanding of 
Deleuze’s philosophy, as it can help to reconstruct an aspect of Deleuze’s thought 
that is key to our understanding of this thought even though it remains implicit in 
Deleuze’s text. Secondly, and I will comment more on this below, there has been a 
tendency to read Deleuze’s later remarks concerning the nature of science and of its 
relation to philosophy back into his early work in a way which, I would suggest, is 
liable to lead to a neglect of the form these concerns take in Deleuze’s early 
philosophy itself. To read the work of the ’50s and ’60s as if it had been constructed 
with some foreknowledge of categories and distinctions only to be formulated 
several decades later strikes me as a recipe for misinterpretation and the detection of 
false patterns.
6
 A third reason for focusing on the early work: this work emerges out 
of a period of French philosophy in which questions pertaining to philosophy’s 
relation to the sciences were particularly alive and important for setting the general 
                                                 
6
 That said, it must be noted that this is precisely the sort of move that Deleuze himself makes in his 
own historical studies, which, as will be discussed in chapter 1, are indebted to the ‘synchronic’, 
structural approach to the study of philosophical systems proposed by Martial Guéroult. 
 6 
 
tone of philosophical discussion, something which makes Deleuze’s relative lack of 
explicit pronouncement on these issues at this time all the more intriguing.
7
  
Returning to the above formulation of this thesis’ guiding question, the term 
‘science’ also needs some clarification. First of all, when I say that I intend to 
investigate the role of science in Deleuze’s early work, I have in mind both particular 
fields of scientific research and ‘science’ as an epistemic ideal. (I will often use the 
term ‘scientificity’ to refer to the latter – a useful Gallicism in the present context.) I 
will thus be concerned with both how Deleuze seeks to orientate his philosophy in 
relation to particular sciences and their conceptual resources, and in relation to 
science as a potential model for the activity of philosophy itself. 
Secondly, I should clarify that while I will be particularly interested in the 
natural sciences (and in this connection occasionally with mathematics), as it is these 
that have tended to play the leading role in the family of readings of Deleuze’s 
philosophy that I will be concerned to criticise, I will also have occasion to discuss 
the role of the social sciences, particularly when considering the historical context 
into which Deleuze’s interventions were made. While this indicates that a 
particularly broad notion of science is in play here, I hope it will become apparent in 
what follows that, given the nature of discussions regarding the relation between 
philosophy and the social sciences in France in the mid-twentieth century, and 
particularly the notion of scientificity in play there, this usage is not unmanageably 
vague. 
In this study of Deleuze’s early thought, I will be particularly interested in 
Deleuze’s early metaphilosophy, his philosophy of philosophy. By Deleuze’s 
                                                 
7
 I will discuss this point in more detail in chapter 1. 
 7 
 
‘metaphilosophy’, I mean his second-order philosophical reflections and 
pronouncements about what philosophy is, its characteristic tasks, methods and aims, 
and its difference from other areas of intellectual activity. With reference to the last 
of these points, I will often speak of philosophy’s ‘specificity’, that is to say, that 
which is unique to philosophy and constitutes its difference from any other mode of 
intellectual activity. Its specificity in relation to science, in particular, will often be in 
question in what follows. 
Metaphilosophical reflections of this kind can be either descriptive or 
prescriptive, depending on whether one seeks to give an accurate description of how 
philosophical practice does in fact function or whether one is rather concerned to 
argue for how philosophy should be practiced. Generally speaking, in his early work, 
Deleuze’s metaphilosophical claims are prescriptive in character, as he speaks about 
philosophical practice in the manner of an ideologue laying down the terms of a bold 
new manifesto. However, there is at times a sense that Deleuze takes his remarks to 
also be of descriptive significance, since he seems to suggest that philosophy just is 
practiced in the manner that he prescribes when it is practiced without self-
deception.
8
 
‘Metaphilosophy’ is not a term that is indigenous to Deleuze’s corpus, and in 
utilising it here I am keenly aware that it may seem to imply a degree of separation, 
or a clear division of labour, between ‘first-order’ philosophising and ‘second-order’ 
                                                 
8
 It is noteworthy that in the 1991 work, What Is Philosophy?, where metaphilosophical 
considerations are explicitly in focus, Deleuze (writing with Guattari) takes a descriptive approach. 
Here, readings of various figures from the history of philosophy are presented in which it is suggested 
that the real philosophical significance of their work can only be made sense of in the context of the 
conception of philosophy articulated by Deleuze and Guattari themselves. There may well be some 
illuminating reason for this change of strategy on Deleuze’s part, but I will not pursue this line of 
inquiry here. 
 8 
 
reflection on the nature of philosophising that is not acknowledged by Deleuze 
himself. In his work, as in the work of many twentieth-century French thinkers, 
reflection of a ‘meta-philosophical’ character is simply part and parcel of what it 
means to do philosophy.
9
 If I make a point of making such a distinction here, then, it 
is in order to provide myself with the necessary terms in order to speak more clearly 
about the various components of Deleuze’s early project than he himself does. 
Although there is clearly a unity of mutual dependence amongst these components, 
Deleuze’s ontology, his metaphilosophy, his ethics can usefully be discussed 
separately – and doing so will help to show how these mutual dependencies function. 
If Deleuze’s metaphilosophy is of particular interest in thinking about the 
status of science in his early thought, this is because the question of the status of 
science in Deleuze’s philosophy has circulated around questions of his conception of 
philosophy, his conception of science and his understanding of their relation. 
Correlatively, it is by clarifying Deleuze’s understanding of the nature and 
specificity of philosophy in his early work that I hope to make clear that there is a 
meaningful discontinuity between philosophy and the sciences in that work. In order 
to understand what is at stake in defending such a position, it will be helpful to take a 
look at the way discussions of these questions have unfolded in the English-speaking 
secondary literature on Deleuze over the last few decades. 
 
                                                 
9
 This, I would suggest in passing, is one of the reasons ‘continental’ philosophy has struggled to form 
anything like a coherent disciplinary framework within which to pursue collective, cumulative 
research of the kind aspired to by many ‘analytic’ philosophers, the coherence of this would-be 
tradition lying instead primarily in a set of shared historical reference points. If the basic method and 
aims of philosophy are being constantly reassessed, it is difficult to establish the sort of ground-level 
background agreement required for a progressive research programme. In the conclusion to this thesis 
I will suggest that this is no bad thing. 
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1 ‘Scientism’ in Deleuze scholarship 
In the introductory essay to his 2010 edited collection on Deleuze and science, Peter 
Gaffney (2010) points to the existence of what he terms a ‘“scienticity” polemic’ (p. 
7) in contemporary Anglophone Deleuze scholarship. This debate is concerned with 
the status of science in Deleuze’s thought and the role of science in the development 
of his philosophy. The debate has been carried out, Gaffney (2010) states, between 
‘two divergent approaches in Deleuzian studies’ (p. 8). One, which he terms ‘the 
scientistic approach’, ‘compares Deleuze’s work to theories and discoveries 
advanced by contemporary “radical” science’; whilst the other, which he terms the 
‘critical approach’, ‘proceeds by drawing a line between physics and metaphysics’ 
(Gaffney 2010, pp. 8-9). While Gaffney is no doubt correct that such positions have 
been taken, the debate has not been all that polemical, insofar as each side has been 
fairly content to ignore the other and elaborate its own interpretation of Deleuze’s 
work without going into much detail regarding the faults it sees in the other 
approach. Within the oversimplified terms of this formulation of the opposing poles 
of the debate, the reading developed here is certainly ‘critical’, in that I will seek to 
show that a fairly clear line can be drawn in Deleuze’s early work between science 
and philosophy. I will not, however, simply ignore the claims of the so-called 
‘scientistic’ camp, but will endeavour to actively and explicitly clarify why they 
constitute a misreading of Deleuze’s early philosophical project, and consequently a 
misrepresentation of what Deleuze has to offer contemporary philosophical debates 
concerning the nature and role of philosophy, its distinctiveness and its relation to 
the sciences. 
 
 10 
 
1.1 A genealogy of the scientistic reading 
Whence this interpretative approach (which, for want of a better term, I will follow 
Gaffney in calling ‘scientistic’)?10 From early on in its development (which begins in 
dribs and drabs in the late ’80s), Anglophone Deleuze scholarship has had a notable 
interest in Deleuze’s engagements with the sciences. Already in the early ’90s, Brian 
Massumi (1992, e.g. p. 58 ff.), in a commentary on Deleuze and Guattari’s 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia, had used conceptual resources drawn from 
thermodynamics in order to elucidate certain aspects of the philosophical edifice 
constructed in those works. This would prove an increasingly popular focus for 
commentators on Deleuze’s (and Deleuze and Guattari’s) work in the years to come. 
Beginning in earnest in the mid-’90s, there is an upsurge of interest (for which the 
University of Warwick was itself an important hub, due in large part to the influence 
of Warwick philosophers Nick Land (2011) and Keith Ansell Pearson (1999)) in 
reading Deleuze’s philosophy in relation to emerging technologies and ‘cybernetic 
culture’, as well as evolutionary biology and its philosophical significance.   
 These early Anglophone readings spawned a range of more or less explicitly 
articulated attitudes regarding the relation between philosophy and science in 
Deleuze’s thought. Under the influence of Land’s ‘cyberpunk’-inspired 
Deleuzianism, a minority of commentators adopt the view that Deleuze’s anti-
humanism can be productively assimilated to the sort of post-Darwinian 
                                                 
10
 I am a little squeamish about using the term ‘scientism’ in this context, since this term’s frequent 
rhetorical use as a term of abuse has leant it the air of a rhetorical cheap shot. At the same time, it may 
show itself to be an appropriate term in the present context all the same, since my criticism of 
‘scientistic’ readings of Deleuze will be that, regardless of any intentions to the contrary, they tend to 
lose sight of the difference between philosophy and science in Deleuze’s thought – to the detriment of 
philosophy. 
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philosophical naturalism defended in the work of cognitivist philosophers of mind 
like Daniel Dennett.
11
 This is not the most common approach, however, and 
alternatively Deleuze will be read as the architect of ‘a novel “philosophical 
biology”’ – a contribution to a ‘tradition […] of modern biophilosophy’ – which 
aims both to contribute to articulating the philosophical underpinnings of 
‘contemporary developments in neo-Darwinian and post-Darwinian paradigms […] 
in biology’ and to developing ‘an “ethological” ethics’ capable of meeting ‘the 
challenge of biological nihilism’ with which neo-Darwinian evolutionary biology 
purportedly threatens us (Ansell Pearson 1997a, p. 17; 1999, pp. 1, 4, 9-10).   
On this reading, although Deleuze is indeed seen to be engaging with 
evolutionary biology and to be concerned to draw out its significance, this 
relationship is in no way unidirectional: as much as ‘biophilosophy’ draws its 
problematic from developments in biology and their philosophical and sociocultural 
impact, it is expected to force the science of biology itself to reassess its own 
theoretical orientation. For example, Ansell Pearson (1997b) argues that Deleuze can 
help show that the move in (then) ‘contemporary biology’ from ‘the genetic 
reductionism of ultra-Darwinism’ to ‘organismic holism in complexity theory’, 
while in some respects a welcome one, is not sufficient: a further move is needed to 
a model of ‘the flows, intensities and pre-vital singularities of pre-stratified, non-
organic life’ (p. 186). In addition, the ethical dimension of the Deleuzian project is 
                                                 
11
 See Welchman (1997), who suggests that a ‘new alliance between Deleuze’s machinic thinking and 
Anglo-American analytic engineering philosophy’ is discernible (p. 225). Welchman is amongst the 
only scholars to so explicitly attribute to Deleuze a philosophical naturalism of a sort recognisable to 
contemporary analytic philosophers. In this respect, his reading avoids many of the difficulties 
through which theorists such as Protevi will put themselves in trying to establish an affinity without 
identity between Deleuze and such positions. Nonetheless, as I will go on to show in the course of this 
thesis, such a reading is ultimately hard to sustain. 
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taken to be external to the concerns of biological science, even if scientific 
developments play a key role in inducing the nihilistic cultural conditions to which 
such an ethics is intended as a response. Thus, however intimate the envisaged 
interaction between philosophy and biology at the heart of Deleuze’s biophilosophy, 
it is emphasised that his work remains in a philosophical (and thus not a scientific) 
register. Indeed, ‘[i]t is […] incumbent upon [Deleuzian] philosophy to philosophize 
in the most radical manner conceivable, doing violence to the mind by breaking both 
with the natural bent of the intellect and with habits of scientific praxis’ (Ansell 
Pearson 1997a, p. 2 [my emphasis]). In the biophilosophical encounter between 
biology and philosophy, it is ‘biological thinking’ which is ‘in the service of a 
philosophy of internal difference’ (Ansell Pearson 1997b, p. 183 [my emphasis]). 
A related exegetical current emerging already at this time in early 
Anglophone Deleuze scholarship aligns Deleuze with some form of materialism. It 
is interesting to note that, in this context, although Deleuze’s purported materialism 
is associated with the sciences, this is often done in a way which explicitly distances 
him from ‘the seemingly reductive materialisms of cybernetics’ noted above 
(Mullarkey 1997, p. 439).
12
 Rather, what these commentators discern in Deleuze is a 
reconceptualisation of ‘matter’ as active and self-organising – as in some sense 
living.
13
 At the heart of this pananimist (one might equally say vitalist) materialism 
                                                 
12
 Indeed, if philosophical naturalism implies ‘that even the human is reducible to the natural realm – 
or rather, that it is reducible to the scientific and materialist view of the natural realm’, then ‘Deleuze 
could not be called a naturalist on this score’ (Mullarkey 1997, p. 448). 
13
 It is important to note that my characterisation of a biophilosophical current and a pananimist 
current in early Anglophone Deleuze scholarship are idealisations from a more mixed reality. Thus, 
Ansell Pearson (1997a) too claims that ‘[t]hinking “machinically” involves showing the artificial and 
arbitrary nature of the determination of boundaries and borders between living systems and material 
forms’ (p. 17). 
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are debates in the philosophy of science concerning the proper relations between 
scientific theories about different levels or scales of reality (that is, debates about 
reductionism). Particularly central here is the idea that the flourishing of complexity 
science and the recognition of the importance of complex systems and emergence 
should urge a reassessment of the notion of reduction as a key mechanism of 
scientific explanation, or as a way to understand the relations between the sciences. 
Deleuze’s materialism will be seen as contributing to thinking through the 
conceptual groundwork of a coherent anti-reductionist metaphysics of the diverse 
domains of reality handled by scientific theories (‘emergence’ will prove to be a key 
term of art in this connection). 
Crucially, amongst those who attribute this sort of pananimist materialism to 
Deleuze is Manuel DeLanda, who will play a key role in the next phase of thinking 
about the relation between philosophy and science in Anglophone Deleuze 
scholarship. In ‘Immanence and Transcendence in the Genesis of Form’, DeLanda 
(1997) attributes to Deleuze a ‘rigorous philosophy of physics’ – or what he also 
refers to as a ‘philosophical physics’ – capable of providing ‘the basis for a 
renovated, reinvigorated materialism’ (p. 513).   
The seed DeLanda (1997) plants in the minds of subsequent Deleuze scholars 
is the idea that if it can be shown that ‘some basic ideas in [Deleuze’s philosophy] 
cohere rather well with the relevant scientific findings’ (p. 513), then these findings 
might be thought to support Deleuze’s philosophical theorising – at the same time as 
the latter could be taken to constitute an elaboration of the philosophical significance 
of this scientific work. In this way, DeLanda’s ‘philosophical physics’ begins to 
complicate and compromise the autonomy of philosophy in relation to the scientific 
materials with which it engages, an autonomy that had still been evident in Ansell 
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Pearson’s ‘philosophical biology’. DeLanda proposes an interpretative approach in 
which, at the same time as Deleuze’s engagements with the sciences are increasingly 
seen to be central to a clear and coherent exposition of his thought, the role of 
philosophy in relation to science in that thought will become confused and hard to 
discern. 
An important event in the development of the family of readings I am 
interested in here is the publication in 2002 of DeLanda’s Intensive Science and 
Virtual Philosophy. In this work, DeLanda (2002) offers a ‘reconstruction’ of 
Deleuze’s philosophy as a non-essentialist ontology (p. 2),14 where the rejection of 
essentialism is seen to be motivated by the nature of physical reality as described by 
complexity science.
15
 Deleuze’s ontology, as reconstructed by DeLanda (2002), is a 
species of scientific realism, in the sense that it grants to the entities posited by our 
currently most successful scientific theories ‘full autonomy from the human mind, 
disregarding the difference between the observable and the unobservable’ (p. 2).16 
                                                 
14
 ‘Ontology’ is understood here in the Quinean sense of the ‘set of entities [one] assumes to exist in 
reality, the types of entities [one] is committed to assert actually exist’ (DeLanda 2002, p. 2). This is 
thus not the Heideggerian sense of ‘ontology’, which is precisely the study of what it means to be and 
not the determination of what there is. In chapter 4 of this thesis, I will have occasion to argue that it 
is because of Deleuze’s ‘ontology’ (in the Heideggerian sense) that he has no fixed ‘ontological 
commitments’ (in the Quinean-DeLandian sense). 
15
 Apparent here is the influence of Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers’ (1986, pp. 290-293) earlier 
remarks to the effect that Deleuze should be counted as an important philosophical precursor to the 
development of the scientific field of nonlinear thermodynamics, having anticipated much of the 
philosophical significance of such changes in our understanding of physical reality. I will return to 
these remarks in chapter 3. 
16
 This scientific realism is contrasted with a naïve realism that would ‘grant to the objects of 
everyday experience a mind-independent existence, but remain unconvinced that theoretical entities 
[…] possess such an ontological autonomy’; as it is with the idealist view that ‘reality has no 
existence independently from the human mind’ (DeLanda 2002, p. 2). 
 15 
 
Furthermore, the mind-independent reality it describes does not conform to the 
constraints of ‘essentialism’ or ‘typological thinking’, understanding individuation 
and the genesis of form instead in terms of ‘dynamic processes’ and their ‘abstract 
(or rather virtual) structure’ (DeLanda 2002, p. 3 [original emphasis]). Such 
processes and structures are ‘what gives objects their identity and what preserves this 
identity through time’ (DeLanda 2002, p. 3). 
Throughout his discussion, DeLanda builds on Deleuze’s appeals to 
conceptual resources drawn from mathematics and physical theory, specifically 
differential calculus and dynamic systems theory. Furthermore, DeLanda heavily 
foregrounds this aspect of his own presentation, suggesting that a rigorous 
explication of Deleuze’s concepts requires such an appeal to scientific and 
mathematical concepts and theories. DeLanda (2002) claims, in addition, that this 
essential engagement with the sciences – along with his purported scientific realism 
– is indicative of the fact that Deleuze takes the sciences (indeed, especially the hard 
sciences) seriously in a way that ‘the “post-modern” tradition’ with which he is often 
associated has, according to DeLanda, refused to do (p. 1). 
DeLanda’s work encourages the view that Deleuze’s philosophy displays an 
essential complicity with specific twentieth-century developments in the natural 
sciences. On this point, DeLanda and those sympathetic to his reading of Deleuze 
often take their lead from a remark made by Deleuze in an interview with the 
philosopher Arnaud Villani, conducted in 1981 and subsequently published as an 
appendix to Villani’s 1999 book on Deleuze, La Guêpe et l’orchidée. Deleuze’s 
notorious remark is that ‘modern science has not found its metaphysics, the 
metaphysics it needs’, and that ‘it is that metaphysics that interests me’ (Deleuze and 
Villani 2007, p. 41). This is what DeLanda’s reconstruction of Deleuzian ‘ontology’ 
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in the terms of mathematics and physical theory is supposed to have confirmed, then: 
that Deleuze’s project is indeed one of articulating the metaphysics of contemporary 
science.
17
 
 
1.2 The scientistic reading’s metaphilosophical deficit 
There are, I would suggest, problems with this approach, and these problems concern 
the underdevelopment of ideas pertaining to the relation between philosophy and 
science in DeLanda’s reading.   
DeLanda (2002) speaks of a ‘philosophical transformation’ (p. 32 [original 
emphasis]) of mathematical and scientific concepts in Deleuze’s work, through 
which the latter come ‘to be detached from their original context’ (p. 172).18 A 
proper understanding of the need for and nature of such a transformation is going to 
depend upon how the difference between philosophy and science is understood. But 
it is on precisely this point that DeLanda’s exposition becomes unclear. This is not to 
say that DeLanda evades the issue entirely. He does gesture towards a solution. But 
he does so in a way that is not altogether satisfactory, either within the context of his 
own account or (as I will show in subsequent chapters) as a reading of Deleuze’s 
early treatment of this issue.
19
 
                                                 
17
 DeLanda sets his reading of Deleuze explicitly in the context of this remark in an interview with 
Peter Gaffney (DeLanda and Gaffney 2010, p. 325). 
18
 I will have occasion to examine in more detail what sense can be made of the notion of a 
philosophical transformation of scientific concepts in Deleuze’s thought in chapter 3, where my 
suggestion will be that a proper understanding of Deleuze’s handling of scientific concepts in fact 
undermines DeLanda’s scientistic reading. 
19
 Whilst DeLanda does not specify that his presentation of Deleuze’s ontology should be restricted to 
the philosopher’s ‘early’ work (in the sense in which I am using that periodisation), it is nonetheless 
legitimate to require that his presentation be adequate as a reading of that period of Deleuze’s work, 
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On those few occasions when DeLanda (2002) gestures towards some 
account of philosophy’s distinctive task, he generally defaults to cursory references 
to Deleuze and Guattari’s final collaborative work, What Is Philosophy?, from which 
he draws the conclusion that philosophy’s task is to ‘make the virtual intelligible’ (p. 
174 [original emphasis]). Philosophy is distinguished from science by its 
‘constructivist method’ (DeLanda 2002, p. 115), using which it moves ‘from 
qualities and extensities, to the intensive processes which produce them, and from 
there to the virtual’ (p. 68). Science, on the other hand, moves ‘in the opposite 
direction’, ‘concentrat[ing] on the final product [i.e. qualities and extensities], or at 
best on the process of actualization but always in the direction of the final product’ 
(DeLanda 2002, pp. 67-68). Hence, the ‘transformation’ of scientific concepts into 
philosophical concepts should be understood as a matter of ‘get[ting] rid of any trace 
of actuality that these concepts may still bear despite their already highly abstract 
nature’ (DeLanda 2002, p. 71). 
DeLanda is far from clear on how this distinctively philosophical method is 
to be understood. He makes some suggestive remarks (with reference to Logic of 
Sense) about the philosopher taking on the role of what Deleuze refers to in 
Difference and Repetition as the précurseur sombre, which is involved in the 
actualisation of a system, but such comments remain, in my view, merely suggestive 
in the absence of a fuller cashing out by DeLanda of how exactly the philosopher’s 
intellectual labour might bear such a role. Perhaps more concretely, DeLanda (2002) 
will also point to an ‘empiricism of the virtual’ (p. 78), which would consist in 
‘locat[ing] those areas of the world where the virtual is still expressed [namely, far-
                                                                                                                                          
since DeLanda does claim (2002, p. 6) that his account is mainly drawn from the framework outlined 
in that period. 
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from-equilibrium systems], and us[ing] the unactualized tendencies and capacities 
one discovers there as sources of insight into the nature of virtual multiplicities’ (p. 
67). (Here, I would contend that DeLanda falls prey to the same criticism to be 
outlined below, namely that he fails to make clear why such an ‘empiricism’ is a 
philosophical task rather than one already being carried out by complexity science.) 
Even setting aside the question of precisely how this ‘method’ is to be 
understood, a question remains as to how adequately this attempt at defining the 
specificity of philosophy in relation to science fits with DeLanda’s own exposition 
of Deleuze’s ontology. The issue is that if DeLanda’s account of the role of scientific 
and mathematical conceptual resources in the articulation of Deleuze’s philosophical 
concepts demonstrates anything, it is, I would argue, just how far these scientific 
concepts go towards doing the intended philosophical work on their own. That is to 
say, DeLanda does such a good job of articulating a plausibly Deleuzian ontology 
using scientific concepts, that it is easy to be left wondering whether much by way of 
‘transformation’ can plausibly be said to have taken place. Is DeLanda’s work a 
particularly clear and illuminating piece of popular science writing? No doubt these 
scientific concepts and conclusions are translated into a Deleuzian vocabulary, but 
they exhibit little by way of more substantive conceptual transformation of the sort 
that might be expected to result from the transport of these concepts into a 
philosophical register. Philosophy’s task, which is supposed to distinguish it from 
the sciences, is supposed to be, as I have noted, to make the virtual intelligible. But 
DeLanda’s own presentation seems to demonstrate that it is the scientific study of 
nonlinear, far-from-equilibrium dynamic systems that provides the conceptual 
resources to achieve such intelligibility. 
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I do not at all mean to suggest that Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy 
is a work devoid of specifically philosophical merit. However, where DeLanda is 
most clearly going beyond an exegesis of the conceptual underpinnings of 
complexity science is in his positioning of Deleuze within contemporary debates in 
the philosophy of science, in particular those debates concerning the importance of 
modal notions for scientific explanation. These aspects of DeLanda’s work serve not 
so much to clarify how scientific notions are translated into a philosophical context, 
as to make a more traditional contribution to the interpretation of the philosophical 
significance of scientific notions. This is philosophy of science firmly in the 
objective genitive. Furthermore, these are the passages where it is least plausible that 
what DeLanda is offering is a reading of Deleuze’s texts, as it is far from clear that 
Deleuze’s own discussions of modality are meant as a contribution to debates 
concerning realism about modal structure in scientific explanation.    
I also do not mean to say that DeLanda’s work is uninformative as a 
clarification of some of Deleuze’s key concepts. On the contrary, it is often 
extremely helpful in this regard. What it fails to clarify, however, is what exactly is 
going on in Deleuze’s philosophy which might be specifically philosophical, which 
is to say, which might add something to the fabric of our intellectual lives which is 
not already provided by the work of the various scientific fields in which complex 
systems of various kinds are studied. 
That DeLanda falls short on this question is perhaps unsurprising given his 
scepticism towards the question itself. DeLanda (2002, pp. 178-180) will distance 
himself from what he sees as the lingering ‘positivism’ of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
discussion of science in What Is Philosophy?, expressing instead his preference for 
the distinction developed in A Thousand Plateaus between ‘royal’ and ‘minor’ 
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science. This formulation, as he himself notes, ‘makes the distinction which [What Is 
Philosophy?] establishes between science and philosophy pass right through the 
middle of science itself’ (DeLanda 2002, p. 180). This displacement of the 
distinction between philosophy and science to within science itself would seem to 
make apparent the artificiality of the gesture towards a differentiation between 
philosophy and science made elsewhere in DeLanda’s work. And in fact, where he 
does distinguish philosophy from science it is often only from ‘linear’, ‘classical’ 
science – the question remains as to whether philosophy is simply to be identified 
with those areas of scientific research where ‘the virtual’ manifests itself, or whether 
some further distinction can be made.
20
  
My suspicion is that ultimately DeLanda’s approach is to see philosophy as 
continuous with science, or at least with certain sciences or certain research 
programmes within the sciences (such a position is indeed strongly suggested by the 
title of DeLanda 2004).
21
 I doubt, however, whether it is plausible to construe 
Deleuze as adopting such a position, for reasons that will be explored in the course 
of subsequent chapters. 
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 Similar manoeuvring is made by Isabelle Stengers (2010), who seems to suggest that a determinate 
boundary between philosophy and science in Deleuze’s work can only be drawn insofar as the science 
in question is ‘royal’ rather than ‘minor’ science. 
21
 DeLanda seems then to end up attributing to Deleuze the sort of position David Papineau (2009, 
§2.1) terms ‘methodological naturalism’, according to which ‘philosophy and science [are seen] as 
engaged in essentially the same enterprise, pursuing similar ends and using similar methods’. I take it 
this is also the sort of view Peter Gaffney (2010) has in mind when he speaks, apropos the sort of 
reading of Deleuze articulated by DeLanda and Protevi, of a ‘general merger of metaphysics and 
theoretical science’ (p. 9). See also Holdsworth (2006). 
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The most outspoken and explicit defender of a broadly ‘DeLandian’ reading 
of Deleuze in the wake of DeLanda’s landmark work has been John Protevi.22 In 
their work on Deleuze and Geophilosophy, Protevi and co-author Mark Bonta (2004) 
claim that ‘[i]n his solo works, Deleuze strives to present a basic ontology or 
metaphysics adequate to contemporary physics and mathematics’ (p. 12). Here, 
contemporary physics and mathematics are explicitly understood in terms of 
‘complexity science’, where this is ‘a catchall phrase’ for scientific fields concerned 
with non-linear dynamics, complex adaptive systems, non-equilibrium 
thermodynamics, and related fields (Protevi and Bonta 2004, pp. 191-192 n. 2). 
Deleuze is ‘the Kant of our time’, in the sense that ‘[j]ust as Kant’s Critiques were in 
a sense the epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, and aesthetics for a world of 
Euclidean space, Aristotelian time, and Newtonian physics, Deleuze provides the 
                                                 
22
 Dorothea Olkowski (2007) has defended a related view, claiming – from within a perspective 
strongly influenced by ‘[m]id to late twentieth-century French theory’ – that the ‘new view of 
physical reality’ asserted by certain developments in twentieth-century physics and mathematics 
demands a new ‘ontology and [philosophical] methodology’ (pp. 1-2). However, while Deleuze is 
clearly an influence on her view, she suggests that the position she articulates constitutes ‘a critique of 
the limits of the particular formalist, mathematical structure used by Deleuze’ to this end, namely ‘the 
manifold of continuous space-time of dynamical systems theory’ (Olkowski 2007, p. 1). For this 
reason, I will not focus here on her position. See also Olkowski (2012).  
Miguel de Beistegui (2004) also offers a reading of Deleuze’s philosophy which bears some 
relation to that of DeLanda and Protevi, insofar as he takes Deleuze’s philosophy to have a strong 
affinity with the developments of complexity science (and other twentieth-century developments in 
the physical sciences), and indeed to be an exploration of the ontological ramifications of ‘the way in 
which twentieth-century physics has radically altered the metaphysical conception of nature inherited 
from Greek antiquity […] and modernity’ (p. 191). However, de Beistegui’s reading is distinguished 
from those of DeLanda and Protevi by his acknowledgement of the Heideggerian resonances of 
Deleuze’s notion of ‘ontology’, neglected by DeLanda’s Quinean conception of ontology. As a 
consequence, de Beistegui’s reading is more awake to the question of how Deleuze’s philosophical 
engagements with the sciences are to be distinguished from these sciences themselves. I will come 
back to the importance of these Heideggerian themes in Deleuze’s early work in chapter 4. 
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philosophical concepts that make sense of our world of fragmented space […], 
twisted time […], and the non-linear effects of far-from-equilibrium 
thermodynamics’ (Protevi and Bonta 2004, pp. vii-viii).  
What is interesting about the new picture of physical reality foregrounded by 
complexity science research, according to Protevi and Bonta, is that it recognises that 
‘nonlinear’, ‘far-from-equilibrium’ systems are far more abundant than ‘linear’ or 
‘steady-state’ systems. In effect, as is often the case with theory succession in the 
sciences, the cases which were taken as the rule to which all cases ought ideally to be 
assimilated have come to be recognised as only a particular and indeed reasonably 
exceptional instance: ‘today linearity or equilibrium is often seen as a special case 
and nonlinearity and far-from-equilibrium systems the majority of cases’ (Protevi 
and Bonta 2004, p. 195 n. 10). This has implications, Protevi and Bonta assert, for 
what counts as reasonable expectations regarding our capacity to predict the 
behaviour of physical systems (since nonlinear systems are for various practical and 
principled reasons resistant to exact prediction), as well as for our understanding of 
the status of ‘emergent’ phenomena and of the objective reality of time. These 
developments are understood to be ‘the scientific endeavors whose results prompted 
Deleuze’ to formulate ‘his ontology’ (Protevi and Bonta 2004, p. 16). 
In more recent work, Protevi (2013) has reiterated this view of Deleuze ‘as 
providing a metaphysics of contemporary science’, citing directly Deleuze’s ‘very 
clear self-description’ from the 1981 interview noted above (p. 1).23 Deleuze, he 
                                                 
23
 Where DeLanda (2002) emphasises that his is a reconstructive reading of Deleuze and therefore 
takes some defensive distance from the letter of Deleuze’s texts in putting so strong an emphasis on 
their use of mathematical and scientific conceptual resources, Protevi (2013) is explicit that he takes 
the development of the metaphysics of contemporary science to be the project ‘Deleuze in fact sees 
himself’ as conducting (p. 1). 
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argues, ‘offers us a naturalist ontology that maps well onto wide-ranging current 
research projects that use nonlinear dynamic systems modeling’ (Protevi 2013, p. 
1).
24
 Such an ontology, Protevi (2013) states, insofar as it ‘can help us think of 
individuation’ (p. 1) in a certain way, ‘helps us see some of the philosophical 
significance’ (p. 4) of key ideas employed in modelling non-linear dynamic systems, 
systems that are now the object of study of all manner of ‘scientific fields […], from 
geomorphology and meteorology in the earth sciences to ecology and genomics in 
the life sciences, economics and sociology in the social sciences, and neurodynamics 
and developmental biomechanics in the cognitive sciences’ (p. 1). 
What starts to become clear in these descriptions by Protevi (2013) of the 
‘utility’ (p. 1) of Deleuze’s philosophy is that what remains obscure in Protevi’s 
approach is what role philosophy is playing in the interaction between science and 
philosophy envisaged here. Thus, Protevi effectively inherits a problem I have 
already noted in DeLanda’s reading. At one point, Protevi (2013, p. 12) asks: ‘do 
working scientists need to know the Deleuzian scheme to understand the ontology of 
models?’ His answer, perhaps surprising given his allusion to Deleuze’s notion of 
the metaphysics contemporary science needs, is: ‘Of course they do not’ (Protevi 
2013, p. 12). He is unwilling to acknowledge a deficit of knowledge or 
understanding (or whatever one might take philosophy to contribute) on the part of 
the scientist regarding the nature of her own conceptual, methodological and 
technical apparatus – a deficit for which it might have been thought that Deleuze’s 
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 ‘Naturalism’ is here understood as primarily an ‘antihumanist’ position, ‘in the Spinozist sense of 
[…] refusing a special status to human beings’ (Protevi 2013, p. 213 n. 2). I will have reason to return 
to and to scrutinise the notion of naturalism as it applies to Deleuze’s thought in chapter 4 of this 
thesis. 
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philosophy was to compensate. The philosopher learns from the scientist (and not 
least, the historian of philosophy finds in science a helpful hermeneutic framework 
for making sense of Deleuze’s texts), but it is not clear that Protevi sees any central 
role for the reverse procedure.  
Trying to discern the role of the philosopher in the work of the sciences in his 
reading of Deleuze, one could perhaps attribute to Protevi the view that Deleuze’s 
philosophy of complexity science provides an amenable medium for the 
dissemination of the use of dynamic systems modelling techniques into new 
domains, particularly in the social sciences. Thus Deleuze’s ‘ontology’ of 
complexity science would provide a basic, non-domain-specific framework from 
which new domains could trace the lines of an approach with ramifications for their 
own field. I find this suggestion a little strained, however, as it is unclear why a 
terminological detour through Deleuze’s baroque and (for the purposes of the 
scientist) hopelessly general and imprecise conceptual apparatus should be a helpful 
tool for the transport of concepts and techniques from one scientific field to another. 
The spread of useful modelling techniques and conceptual innovations from one 
scientific field to another, and the hybridisation of fields this is wont to generate, 
seems to unfold quite without the need for philosophical supervision or assistance – 
as Protevi himself admits in his above-quoted remarks. The scientist does not need 
the philosopher to comprehend her own activity. 
What then is the role of philosophy here? What does philosophy add to what 
the sciences in question are already doing? Protevi suggests, as I have shown, that 
Deleuze’s philosophy helps us to extract from the general methodological approach 
underlying the interdisciplinary research programme of complexity science the 
latter’s philosophical significance. Given that Protevi does not take this to be 
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primarily for the scientist’s benefit, is this to be understood as an exercise in granting 
philosophers access to material that is important for their own activities? That is, is 
the value of Deleuze’s philosophy that it translates complexity science into a 
language philosophers can understand? This does not seem to be the case, because 
Protevi, building on DeLanda’s approach, is just as much concerned to use the 
language of complexity science as an interpretative frame through which to 
understand Deleuze’s philosophical concepts as he is to elucidate the philosophical 
significance of complexity science in the language of Deleuzian philosophy. It seems 
that Deleuze’s idiosyncratic terminology and style is no more readily accessible a 
medium than the terminology of the complexity sciences themselves. 
What DeLanda, Protevi and other proponents of the scientistic reading of 
Deleuze seem to struggle to articulate, then, is the nature of philosophy as Deleuze 
conceives it, and the specificity of philosophy’s contribution to our intellectual 
lives.
25
 Other than in some of DeLanda’s remarks, these commentators seem reticent 
in attributing to Deleuze the view that philosophy collapses into science. Such a view 
would seem difficult to sustain given Deleuze’s many strident proclamations of his 
own status as philosopher. And yet, this reading leaves philosophy’s distinctive 
contribution to an encounter between philosophy and science, supposedly at the heart 
of Deleuze’s philosophical project, unclear. In this thesis, I will present an account of 
                                                 
25
 For a couple of recent examples of this tendency to lose track of the difference between philosophy 
and the sciences in Deleuze’s work, see Gangle (2014) and Calamari (2015). Éric Alliez, on the other 
hand, explicitly argues (2011; 2013) that the ‘transdisciplinarity’ of Deleuze’s thought leads to an exit 
from philosophy, although the resulting notion of a post-philosophical ontology is not very clearly 
articulated. Alliez’s conclusions are not in conflict with the main thrust of the argument of the present 
thesis, however, insofar as he identifies Deleuze’s collaborative work with Guattari as the site of this 
post-philosophical transdisciplinarity, in contrast to the persistence of disciplinary philosophy in 
Deleuze’s earlier writings. 
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Deleuze’s metaphilosophy that allows us to get a clearer view of the relative statuses 
and positions of philosophy and science in Deleuze’s early thought. In doing so, I 
hope not only to correct the metaphilosophical deficit in the scientistic reading, but 
to show that a plausible non-scientistic account of Deleuze’s early metaphilosophy 
can be formulated. 
In seeking to clarify what sort of relation between philosophy and science is 
supposed to obtain in Deleuze’s thought, and what distinctive role, if any, philosophy 
is supposed to be playing, commentators are more often than not led to Deleuze and 
Guattari’s final jointly authored work, What Is Philosophy? (1991). In this text, 
Deleuze and his co-author are explicitly concerned with the differences between 
philosophy, science and art. On this basis, the separation of philosophy and science 
in Deleuze’s work is emphasised, with the consequence that the attribution to 
Deleuze of anything like a Quinean collapse of the distinction between philosophy 
and the empirical sciences (of the sort found in many defenders of so-called 
‘methodological naturalism’ in contemporary analytic philosophy) is strongly 
disavowed. Alternatively, where something like a collapse of philosophy into science 
is indeed contemplated, commentators might appeal to Deleuze and Guattari’s 
discussion of ‘royal’ and ‘nomad’ science in A Thousand Plateaus, identifying 
philosophy and science only on the condition that it is a ‘nomad’ or ‘minor’ science. 
I have noted both these approaches in DeLanda’s work (as well as that of Isabelle 
Stengers). 
Such an approach displays a problematic lack of concern for periodisation. It 
cannot simply be assumed that conclusions or ideas in the philosophy of science or 
in metaphilosophy that Deleuze formulates in the 1980s and ’90s, and what is more 
in collaboration with a co-author (Félix Guattari), are representative of an attitude 
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under which Deleuze is already operating in the ’50s and ’60s (prior to ever having 
met Guattari). This sort of retrospective reading is, unfortunately, a general tendency 
in Deleuze scholarship: it is seemingly more common for scholars to endeavour to 
treat Deleuze’s corpus as a more or less unified or unifiable whole, even to attribute 
to him positions which are composited from remarks made at various different stages 
of his work, than it is to see detailed studies of particular texts or periods of his 
thought. I find it hard to see how such an approach can be justified, and I will 
attempt to avoid the production of such ahistorical chimeras in what follows.
26
 
 
1.3 Critical readings 
The present study is not the first to take a critical stance towards scientistic readings 
of Deleuze’s work. However, it aims to work through these criticisms in a greater 
degree of detail than has been attempted elsewhere, and, in the process, to develop a 
distinctive reading of Deleuze’s early philosophy. 
 Amongst other commentators who have discussed philosophy and science in 
Deleuze from a non-scientistic perspective, James Williams’ work should be noted. 
Williams (2006) criticises DeLanda’s reading of Deleuze for ‘over-stressing the link 
between Deleuze and a particular science’, and ‘fus[ing] philosophical and scientific 
explanation’ (p. 99). This is a consequence of DeLanda’s inattentiveness to the 
‘critical stance with respect to scientific methods and theories’ that Williams (2006) 
claims to observe in Deleuze’s work, a stance which ‘allows for change in scientific 
                                                 
26
 This is not to say that an attempt to discern continuities in Deleuze’s work is wholly illegitimate; 
only that reading backwards from Deleuze’s later works to his earlier works in search of such 
continuities has its risks. In the conclusion, I will comment on possible continuities between 
Deleuze’s early and later work, but I will seek to do so on the basis of an analysis of the early work 
that does not rely on this sort of retrospective projection. 
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theories, but also – and more importantly – for scepticism with respect to the latest 
science and an awareness of the implications of earlier failures’ (p. 100). The 
problem, in effect, is that DeLanda’s reading binds the fate of Deleuze’s philosophy 
to the fate of specific, fallible empirical theories in a way which, according to 
Williams, misunderstands the intended status of Deleuze’s claims as transcendental 
claims.
27
 Williams’ criticisms are apposite to the argument put forward in the present 
thesis, which is generally in keeping with the spirit of Williams’ remarks and will 
indeed appeal in places to a similar line of argument to that offered by Williams. 
Williams’ argument is made, however, in a brief article and in the context of a 
comparative study of Deleuze and Gaston Bachelard on the nature of theory change 
in the sciences. My argument will seek to build on the arguments and ideas Williams 
puts forward and explore the difficulties with the scientistic reading in more detail. 
In the process, I will develop a reading of Deleuze’s philosophy which diverges on 
certain key issues from that offered in various works by Williams. 
 Also worthy of note is Todd May’s work. First of all, May (2005, p. 239) is 
one of the only commentators of whom I am aware to note the danger of 
misinterpretation that lies in using the conception of science developed in What Is 
Philosophy? as a lens through which to view Deleuze’s earlier references to science. 
The reason this would be a mistake, May (2005) argues, is that, in the latter, Deleuze 
‘is not offering us a view of science that either conforms to or confirms his own 
philosophical project’, but rather ‘appropriating and often reworking scientific 
themes for his own philosophical purpose’ (p. 239). For Deleuze, May continues: 
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 In a 2010 interview with Peter Gaffney, DeLanda acknowledges this consequence of Williams’ 
reading, although he does little to satisfactorily respond to it (DeLanda and Gaffney 2010, pp. 328-
331). 
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Philosophy is a project distinct from science.  Its goal is neither to clarify science 
nor to offer it conceptual foundation. Science’s role is neither to provide evidence 
for philosophy nor to illustrate it. 
(May 2005, p. 254) 
 
If Deleuze discerns in science resources relevant to his own project, May (2005) 
suggest, this is because ‘both science and philosophy concern the virtual’, although 
they do so in divergent ways (p. 254). However, despite his earlier warnings against 
falling back on the account of science given in What Is Philosophy? in order to 
explain Deleuze’s appeals to scientific concepts in his early work, May (2005, p. 251 
ff.) ultimately falls back on precisely such a move in his attempt to make sense of 
Deleuze’s use of these resources. While the argument pursued in this thesis will be 
generally in step with May’s approach, I hope to offer a more satisfying account of 
what is going on in Deleuze’s early work when he appears to rely on specific 
conceptual developments in the sciences. 
 
2 ‘Deleuzian’ history of philosophy and anachronism 
As a reading of Deleuze, the scientism (inadvertent or not) of Protevi and DeLanda 
is marked by anachronism, in the sense that it attributes to the early Deleuze 
concerns and motivations alien to his own philosophical context. This is because the 
formulation of such a reading has been motivated, in large part, by conflicts quite 
alien to the philosophical field of postwar Paris. The idea of a scientistic Deleuze is, 
I would suggest, best understood as the product of those theoretical (but also, more 
broadly, institutional and ‘academico-political’) conflicts arising between 
scientifically-minded rationalists and so-called ‘postmodern’ cultural relativists in 
English-speaking (particularly US) academia in the 1990s. (More recently, as I will 
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explore in more detail in the conclusion of this thesis, it has played a role in the 
changing tides of intellectual fashion amongst Anglophone ‘continental’ 
philosophers.) Deleuze is presented as a ‘third way’: an unrepentant scientific realist 
at the heart of ‘post-structuralism’. In DeLanda’s work this is quite explicit (2002, 
pp. 1-2), but I think it is plausible to suggest that these sorts of institutional pressures 
have played an important role in suring up the influence of this kind of reading more 
generally.  
That Deleuze scholarship should have become an arena in which this conflict 
plays out is explained by the importance of the Anglophone reception of mid-
twentieth-century French philosophy (what would come to be known as ‘French 
Theory’) for the formation of the ‘postmodernist’ position that would become so 
prevalent in many humanities (and some social sciences) faculties in the English-
speaking world from the late 1970s onwards (see Cusset 2008). Against this 
backdrop, DeLanda’s (2002) bid to paint Deleuze as a scientific realist of a stripe 
recognisable to ‘an audience of analytical philosophers of science, and of scientists 
interested in philosophical questions’ (pp. 1-2) is explicitly advertised as an attempt 
to show that not all French post-structuralist philosophers are ‘French Theorists’ in 
the above noted sense. In particular, DeLanda intends his reconstruction of 
Deleuze’s philosophy as an answer to the criticisms of physicists Alan Sokal and 
Jean Bricmont (1997; 1998), who had taken Deleuze and various other 
representatives of French Theory to task for their purportedly sloppy or downright 
nonsensical uses of mathematical and scientific terminology. This intervention was 
part of the aforementioned conflict raging at the heart of US academe between pro-
science rationalism and postmodern relativism, and DeLanda’s concerted effort to 
vindicate in detail Deleuze’s use of scientific language as literal and meaningful, and 
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indeed philosophically illuminating, effectively deploys Deleuze as a tool in this 
polemic. I want to distance the early Deleuze from this anachronistic view by 
determining what sort of intervention Deleuze can plausibly be seen to make in his 
own intellectual context, something that strikes me as an appropriate precursor for a 
discussion of what relevance, if any, Deleuze’s thought might have in our own 
intellectual context. 
 I envisage this thesis as a study in the history of philosophy. This is not the 
place for a detailed discussion of the proper aims and methods of the history of 
philosophy, a discussion which is only gaining in momentum, and consequently in 
depth and nuance.
28
 However, it seems pertinent to offer some remarks on some of 
the central methodological assumptions guiding the present project – and how these 
relate to (and perhaps find themselves in tension with) Deleuze’s own thoughts on 
the aims and methods of the history of philosophy. 
 I have noted above that the scientistic reading of Deleuze is marked by 
anachronism, in the sense that its formulation is, in certain key respects, a response 
to an intellectual and academic situation that is not Deleuze’s own. It is implicit in 
my aim to correct the misapprehensions of such a reading that I object to this 
anachronism, but it is in no way a given that anachronism is a vice in the history of 
philosophy (at least insofar as the latter is understood to be a philosophical rather 
than simply historical enterprise). In particular, Deleuze himself embraces certain 
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 See, for example, the range of positions represented in Lærke et al. (2013) and Sorell and Rogers 
(2005). 
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kinds of anachronism as a productive tool for philosophers engaging with historical 
texts.
29
 
 The antipathy Deleuze expressed (in particular in his 1973 open letter to 
Michel Cressole) towards a certain form of history of philosophy is often noted (see 
Deleuze 1995, pp. 5-9).
30
 John Sellars (2007) articulates the orthodox view of 
‘Deleuzian’ history of philosophy when he states that the history of philosophy ‘may 
best be conceived as a creative encounter between two philosophers’ that ‘afford[s] 
the opportunity for the author to develop his own thoughts’; and that this approach is 
‘at odds with the usual scholarly approach’, which demands, according to Sellars, 
that the work of history, at least ideally, ‘contain absolutely nothing added by the 
scholar at the level of philosophy’ (p. 556). The latter point, namely that Deleuze’s 
approach to the history of philosophy is in tension with mainstream history of 
philosophy, is questionable – perhaps all the more so when the ‘mainstream’ in 
question is contemporary Anglophone history of philosophy rather than mid-
twentieth-century French history of philosophy.
31
 If Deleuze has something to add to 
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 For a presentation of Deleuze’s approach to the history of philosophy formulated explicitly in terms 
of the productivity of anachronism, see Neil (1998). 
30
 For an illuminating account of Deleuze’s evolving attitude towards the history of philosophy, and 
the latter’s place in his thought, see Smith (2012a). 
31
 See Lærke (2015): ‘Even though Deleuze himself was eager to distance himself from historians, 
and to depict his readings as highly unorthodox, […] Deleuze’s work in the history of philosophy is in 
reality much less exotic than what both Deleuze and his commentators would have us believe’ (p. 
394). Lærke (2015) rejects the ‘reviled figure of the “traditional historian of philosophy”’ – 
‘pedestrian historians of philosophy engaged in pointless repetition opposed to the inventive 
Deleuzian reader engaged in inventing new concepts in conversation with the great philosophers’ – as 
‘a straw man’ (p. 395). ‘[T]here is, in the end, nothing particularly avant-garde or wildly unorthodox’ 
about Deleuze’s historical studies; ‘[t]hey are just very good readings alongside other very good 
readings that should be allowed to inform each other’ (Lærke 2015, p. 395). 
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contemporary debates about the aims and methods of the history of philosophy, it is 
not overly plausible that this contribution lies in the rejection of a purist 
antiquarianism. Such an approach would seem to be fairly marginal in English-
speaking academe today, at least in philosophy departments. In the latter institutional 
context, the need to justify the philosophical merit of the history of philosophy in an 
atmosphere dominated by analytic philosophy’s traditionally anti-historical attitude 
has fostered a ‘presentist’ approach focused on reading historical texts in terms of, 
and justifying the worth of such reading in relation to, current philosophical 
problems and assumptions – an approach nearer to Deleuze than it is to either 
traditional antiquarian history or modern social-scientific history. 
 Nevertheless, it is no doubt still true that criticising a reading of Deleuze’s 
philosophy for its anachronism is not a particularly ‘Deleuzian’ gesture – especially 
given that I am perfectly happy to acknowledge that this anachronism has led to a 
great deal of philosophically interesting and productive work. I should clarify, then, 
the attitude to anachronism expressed here, and how it underlies the aims of the 
present study.  
 What, if anything, is the problem with anachronism in the history of 
philosophy? What is the problem with anachronism in the history of postwar French 
philosophy? I find myself sympathetic to Yitzhak Melamed’s (2013) view that 
anachronism ‘deprives us of the rare opportunity to challenge ourselves in a critical 
dialogue with intelligent views that are different from ours’ (p. 274). Part of what is 
valuable about the history of philosophy – and this, I think, is a Deleuzian point – is 
that the demands of historical and contextual reconstruction force us to enter into and 
try to make sense of an intellectual milieu different from our own, and so force us to 
recognise the contingency of our own intellectual habits. This is a general point. A 
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more specific point pertains to the particular instance of anachronism in question, 
namely the scientistic reading. If I object to this particular reading on the grounds of 
its anachronism, it is because this anachronism obscures what I take to be (and will 
argue to be in the course of this thesis) Deleuze’s more interesting contribution to 
contemporary debates about the nature of philosophy and its relation to science. That 
is to say that the particular dynamics of the Anglophone reaction to perceived French 
‘postmodernism’ and of the defensive strategies of Anglophone ‘continentalists’ in 
response to their analytic critics has obscured aspects of Deleuze’s relation to the 
sciences that can be interesting for our current situation. I will return to these points 
in the conclusion. 
 So, I want to get a more accurate picture of what sort of intervention Deleuze 
is in fact making in his early work given the philosophical context in which this 
intervention was originally made; but I want to do this because I believe that doing 
so gives us an insight into a different Deleuze, one of more interest and relevance for 
contemporary metaphilosophical debates than the Deleuze offered by the scientistic 
reading. 
 This being said, I am nevertheless not of the view that the history of 
philosophy needs to provide some justification of itself in terms of its relevance for 
currents philosophical debates. It seems to me legitimate to claim, in the words of 
Lærke, Smith and Schliesser, that ‘the history of philosophy is to be studied and 
understood for its own sake and on its own terms, even when the problems of 
interest to the figures in this history have since fallen off the philosophical agenda’ 
(in the introduction to Lærke et al. 2015, p. 1). The interest of a contextually 
sensitive reading of Deleuze’s early philosophy is thus not dependent, as I see it, on 
Deleuze’s relevance for currently prevalent philosophical debates – despite the fact 
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that, as I will indicate in the conclusion, his thought’s contemporary relevance is 
brought out more clearly by a more context-sensitive reading. 
 A worrying prevalent tendency in the literature on Deleuze towards which I 
am not sympathetic is the view that the only legitimate way to read Deleuze is a 
‘Deleuzian’ way; that if Deleuze is to be an object of study for the history of 
philosophy this must be history of philosophy conducted in a mode that he would 
have found appealing. This might be expressed as the view that only Deleuzians can 
read Deleuze. Such a view strikes me as ironic given that – regardless of whether or 
not Deleuze would have been sympathetic to the present study – it is certainly true 
that he was disdainful of ‘disciples’, and of any philosophy that displayed a tendency 
towards the formation of a ‘school’.32 In this respect, I am not convinced that yet 
another self-consciously Deleuzian reading of Deleuze would be any more in 
keeping with the spirit of le maître. 
 It is worth mentioning at this point that Simon Duffy has argued against 
taking too seriously debates in Deleuze scholarship concerning the relation between 
philosophy and science for reasons that are pertinent to the methodological questions 
presently at hand. The disagreement about Deleuze’s attitude to the sciences that lies 
at the heart of the so-called ‘scienticity polemic’ is, according to Duffy (2013, pp. 
167-169), a consequence of the sort of methodological disagreement I have noted 
here, namely a disagreement about whether the historian of philosophy should be 
engaged in contextual reconstruction of historical texts or appropriating them as 
resources with a view to tackling current philosophical problems. Duffy concludes 
from this that the key players in the ‘polemic’ are often simply engaged in different 
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 See Deleuze’s comments on ‘Wittgensteinians’ in his L’Abécédaire (Deleuze and Parnet 2004). 
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enterprises – that is, they are talking past each other. Commentators such as 
DeLanda are openly ‘engaged in the project of redeploying, more or less adequately 
aspects of Deleuze’s philosophy specific to a particular task at hand in other 
domains’ (Duffy 2013, p. 168 [my emphasis]). This approach should not be 
conflated with ‘the project of explicating the arguments drawn from the history of 
philosophy and the history of various disciplines in science that Deleuze draws upon 
in the construction of his philosophy’ (Duffy 2013, p. 168). Consequently, much of 
the force of the debate is supposed to come from a lack of clarity of aims, or at least 
a mutual misunderstanding of aims, since ‘the only basis for these different strategies 
to be perceived as competing with one another is if the proponent of one approach 
makes the false claim to be working under the jurisdiction of the other approach’ 
(Duffy 2013, p. 169). 
 By way of response to this thought, I would first note that I am, as I have said 
above, more than happy to acknowledge the great philosophical worth of the sort of 
anachronistic readings articulated by DeLanda and Protevi. In this respect, I am not 
overly committed to the idea of a ‘polemic’, and I am happy to acknowledge that this 
is more than one legitimate way in which Deleuze’s text can be used. However, I am 
not convinced that reconstructive projects such as DeLanda’s are capable of 
remaining wholly agnostic regarding the historical and textual accuracy of the 
readings they put forward, at least insofar as they are offered as, precisely, readings 
of Deleuze. While I understand Duffy’s contention, it seems to me that so long as 
scientistic readings are offered as attempts to illuminate Deleuze’s philosophy, rather 
than simply as autonomous projects inspired by Deleuze’s work, there will be room 
for a more historically attentive corrective to these readings. It is such a corrective 
that I will try to formulate in this thesis. 
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3 Structure of the thesis 
I will structure my exploration of the role of science in Deleuze’s early philosophy as 
follows: 
 In chapter 1, I will set Deleuze’s early work in the context of broader debates 
in philosophy in France in the 1950s and ’60s by outlining the general contours of 
some of these debates and attempting to locate Deleuze’s philosophy within the 
logical space they form. In particular, I will consider how Deleuze positions himself 
in relation to his then more prominent teachers, as this will help us to see how 
Deleuze tries to carve out his own distinctive position. I will show how Deleuze 
seeks to produce a reconciliatory position which brings together resources from 
across the spectrum of available philosophical possibilities, although I will 
tentatively conclude that his focus on creativity ought to lead us to raise questions as 
to the extent of his affinity with scientific, as opposed to literary, culture. 
 In chapter 2, I will turn to a more detailed characterisation of Deleuze’s 
metaphilosophical stance. In particular, I will consider Deleuze’s conception of 
philosophy as critique and as concept creation, with a view to clarifying his 
understanding of philosophy as a ‘critical-creative’ enterprise. In the process, I will 
show how critical-creative philosophical thinking relates, for Deleuze, to scientific 
cognition. I will argue that Deleuze takes the role of critical-creative thinking to be 
quite different within philosophy and science. 
 With this account of Deleuze’s understanding of philosophy as background, I 
will then turn, in chapter 3, to an examination of Deleuze’s use of scientific and 
mathematical concepts. I will argue that the philosophical position Deleuze adopts in 
his early work is not essentially dependent on these terminological resources; rather, 
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they provide him with the means to illustrate and express philosophical positions that 
are articulable and defensible independently of the use of these resources. 
Consequently, Deleuze’s early philosophy is not a response to, nor is it dependent 
upon, specific developments in mathematics or the exact sciences. 
 In chapter 4, I consider the broader theme of immanence as it appears in 
Deleuze’s early work, and consider whether a connection can be drawn between 
Deleuze’s concern with immanence and the question of philosophy’s relation to the 
sciences. An understanding of the full range of resonances and the full significance 
of this notion of immanence in Deleuze’s early work, it will be argued, rather than 
serving to establish a connection between philosophy and science, instead serves to 
further clarify the divergence between philosophy and science in Deleuze’s thought 
that is explored in chapters 2 and 3. 
 I will conclude the thesis with some reflections on what Deleuze’s 
philosophy might contribute to our understanding of the proper relation of 
philosophy to the sciences today. Against the approach of proponents of the 
scientistic reading, my concluding suggestion will be that Deleuze’s early 
metaphilosophical reflections help us to think about ways in which philosophy can 
resist the demand to become ‘scientific’, and – perhaps more importantly – reasons 
why we should resist such a demand. 
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Chapter 1 
Situating Transcendental Empiricism 
Scientificity, Structuralism and the Specificity of 
Philosophy in 1950s and ’60s French Thought 
 
 
 
Introduction 
As I have outlined in the introduction to the present thesis, one of the problems with 
the scientistic interpretation of the relation between philosophy and science in 
Deleuze’s early work is the anachronistic lens through which it views this relation. In 
particular, its understanding of the significance of Deleuze’s engagement with the 
sciences is coloured by the rhetorical demands of tensions within English-speaking 
(particularly North American) academe concerning the proper attitude of the 
humanities and social sciences towards the natural sciences and the role of ‘French 
Theory’ in that debate. It is in response to these polemics that Manuel DeLanda has 
offered a reading of Deleuze in terms of the concerns of contemporary Anglophone 
philosophy of science, concerns quite alien to Deleuze’s native intellectual milieu. 
This chapter begins the work of correcting the distortions engendered by this 
anachronism by considering the context of Deleuze’s early work, that is, the French 
philosophical field of the 1950s and ’60s. 
 I will argue that Deleuze’s location within the philosophical field does not 
indicate that he embraces the idea of a particularly close affinity between the 
sciences and philosophy. Indeed – and this claim will be cashed out further in 
coming chapters – the conception of philosophy Deleuze is working to articulate in 
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the ’50s and ’60s is in tension with a project that would seek to subject philosophy to 
the demands of ‘scientificity’, either in terms of a disciplining1 of philosophy by the 
sciences or even in terms of conceiving philosophy as a discipline with its own 
distinctive standards of ‘scientificity’ (à la Bergson).2 
 My discussion will be structured as follows. In §1, I will examine the role an 
engagement with the sciences has played in French philosophy, with a view both to 
showing that Deleuze’s interest in the sciences is not particularly distinctive in its 
context and to giving a sense of the structure of the philosophical field in France 
during this period. I will suggest that Deleuze adopts a reconciliatory stance to the 
key tensions that structure the field. In §2, I will examine the nature of this 
reconciliatory approach by elucidating the ways in which Deleuze situates himself in 
relation to more well-established figures within the field, namely Ferdinand Alquié, 
Martial Guéroult and Jean Hyppolite. These three figures effectively form a 
spectrum of positions between a literary model of philosophy orientated towards 
sub-conceptual experience (Alquié) and a quasi-scientific model of philosophy 
orientated towards the autonomous dynamics of conceptual systems (Guéroult), with 
Hyppolite attempting to find a philosophically satisfying middle ground. Deleuze, I 
will argue, formulates his position as an attempt to construct an alternative middle 
                                                 
1
 For this notion of philosophy as needing to be ‘disciplined’ by extra-philosophical (presumably less 
‘wayward’) research areas, see Williamson (2007, pp. 285-286). This idea should be distinguished 
from Deleuze’s understanding of the productivity for philosophy of maintaining a connection to its 
‘outside’, which has nothing to do with ‘disciplining’ philosophy in Williamson’s sense. 
2
 Indeed, from at least the mid-’60s – at which point he begins to criticise the idea of ‘method’ whilst 
continuing to emphasise that one of Bergson’s key innovations was his method – this would seem to 
be one of Deleuze’s key disagreements with Bergson (NP, pp. 118-126/pp. 103-110; Deleuze 2008a, 
p. 12, p. 47, pp. 60-65; DR, pp. 213-216/pp. 164-167; compare Deleuze 1988, chap. 1). On Bergson’s 
insistence on the importance of a rigorous philosophical method, see Janicaud (1997, pp. 169-178). 
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ground to that offered by Hyppolite’s Hegelianism. In §3, I examine Deleuze’s anti-
Hegelian alternative to Hyppolite’s reconciliatory position (i.e. transcendental 
empiricism) in more detail, considering first Deleuze’s reasons for rejecting 
Hyppolite’s position, before looking at how transcendental empiricism differs from 
this position (and how its reconciliation of Alquié and Guéroult is cashed out). 
Whilst the resulting position refuses to emphasise the role in thought of sub-
conceptual experience at the expense of the role of concepts and ideal structures, it 
will nevertheless be argued that Deleuze’s reconciliatory position airs more on the 
side of the literary than the scientific. 
 
1 Science as object, problem and ideal in postwar French 
philosophy 
In this first section, what I want to address is an idea that seems to recurrently appear 
in the background of scientistic interpretations of Deleuze’s relation to science, 
namely that Deleuze’s engagements with the sciences, particularly mathematics and 
the hard sciences, are distinctive, even idiosyncratic, in the context of twentieth-
century French philosophy.
3
 This could not be further from the truth. Deleuze’s 
engagement with the sciences hardly serves to distinguish him from a great number 
of his compatriotic contemporaries – even those who might be presumed to be the 
likely bearers of DeLanda’s distinctly accusatory label, ‘postmodernist’.  
                                                 
3
 DeLanda (2002), for example, foregrounds the distinctiveness of Deleuze’s scientific realism, 
suggesting that this sets him apart from the sort of social constructivism associated with 
‘postmodernism’ (pp. 1-3); whilst Protevi contrasts ‘the Deleuze and science connection’ to ‘a deeply 
entrenched suspicion of science on the part of many phenomenologists and post-phenomenologists’ 
(DeLanda et al. 2005, p. 67). 
 42 
 
The changing faces and fortunes of philosophy in the modern era are 
entangled with the emergence and development of modern science. A central aspect 
of this entanglement is the way in which transformations in the scope of the sciences, 
in the way in which their ‘scientificity’ is conceived and in the intellectual and 
cultural status of being able to proclaim one’s intellectual activity ‘scientific’, 
particularly relative to other kinds of intellectual quality – coupled of course with 
corresponding transformations in the social and institutional parameters of 
intellectual activity – have affected and been affected by transformations in how 
philosophy is conceived, its role and value, and renegotiations of its (de jure and de 
facto) borders. Perhaps the most striking product of this ongoing process is the 
separation of philosophy and the sciences, generally considered an artefact of the 
nineteenth century, which has resulted in the philosophy department finding itself – 
to the discomfort of some – in the humanities faculty, institutionally segregated from 
the sciences. 
The reception of French philosophy in the English-speaking world in the 
second half of the twentieth century has tended to focus on those thinkers, and those 
aspects of the work of these thinkers, primarily concerned with literature and the 
aesthetic (as well as politics), whilst downplaying or ignoring philosophical 
engagements with the sciences, particularly where these engagements are broadly 
sympathetic. In this way, an image of philosophy in France in the twentieth century 
as essentially humanistic and literary in spirit, rather than scientific and rationalistic, 
and perhaps even as hostile to science and rationality, has for some time prevailed 
both amongst its enthusiasts and its detractors. This image is liable to distort. That 
humanistic culture has played an important role in French philosophy, whilst, 
likewise, philosophy has played an important role in humanistic culture in France, is 
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no doubt true. The importance of philosophy in the French education system is 
inseparable from the importance of the humanities in French intellectual culture, and 
the relative decline of the latter (relative to the growing cultural prestige of the 
sciences) has contributed to a growing insecurity of the former. It is also true that 
whilst the professionalisation of philosophy as an academic discipline in the English-
speaking world has effectively succeeded in establishing a tangible distance between 
philosophers on the one hand (that is, those who feel themselves entitled by their 
institutional situation to adopt the title of ‘philosopher’) and literary culture and the 
public sphere on the other, in France (particularly during the period with which this 
study is concerned), the borders between academic philosophy and the literary avant-
garde, not to mention academic philosophy and engagement in politics and the 
public sphere, have been persistently porous.
4
 (For those Anglophone philosophers 
who insist on identifying philosophy with the policing of norms of academic 
communication, these dalliances with extra-academic means of expression are surely 
an especial affront.) Nevertheless, it is impossible to understand the significance of 
debates concerning the nature and value of philosophy in France in the twentieth 
century, the evolution and mutation of strategies for determining philosophy’s 
specificity, without an appreciation of the importance of science as both an object 
and a model, and in some cases a challenge, for philosophy. 
One point to note, then, is that France plays host to a rich heritage of 
philosophical thinking about the sciences. Going back to Descartes and the French 
Enlightenment, through the positivism of Comte and Littré and the neo-Kantianism 
of Brunschvicg, carrying on into the middle of the twentieth century in the history 
                                                 
4
 See Fabiani (1988, pp. 163-164). 
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and philosophy of science of Koyré, Bachelard and Canguilhem and the philosophy 
of mathematics of Cavaillès, Lautman and Vuillemin, rationalistic philosophical 
engagements with the sciences have been a persistent feature of French philosophy. 
The philosophy of science (or épistémologie) has steadily maintained a solid 
academic presence, unperturbed by the changing tides of intellectual fashion. Thus, 
the 1940s, the heyday of Sartrean existentialism with its literary bent and distinct 
lack of interest in the sciences, saw the publication not only of Being and 
Nothingness but of Bachelard’s La Philosophie du non and Le Rationalisme 
appliqué, works of epistemology in a staunchly critical-rationalist vein.  
A further point is that a degree of scientific competence, and an interest in the 
sciences, has not, in France, been reserved for specialist épistémologues. One can 
expect a degree of familiarity with the sciences amongst most philosophers educated 
in the first two thirds of the century, since between 1904 and 1965 a science 
component was a compulsory part of the agrégation examination taken by all those 
wishing to pursue teaching careers in philosophy (the favoured career trajectory for 
philosophy graduates).
5
 When a philosopher like Merleau-Ponty, who ultimately 
wants to assert the limitations of empirical science and the incapacity of ‘objective’ 
thought to achieve an ‘originary’ grasp of human subjectivity, nevertheless bolsters 
his phenomenology of perception with cases drawn from contemporary 
psychological research, he thereby draws on a scientific education shared by his 
fellow agrégés. Even prior to this institutionalisation of science education in the 
                                                 
5
 See Schrift (2006): ‘Until 1965, a student of philosophy was required to undertake advanced work 
and be certified in one of the sciences, whether hard (physics, mathematics, chemistry, biology) or 
soft (psychology, ethnology, prehistory) in order to qualify to take the agrégation de philosophie and 
receive a teaching credential in philosophy’ (p. 41). Also see Schrift (2006, p. 41 n. 3 and n. 5). 
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careers of academic philosophers, those currents of philosophy in France that have 
sought to determine the limitations of empirical science and to regulate its expansion 
into the sphere of humanistic culture – which is to say, those currents of thought one 
might expect in, say, a German context to revel in irrationalism and a cultivated 
ignorance of the sciences – have tended to attempt to confront the sciences in an 
informed and sensitive manner: Bergson is of course the exemplar here.  
A third point to note is that in France, as in other national contexts, since at 
least the second half of the nineteenth century, a central aspect of metaphilosophical 
debate has been the question of how to situate philosophy in relation to the sciences. 
If the sciences have posed a challenge to philosophy in France, this is not necessarily 
due to any explicit polemical intent – although no doubt such polemics have 
occurred. Rather, the very existence of the sciences, insofar as they have emerged 
from philosophy to become autonomous disciplines, has forced philosophers to 
reconsider the scope and nature of their enterprise as an enterprise that must now 
define its specificity in relation to these disciplines that can no longer be taken to fall 
within its remit. This challenge can only be made all the more pressing as 
‘scientificity’ gains ever greater cultural prestige, since the need for these high status 
disciplines to separate themselves from philosophy in order to realise their full 
scientific status might seem to imply a devaluing of what remains within philosophy. 
Questions of the role and value of philosophy in France from the late nineteenth 
century to today are thus hard to separate from questions of the specificity of 
philosophy in relation to the sciences. 
Consequently, different strategies and responses have emerged by which 
philosophers seek to define the role and value of their own activity and its specificity 
in relation to science. Conceptions of philosophy can be distinguished by whether 
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philosophical activity is in some sense subordinated to scientific activity – as is the 
case when philosophy is conceived (in a neo-Kantian fashion) as carrying out some 
kind of methodological housekeeping, disposing of obstacles to scientific progress – 
or rather goes beyond (‘dépasse’) the limitations of scientific thought to achieve a 
‘higher’ mode of intellectual activity. These are not the only options: in What Is 
Philosophy?, for example, Deleuze and Guattari attempt to reject this hierarchical 
conception and conceive science and philosophy as simply ‘adjacent’ modes of 
creation.
6
 There is also the possibility that the two poles can bleed into one another: 
even when the philosophical work of reflection is carried out in a spirit sympathetic 
to science, or even rhetorically subordinated to the sciences – as is the case with the 
neo-Kantian conception of philosophy – this nonetheless testifies to the belief that 
the sciences are not equipped to carry out their own methodological housekeeping, 
and correspondingly that an extra-scientific body – traditionally speaking, 
philosophy – is required to take charge of the task of ‘reflection’.7 These nuances 
aside, the point is that an important part of French philosophers’ understanding of 
the nature and value of their own activity has consisted in its demarcation from the 
activity of the gradually coalescing figure of the scientist (le savant, le scientifique). 
                                                 
6
 For an account of the rejection of disciplinary hierarchies in Deleuze’s later work, see Rae (2014, 
esp. chap. 8). 
7
 The dispute between Pierre Bourdieu and Jacques Rancière is emblematic of the ongoing struggle 
over the rights to critique and its connection to the question of the relation between philosophy and 
science in French intellectual life. Bourdieu’s (2001) insistence that the social sciences must engage 
in a rigorous practice of ‘auto-objectification’ is part of an ongoing bid to wrestle this responsibility 
for meta-criticism away from philosophers and place it in the hands of scientists themselves. 
Meanwhile, Rancière’s (2003) critique of the ‘authority’ of science in Bourdieu’s work, whilst 
couched in political terms, can also be seen as a bid to assert the rights of philosophy over science as 
the activity most capable of carrying out critical reflection (pp. xxv-xxviii, p. 165 ff.).  
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Where conceptions of philosophy differ, divergent attitudes towards the sciences are 
often not too far beneath the surface. 
The image of twentieth-century French philosophy as participating primarily 
in humanistic rather than scientific culture thus needs to be tempered and nuanced by 
an awareness of the persistent philosophical interest in the sciences in France, the 
high level of scientific competence possessed by even those ultimately keen to 
subordinate the scientific to the philosophical in the hierarchy of modes of 
intellectual activity, and the importance of the relation between philosophy and 
science for debates about the role and value of philosophy. That Deleuze’s 
familiarity with and interest in mathematics and the sciences were far from 
exceptional should thus be apparent. If anything, what is striking about Deleuze, in 
relation to his contemporaries, is his relative silence on ‘epistemological’ issues (in 
the French sense). 
 
1.1 Philosophy’s changing relation to the sciences in the 1950s and 
’60s 
The importance of the relation between philosophy and the sciences for debates 
about the role and value of philosophy in France is manifest in the 1950s and ’60s, 
the decades during which Deleuze composed his early works and pursued the line of 
thought that culminated in the publication in 1968 of Difference and Repetition. In 
this period, one of the most important factors determining the shape of 
metaphilosophical debate in France was the increased status, especially considered 
relative to philosophy, of the human sciences (les sciences de l’homme) – 
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particularly cultural anthropology, psychoanalysis and linguistics.
8
 Particularly 
relevant is the way in which this increase in the status of the human sciences puts 
pressure on certain established strategies for conceiving the specificity of 
philosophy, creating a tension that gives rise to the production of new philosophical 
possibilities and a corresponding reframing of the philosophical field. Deleuze’s 
‘transcendental empiricism’ is one of these new philosophical possibilities opened 
up by the conditions of the human sciences’ postwar challenge to philosophy. But it 
remains to be seen in precisely what sense this is the case, and what this implies for 
the relation between philosophy and science in Deleuze’s early work. 
What role does a confrontation with the sciences play in the changing 
dynamics of metaphilosophical debate in France in the ’50s and ’60s? Three factors 
are especially relevant here: (i) the general conceptions of philosophy available at the 
beginning of this period; and the way in which these conceptions are challenged by 
(ii) the expansion in scope of credibly ‘scientific’ activity, and (iii) the professed 
stakes of the conception of scientificity employed in this connection. How are these 
factors connected, and how does the manner of their connection lead to new 
metaphilosophical strategies characterised by reappraisals of philosophy’s relation to 
the sciences? 
Existentialism and French phenomenology are, generally speaking, 
characterised by a conception of philosophy’s specificity couched in terms of the 
specificity of philosophy’s proper object or domain of inquiry, namely human 
existence, experience or subjectivity – la réalité humaine (Henry Corbin’s French 
translation of Heidegger’s Dasein). Philosophy’s specificity as an intellectual 
                                                 
8
 See Bianco (forthcoming, §2); Bourdieu and Passeron (1967); Pinto (1987, p. 62 ff.); Schrift (2006, 
chap. 4). 
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activity is thus indexed to the specificity of its object. The latter is understood, in 
part, in terms of the resistance of human existence or experience to effective study 
by savoirs positifs (objective, empirical, third-personal modes of inquiry). 
Consequently, philosophy’s specificity will also have a methodological component – 
that is, the philosophical method will have to be differentiated from that of the 
empirical sciences insofar as philosophy’s proper object is characterised by a 
resistance to the epistemic techniques of the sciences.
9
  
The wave of attempts associated with Deleuze’s generation to construct new 
conceptions of philosophy can be seen as a response to the challenge to this 
metaphilosophical strategy posed by the advancement in the status and self-
confidence of the human sciences described above. The nature of this challenge is 
quite straightforward. If philosophy’s specificity relies upon the resistance of the 
human sphere to scientific study, then a convincing scientific inquiry into this sphere 
poses a challenge to the presuppositions of this metaphilosophical strategy. If the 
role and value of philosophy is grounded in the need for a philosophical 
anthropology, which is in turn grounded in the impossibility of a scientific 
anthropology, then the construction of a plausible scientific anthropology is in a 
position to undermine philosophy’s role and value.10 For those aspiring philosophers 
                                                 
9
 Even Merleau-Ponty (2002), who is far more positively inclined towards and engaged with the 
empirical sciences than Sartre, insists that phenomenology ‘is from the start a foreswearing [désaveu] 
of science’ (p. ix). 
10
 To nuance this point a little, it is not that phenomenology is unable to accommodate the 
pronouncements of a scientific anthropology, so much as that it is unable to do so unless the 
theoretical significance of these claims is firmly kept in place within an ‘empirical’ perspective. As 
Bourdieu and Passeron (1967) suggest, it is the theoretical ambitiousness of Lévi-Strauss’ structural 
anthropology which allows it to pose a threat to philosophical anthropology, insofar as it cannot easily 
be put in its place by accusations of ‘positivism’. 
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for whom phenomenology or the philosophy of existence might have provided a 
fruitful philosophical approach – namely, those wishing to be philosophical 
‘producers’ rather than simply ‘reproducers’ (Fabiani 1988, pp. 164-167) – but who 
found themselves impressed by the renewed claims to scientificity of the human 
sciences, the need and opportunity for the formation of a new conception of 
philosophy became apparent. 
A key factor here is that the human sciences’ claim to scientificity took the 
form of a claim to autonomy from philosophy (see Boudieu and Passeron 1967). 
Hence, the assertion of the possibility of a scientific study of human phenomena was 
part of an assertion of the possibility of the non-philosophical study of human 
phenomena. The polemic between Sartre and Lévi-Strauss,
11
 as well as Lévi-Strauss’ 
debate with Paul Ricœur,12 serve to indicate that both proponents of phenomenology 
and of the new anthropology saw an empirical science of the human sphere as 
potentially undermining the methodological presuppositions of humanistic 
philosophy (as, in a slightly different way, does Canguilhem’s (2005) critical 
response to the phenomenological critique of Foucault’s ‘archaeology’).13 
Thus, in the face of a shift in the balance of power between philosophy and 
the human sciences, various philosophical projects emerge which are engaged in a 
reappraisal of science and of the relation between philosophy and the sciences. To 
                                                 
11
 See Lévi-Strauss (1966, chap. 9); Schrift (2006, pp. 46-48); and Dosse (1997a, pp. 232-236). 
12
 Ricœur (1963) and Lévi-Strauss (1963); see also Dosse (1997a, pp. 236-238). 
13
 Also note the fact that Simone de Beauvoir’s (1949) positive reception of Lévi-Strauss’ work is 
based on the assumption that ‘Lévi-Strauss refrains from venturing onto philosophical terrain, never 
abandoning rigorous scientific objectivity’ (p. 949). 
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take a few examples, consider Althusser’s Marxist epistemology;14 the ‘Lacano-
Althusserian’ project of Althusser’s ENS students in the Cercle d’Épistémologie, 
documented in the journal Cahiers pour l’analyse (Hallward and Peden 2012); 
Foucault’s (2002) ‘archaeology of the human sciences’; or indeed Derrida’s (1997) 
new ‘science’ of writing, ‘grammatology’. Derrida encapsulates something of the 
shared spirit of these projects in describing his work as the product of a ‘concern that 
I shared with a fair few people at the time […], to substitute for a phenomenology à 
la française […], little concerned with scientificity and epistemology, a 
phenomenology turned more towards the sciences’ (Derrida, in Janicaud 2001, p. 93 
[my translation]). ‘We were very much occupied’, he continues, ‘with the question 
of scientific objectivity’ (Derrida, in Janicaud 2001, p. 93 [my translation]). Most of 
the projects named above were not as comfortable as Derrida with continuing to 
associate themselves with phenomenology; the key part of Derrida’s statement is 
rather this dissatisfaction with the attitudes towards the sciences promulgated by 
‘phenomenology à la française’, and a corresponding sense of the need to pay 
greater attention to ‘epistemological’ questions and to reconceive the nature and 
value of philosophy accordingly.  
While some of those educated as philosophers at this time would be 
sufficiently convinced by the human-scientific challenge to philosophy to switch 
disciplines and forge academic careers in the human sciences themselves – which 
‘recruited numerous researchers and teachers from amongst the philosophers’ in this 
                                                 
14
 ‘[F]rom Plato to Husserl and Lenin […], by way of Cartesian philosophy, eighteenth-century 
rationalist philosophy, Kant, Hegel and Marx, the philosophy of science is much more than one part 
of philosophy among others: it is philosophy’s essential part, to the extent that, at least since 
Descartes, science, the existing sciences […], serve as a guide and a model for every philosophical 
reflection’ (Althusser, in Macherey 1998, pp. 161-162 [original emphasis]). 
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period (Pinto 1987, p. 77 [my translation]) – for those still wishing to identify 
themselves as philosophers, this renewed interest in epistemology and in 
philosophy’s relation to the sciences provided a means to respond to the challenge 
(Pinto 1987, pp. 77-78). These projects can be seen as an attempt by a generation of 
up-and-coming philosophers (spearheaded by those, like Deleuze, who had 
completed their pre-doctoral tertiary education, and thus were able to begin academic 
careers, in the late 1940s) to map out a new philosophical space outside the 
‘humanism’ of French phenomenology – which in practice meant outside the 
philosophical options presented to them by their teachers. 
The need for a new space of this kind is connected to the position of these 
relatively young academics within the system of academic philosophy in France, as 
well as to the role that had been played, for the previous generation of academic 
philosophers, by existentialism and phenomenology. In effect, what phenomenology 
and the philosophies of existence had provided for the generation prior to Deleuze’s 
was an alternative to academic orthodoxy, which is to say an alternative way of 
doing philosophy to that offered by the orthodox academic practice of scholarly 
commentary characteristic of the traditionalist history of philosophy which 
dominated la philosophie universitaire. Those philosophers of Deleuze’s generation 
for whom the idea of a defeat of ‘humanist’ philosophy at the hands of the human 
sciences was a compelling intellectual event were thus generally those, like Deleuze 
himself, eager to find alternatives to academic orthodoxy, but for whom 
phenomenology no longer seemed an appealing such alternative.
15
 This search for an 
exit from academic orthodoxy, a subversiveness which seems to evolve out of more 
                                                 
15
 This ambivalence towards academic orthodoxy tends, as Fabiani (1988, p. 165) has noted, to be 
correlated with a relatively marginalised academic position. See also Bourdieu (1988, pp. xviii-xix). 
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traditional ideas of the freedom of philosophical thinking from the mundanities of 
quotidian academic work (Fabiani 1988, pp. 159-60, pp. 170-1), contributes to 
explaining why these philosophers were not compelled by the challenge to 
phenomenology to take up the broadly neo-Kantian project of post-Bachelardian 
epistemology and history of science, since the latter, although relatively marginalised 
by traditionalist history of philosophy, is far from breaking with the prevailing norms 
of conventional research culture. 
For many of these aspiring or relatively institutionally marginalised 
philosophers, the term ‘structuralism’ would come to seem an appropriate one to 
designate this variegated space of new philosophical possibilities.
16
 Structuralism 
effectively replaced existentialism as the dominant orientation of a philosophical 
‘avant-garde’17 populated by academics with an ambivalent relationship with the 
mainstream of their discipline, in search of ‘new means of philosophical expression’ 
(DR, p. 3/p. xxi).
18
  
One key aspect of philosophers’ self-identification with structuralism in the 
1960s is an appropriation of the human-scientific challenge to philosophy (which 
had proclaimed itself ‘structural’ – ‘structural anthropology’, ‘structural linguistics’, 
etc. – although its proponents generally took their distance from the notion of a 
structural-ism taking form within the philosophical and literary avant-garde (Dosse 
                                                 
16
 ‘Not long ago we used to ask: What is existentialism? Now we ask: What is structuralism?’ (DI, p. 
239/p. 170) 
17
 I adopt this notion of a philosophical avant-garde in twentieth-century French philosophy from the 
sociologist of philosophy Louis Pinto (1987). 
18
 On the formation of ‘structuralism’ as an umbrella term for a space of possibilities for a new 
generation of the philosophical avant-garde, see Balibar (2003) and Pinto (2009, chap. 4). 
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1997a, p. xxiv; Pinto 2009, pp. 219-220)),
19
 and a displacement of this challenge 
such that it ceases to be an external challenge to philosophy tout court and is 
recommissioned as an internal challenge to a ‘humanist’ paradigm in philosophy, 
represented most exemplarily by Sartre and the archetype of the intellectuel engagé. 
Whilst the use of the term ‘structuralism’, and the project of constructing a 
philosophical structuralism or a structuralism in philosophy, might thus seem to 
indicate a scientistic or at least scientific or quasi-scientific intent, in the sense of 
taking the sciences as a model for philosophy or even of closing the gap between 
philosophy and science, this does not, in practice, prove to be the case. Rather, 
philosophical structuralism turns out to be a broad church, incorporating a spectrum 
of attitudes towards the human sciences and science more generally. Thus, although 
the space of positions that emerges under the rubric of philosophical structuralism is 
in part motivated by a renewed attentiveness to epistemological questions and by a 
dissatisfaction with established ways of framing philosophy’s relation to the 
sciences, an adherence to a ‘structuralist’ philosophical project cannot be taken, in 
and of itself, to determine a particular attitude towards the sciences. Consider, for 
example, Foucault and Derrida.
20
 Both associated with philosophical structuralism, 
Derrida’s (e.g. 1997) work of the mid- to late ’60s is engaged in a critique of the 
claims of the human sciences to be able to escape the horizon of ‘metaphysics’, and 
consequently a critique of the very idea of science as something extra-philosophical; 
whilst Foucault’s (2002) work of the same period assimilates the tools of ‘positive’ 
                                                 
19
 See Milner (2008, p. 277 ff.) for an account of the distinction between structuralism and the 
structural project in the human sciences as a project of renewing the scientificity of the latter. 
20
 I follow Pinto (2009, pp. 283-285) in taking Foucault and Derrida as representative of divergent 
attitudes towards the relation between philosophy and science within philosophical structuralism. 
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science in the service of a project which ultimately proclaims its philosophical 
pretensions. Foucault’s work thus exhibits a far more positive attitude towards the 
sciences, whereas Derrida’s attitude is essentially critical21 – although it is 
noteworthy that both question, in different ways, the possibility of the human 
sciences’ escaping from the horizon of philosophy (precisely what was at stake in the 
original ‘structural’ human-scientific challenge to philosophy). The decline of 
existentialism and the rise of structuralism amongst the French philosophical avant-
garde does not, therefore, correlate to a broadly more positive attitude towards the 
sciences on the part of philosophers, or a general conception of philosophy that 
would place it in the service of the sciences, so much as it indicates an increased 
interest amongst the philosophical avant-garde in engaging with extra-philosophical 
concepts and experimenting (more or less seriously) with scientificity, or at least 
some of its trappings.
22
 A broad array of positions on the relation between 
philosophy and the sciences persists in this space. 
This structuralist tendency does not, of course, succeed in hegemonising the 
philosophical field, and other currents persist throughout the heyday of philosophical 
structuralism. Phenomenology, Christian philosophy, Marxist philosophy can all still 
be found, not to mention history of philosophy in various more or less traditional 
                                                 
21
 On the ambiguity of Derrida’s rhetorical relationship with ‘scientificity’, especially in relation to 
his claims to the quasi-scientificity of his own discourse, see Dosse (1997b, chap. 2)  
22
 Pierre Bourdieu (1990) has questioned the seriousness of some ‘structuralist’ philosophers’ 
engagements with science, suggesting that the 1960s played host to an ‘“-ology effect” – in allusion to 
all those nouns that use that suffix, archaeology, grammatology, semiology, etc.’: ‘half-hearted 
changes of label which enable one to draw freely on the profits of scientificity and the profits 
associated with the status of philosopher’ (p. 6). A ‘flirtation’ with scientificity was sufficient in order 
to adopt ‘the external signs of scientificity without the constraints of a genuine research programme’ 
(Fabiani 2010, p. 120).  
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configurations. The emergence of philosophical structuralism is, nonetheless, 
perhaps the most striking and novel development of this period, as well as marking a 
change in the status of philosophical engagements with the sciences. 
Where, then, does Deleuze fit into this mutating intellectual landscape? The 
first thing to note is that Deleuze (at least by the closing years of the 1960s) 
identifies with philosophical structuralism.
23
 Although Deleuze’s affinity with 
structuralism is evident from the numerous references to structuralist figures and 
ideas that pepper Difference and Repetition, this affinity is most clearly evidenced in 
his article, ‘How Do We Recognise Structuralism?’ (written in 1967 but only 
published a few years later in 1971). Structuralism, he claims, can provide us with ‘a 
new transcendental philosophy’ (DI, p. 244/p. 174.).24 It seems plausible that the 
reconfiguration of transcendental philosophy Deleuze himself sought to carry out in 
his work of this period was intended to realise these philosophical consequences of 
structuralist thought.  
Deleuze’s presentation of structuralism pays little attention to disciplinary 
boundaries; he gives a list of criteria for ‘recognising’ structuralism that are drawn 
from anthropology, literary criticism, psychoanalysis, mathematics etc. However, 
this apparent porousness of the boundaries between disciplines in Deleuze’s 
presentation of structuralism, particularly between philosophy and these other 
disciplines, does not seem to indicate a ‘scientism’ on Deleuze’s part, that is, a 
                                                 
23
 Despite the influence of Sartre on his thought in the 1940s, Deleuze seems never to have identified 
with Sartre’s ‘humanism’ or his model of the philosopher as engaged intellectual. 
24
 Here, Deleuze takes up Ricœur’s complaint, already recast in a positive light by Lévi-Strauss in his 
response to Ricœur, that structuralism (in the form of structural anthropology) has overstepped its 
proper bounds qua science by coming to constitute a ‘Kantianism without a transcendental subject’ 
(as cited in Dosse 1997a, p. 237). 
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collapse of the distinction between philosophy and the sciences. If anything, it seems 
that Deleuze’s presentation of structuralism represents a particularly clear example 
of the appropriation of conceptual resources from other disciplines by philosophy.
25
 
This dynamic in Deleuze’s thought is evidenced by comments made following a 
presentation to the Société français de philosophie, made the same year that he 
composed his text on structuralism (i.e. 1967). In the discussion following this 
presentation, which consisted in a précis of material that would later be published as 
the final chapters of Difference and Repetition (and which appears in the collection 
Desert Islands under the title ‘The Method of Dramatisation’), Ferdinand Alquié (to 
whom I will return shortly) raises concerns regarding the place of the philosophical 
in Deleuze’s presentation: ‘[W]hat struck me was that all the examples [Deleuze] 
uses are not properly philosophical examples’ (DI, p. 148/p. 106). Instead one finds 
– much as in Deleuze’s presentation of structuralism’s ‘philosophy’ – mathematical 
examples, physiological examples, biological examples, psychoanalytical examples, 
etc. Alquié states that he appreciates that Deleuze is seeking ‘to orient philosophy 
toward other problems, [...] criticiz[ing] classical philosophy – justifiably so – for 
not providing us with concepts sufficiently adaptable to science, or psychological 
analysis, or even historical analysis’ (DI, p. 148/p. 106). However, in this supposed 
re-orientation of philosophy away from traditionally philosophical questions, 
Deleuze has posed and endeavoured to solve questions which ‘are perhaps not 
strictly philosophical questions’: alongside these non-philosophical problems, 
according to Alquié, ‘there remain classical philosophical problems, namely 
                                                 
25
 In this respect, I concur with Éric Alliez’s (2011, p. 38; 2013, p. 224) suggestion that Deleuze’s 
does not so much embrace structuralism as a ‘transdisciplinary’ project as he engages in a 
‘philosophical re-foundation’ of structuralism. 
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problems having to do with essence’ (DI, p. 148/p. 106). Thus, for Alquié, in 
displacing the concept of essence, something is concurrently misplaced, namely the 
specificity of philosophy itself. Setting aside Alquié’s apparent misunderstanding of 
the intended philosophical significance of Deleuze’s discussion (which is strictly 
speaking a reformulation of the concept of essence rather than a dismissal), what is 
important about this criticism is that Deleuze perceives it to jar with his own 
conception of his metaphilosophical stance. Taken aback by Alquié’s suggestion, 
Deleuze insists: ‘I do believe in the specificity of philosophy [je crois entièrement à 
la spécificité de la philosophie]’ (DI, p. 149/p. 106).26 What this exchange 
demonstrates, then, is that while Deleuze, in keeping with an eclecticism or 
‘encyclopaedism’ (Pinto 1987, p. 66) typical of the structuralist tendency amongst 
the philosophical avant-garde, borrows conceptual resources from a wide range of 
disciplines, and shows little concern for the disciplinary borders that define these 
concepts’ original contexts, this is not a dissolution of philosophy into these other 
disciplines so much as an appropriation of these extra-philosophical resources in 
order to articulate a project which remains resolutely philosophical.
27
  
This redeployment of conceptual resources drawn from the sciences is an 
important characteristic of Deleuze’s philosophy and one which plays a central role 
in motivating the scientistic reading. Consequently, I will have cause to return to this 
feature of Deleuze’s philosophy and address it in more detail subsequently (in 
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 I will have cause to return to this remark and its context later in the chapter. 
27
 Étienne Balibar (2003) exemplifies this attitude when he states that ‘structuralism is a properly 
philosophical movement and that is where its importance lies’, in spite of the fact that ‘more than one 
protagonist of the structuralist adventure’ would be designated, or designate themselves, ‘a 
nonphilosopher (for example, a “scientist”, particularly in the field of the “human sciences” […]), 
even an antiphilosopher’ (p. 4 [original emphasis]). 
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chapter 3). For now, given Deleuze’s apparent commitment to the ‘specificity’ of 
philosophy, even in the midst of philosophical structuralism’s varied engagements 
with and appropriations from the sciences, a question arises as to how Deleuze 
conceives this specificity. 
 
1.2 Philosophy between two cultures 
I have already emphasised the importance of situating philosophy in relation to the 
sciences for metaphilosophical debates in France from the second half of the 
nineteenth century. The twentieth century witnesses a change in the dominant 
academic culture in France (and across Europe): a decline of the humanities and a 
rise to dominance of natural science. The rise of the social sciences in the postwar 
period further contributed to the emergence of new images of the academic and of 
academic work, competing with established humanistic models. This new emphasis 
on scientific criteria of intellectual prestige was not necessarily terribly hospitable to 
philosophy, a discipline the exceptional status of which within the French education 
system was based on an idea of the value of philosophy distinctly in tension with a 
scientific model.
28
 Nevertheless, in this atmosphere, philosophers relate to scientific 
culture in different ways. In particular, some philosophers are attracted to the 
methodological rigour and acuteness of focus of scientific research culture, seeking 
to conduct their philosophising in a manner that would be deemed legitimate by this 
                                                 
28
 Jean-Louis Fabiani (1988) has produced an illuminating study of the historical emergence of this 
idea of philosophical ‘exceptionalism’ in France during the Third Republic, and the tension between 
this idea and the demands of a research culture increasingly regulated by ‘scientific’ norms and ideals. 
The final chapter of this work contains some suggestive remarks on the continuity between the Third 
Republic figure of the philosopher as legislator and regulator and the mid-twentieth-century figure of 
the philosopher as academic subversive, ideas which are fleshed out in Fabiani (2010).   
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culture; whilst others continue to embrace an essentially humanistic, even literary or 
artistic, model of philosophy, emphasising the freedom of philosophical thought 
from the mundane constraints demanded by scientific culture and specialised 
research. 
In a piece on Georges Canguilhem, published in the Revue de métaphysique 
et de morale in 1985,
29
 Foucault seems to gesture at something like this distinction. 
In the article, he posits a ‘dividing line’ in French philosophy ‘that separates a 
philosophy of experience, of meaning, of the subject, and a philosophy of 
knowledge, of rationality, and of the concept’ (Foucault 1998, p. 466). On the side of 
the philosophy of experience, he places Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, but also Bergson, 
Lachelier and Maine de Biran; whilst on the side of the philosophy of the concept, he 
places (implicitly) himself, Cavaillès, Bachelard, Koyré, Canguilhem, and delving 
further back Poincaré, Couturat and Comte. Throughout the article, a broad array of 
sympathetic philosophical engagements with the sciences are placed on the side of 
‘the philosophy of the concept’, while the capacity of those philosophers situated on 
the other side of the divide to do justice to the sciences and scientific rationality is 
put in question.  
There are numerous respects in which Foucault’s distinction, as he 
formulates it, is liable to distort matters. It seems to seek to be exhaustive, but in fact 
excludes important possibilities by conjoining too many diverse terms (experience, 
                                                 
29
 The Revue article is a reworked version of an article originally published in 1978 as the 
introduction to the English translation of Canguilhem’s Le Normal et le pathologique. The 1978 
version is less historically ambitious than the 1985 version, the latter projecting Foucault’s schema 
back into the nineteenth century. 
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meaning, subject; knowledge, rationality, concept).
30
 In addition, the assignment of 
philosophers to one side or the other of this dividing line submerges nuances and 
ambiguities of these thinkers’ positions – a point that various commentators have felt 
the need to make particularly in the case of Bergson (see Bianco 2011; During 
2004). Nevertheless, Foucault’s distinction does seem to pick up on a dimension 
along which philosophers might be distributed within the philosophical field in 
postwar France, namely the extent to which they identify with, or rather seek to resist 
and subvert, a scientific research culture and the constraints that it seeks to place on 
philosophical thought. It also indicates the way in which this tension manifests itself 
at the level of concrete philosophical commitments; that is to say, agents within the 
field perceived this dispute regarding philosophy’s relation to scientific culture as 
bound up with the extrication of philosophy from the ‘humanist’ concerns of French 
phenomenology (‘experience’, ‘meaning’, ‘subject’). If Foucault’s division is 
excessively binary, it is probably because it bears the traces of the ‘anti-humanist’ 
polemics which helped forge the idea of a new space of philosophical structuralisms 
opposed to phenomenology and the philosophies of existence.
31
 Interpreted in this 
way, the French philosophical field can be thought of as partially structured in terms 
of a spectrum stretched between scientific culture and humanistic culture, and of 
philosophers views on the relation between concepts and experience as being 
indicative of their position on this spectrum. Philosophers are pulled in one direction 
                                                 
30
 Pierre Cassou-Noguès (2010, pp. 233-234) clearly articulates this point, showing how the idea of a 
‘philosophy of the concept’ evolves from Cavaillès’ initial formulation to Canguilhem’s 
reformulation and finally Foucault’s version. 
31
 In this respect, Foucault’s historical tableau seems to be a good example of what Eric Schliesser 
(2013a) has termed ‘philosophic prophecy’, a rhetorical use of the history of philosophy in order to 
lend legitimacy to an attempted reframing of the terms in which philosophical debate develops. 
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by the rising cultural status of the sciences and scientific models of intellectual 
practice, at the same time as they are pulled in the other direction by ingrained 
associations between philosophy’s exceptional status within French humanistic 
culture and its creativity, critical authority and freedom from the strictures of 
specialised, empirical research. 
If Foucault sees fit to associate the poles of this spectrum with ‘concept’ and 
‘experience’ respectively, it is thus because of the sorts of positions that have 
operated nearest to each pole. That is to say, the clearest example of a twentieth-
century French philosophical current with an affinity with scientific culture is 
undoubtedly that of Bachelardian epistemology, which strongly emphasises the 
rational-historical dynamic of concepts, in opposition to immediate experience, as a 
criterion of scientificity;
32
 meanwhile, certain strands of existentialism, in 
emphasising ‘lived experience’ (le vécu) as the proper domain of philosophy, seem 
to exemplify a particularly literary philosophical bent.
33
 Whilst Foucault’s insistence 
on a binary division is ultimately polemically motivated, then, it nonetheless seems 
that his terms do give us a flavour of the spectrum of positions that populate the 
philosophical field in France in the ’50s and ’60s, between the pull of the sciences 
                                                 
32
 Related is Cavaillès’ (1970) work, which sees the development of transfinite mathematics and the 
formalisation of infinity as invalidating the idea that the dynamics of concepts in mathematical 
thought must be grounded in concrete experience. Bachelard also argues that the plasticity of 
mathematical form exceeds the limits of our intuitive, pre-scientific categories, associating the 
freedom of mathematical concepts from the constraints of common sense with the ‘epistemological 
break’ between pre-scientific and scientific thought (Tiles 1984, chap. 3). 
33
 An interesting example in this connection is Jean Wahl (1944), whose work valorises sub-
representational experience at the same time as it calls for ‘thinker-poets [poètes-penseurs]’, who are 
set in opposition to ‘the historian and the professor of philosophy’ (i.e. to academic orthodoxy) (pp. 7-
8). 
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and the pull of the humanities, between the self-sufficiency of conceptual systems 
and their dynamics on the one hand and concrete experience with its resistance to 
conceptual thought on the other. 
Frédéric Worms (2005) offers another way of framing the sorts of positions 
to be found at the poles of this spectrum, pointing to ‘two types of philosophical 
relation to science’ in twentieth-century French philosophy: ‘the critical deepening 
[of science]’ and ‘the metaphysical surpassing of science’ (p. 39). The latter tasks 
philosophy with ‘study[ing …] that which resists, in the real itself or in our thought, 
the endeavours of scientific thought’, whilst the former tasks philosophy with 
‘study[ing …] the risks that threaten this thought from within with being frozen into 
a dogmatism or an ideology’ (Worms 2005, p. 54). Assimilating Worms’ description 
with Foucault’s, the spectrum of positions can be seen as passing from a philosophy 
of experience which seeks to demarcate scientific thought’s de jure limits in a certain 
kind of experience and which sees philosophy as the mode of thought that is 
equipped to venture beyond these limits; and a philosophy of the concept which sees 
philosophy’s task as one of facilitating the ongoing development of scientific 
conceptual systems through an analysis of their functioning. 
Where should Deleuze be located on this spectrum? How does he situate 
philosophical activity in relation to these oppositions? One particularly striking 
suggestion comes from Alain Badiou (2000; 2004, chap. 6; 2009, pp. 7-8, pp. 267-
268), who claims that Deleuze’s philosophy is an archetypal example of the 
‘philosophy of experience’: a vitalism, or even a mysticism, complicit with 
phenomenology, concerned to delimit the power of conceptual thought in the face of 
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concrete existence.
34
 Recapitulating Foucault’s schema, Badiou (2000) portrays 
French philosophy in the twentieth century as split between the dual inheritances of 
Bergson and Brunschvicg: ‘on the one hand, a depreciation of the abstract as a 
simple instrumental convenience, and, on the other, an apologia of the Idea as the 
construction in which thought is revealed to itself’ (p. 98). ‘Deleuze’s immense 
merit’, Badiou (2000) claims, ‘was to have assumed and modernized the Bergsonian 
filiation’: ‘Deleuze single-handedly succeeded in […] secularizing Bergsonism and 
[…] connecting its concepts to the creations at the forefront of our time’ (p. 99). 
Such a doctrine ‘does not’, however, ‘support the real rights of the abstract’, insofar 
as ‘it cannot avoid continually depreciating what there is of conceptual stability in 
the order of theory’ (Badiou 2000, p. 99). Deleuze’s philosophy, according to 
Badiou, concerns itself with concrete existence at the expense of a proper 
appreciation of the power of conceptual thought. Correspondingly, Badiou doubts 
the seriousness of Deleuze’s engagements with mathematics and the sciences. 
Is Badiou’s assessment correct? There are reasons for regarding it to be 
misleading. What is striking, upon examining Deleuze’s philosophical commitments 
in more detail, is not that they sit particularly clearly on one side of Foucault’s divide 
or the other, but rather that Deleuze’s allegiances are markedly split. (Badiou’s 
insistence on a historically persistent binary, no less than Foucault’s, testifies to his 
ultimately polemical intent.) 
The intellectual historian Knox Peden (2011; 2014, chap. 2), in discussing 
the divisions within the postwar French philosophical field out of which Foucault’s 
schema seems to have grown, identifies Martial Guéroult and Ferdinand Alquié as 
                                                 
34
 See also Hallward (2006), who also seeks to associate Deleuze’s philosophy with mysticism. 
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particularly clear exemplars of the two poles of the spectrum of available positions, 
that is to say, proponents of philosophies particularly attentive to the demands of ‘the 
concept’ and of ‘experience’ respectively. Historians of philosophy, both figures 
rejected the idea that history and the social sciences were better positioned than 
philosophy to investigate the latter’s history. However, the nature of their 
understanding of the proper method of the history of philosophy and what renders it 
properly philosophical were opposed, and their longstanding conflict is emblematic 
of the dynamic of the postwar metaphilosophical debate in France. As Bianco 
(forthcoming, p. 2) notes, Alquié represents a literary model of philosophy orientated 
towards experience’s resistance to conceptuality and objectivity, whilst Guéroult 
represents a quasi-scientific model of philosophy orientated towards a rational 
interrogation of concepts, structures and systems. What is interesting about the 
metaphilosophical dispute between these figures from the point of view of the 
present chapter is that Deleuze manifests a clear commitment to both of them. This 
immediately indicates that any attempt to position Deleuze within the space of the 
debates indicated by Foucault’s schema will have to be more nuanced than Badiou’s. 
The conception of philosophy at which Deleuze ultimately arrives (‘transcendental 
empiricism’) is an attempt to reconcile certain aspects of Alquié’s and Guéroult’s 
conceptions of philosophy, and thus to find a point of intersection at which the 
divide described in Foucault’s schema becomes indiscernible.35 In other words, 
Deleuze is nearer the middle of the philosophical spectrum than either of its 
extremes. In taking this reconciliatory line, as I will show, Deleuze follows the lead 
                                                 
35
 Here I follow Bianco (forthcoming) and Peden (2011; 2014, esp. chap. 2) in seeing the work of 
reconciling Alquié and Guéroult as central to the formation of Deleuze’s own early conception of 
philosophy. 
 66 
 
of Jean Hyppolite – and an important determining factor for his eventual position is 
an attempt to extricate such a reconciliatory position from the Hegelian approach 
embraced by Hyppolite.  
An examination of the way in which Deleuze situates himself in relation to 
these figures can thus help us to clarify his position and how it is situated in the 
philosophical field.  
 
2 Alquié, Guéroult, Hyppolite 
2.1 Between Alquié and Guéroult 
Peden (2011) summarises the dispute between Alquié and Guéroult as a dispute 
between ‘a philosophy which emphasizes the limits of rational thought to the profit 
of a more primordial, ineffable experience or intuition, and a philosophy which 
insists upon the capacity of rationalism to transgress the limits of lived experience to 
articulate conceptual insights of a universal or indeed absolute variety’ (p. 365). 
Philosophy is conceived either as the excavation of a sub-conceptual experience or 
as the analysis of ideal rational structures. How does Deleuze situates himself in 
relation to these seemingly divergent conceptions of philosophy? 
Deleuze makes clear statements of affiliation with Ferdinand Alquié at two 
points in his early work (although many more in private correspondence).
36
 The first 
is in a 1956 review, published in the journal Cahiers du sud, of Alquié’s Descartes, 
                                                 
36
 Alquié was an esteemed Sorbonne historian of philosophy and Deleuze’s longtime teacher, 
supervising his secondary doctoral thesis on Spinoza. Deleuze dedicated his monograph on Kant to 
him. For an overview of Alquié’s role in Deleuze’s education and intellectual development, see 
Bianco (2005, pp. 91-6; forthcoming); see also Dosse (2010, p. 95, pp. 97-98, p. 110, pp. 113-114, pp. 
117-120, p. 143). For accounts of Deleuze’s correspondence with Alquié, see Bianco (forthcoming).  
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l’homme et l’œuvre, an introductory text building on the reading presented in 
Alquié’s 1950 monograph, La Découverte métaphysique de l’homme chez 
Descartes.
37
 There, Deleuze states that in Alquié’s Descartes – and it is quite clear 
that, throughout the review, Deleuze attributes to Alquié himself the positions he 
takes the latter to attribute to Descartes
38
 – he discerns ‘a conception of philosophy 
we must preserve’ (FAD, p. 473 [my translations throughout]). While Deleuze does 
not embrace the whole of Alquié’s Cartesianism,39 there are nevertheless clearly 
aspects of Alquié’s general conception of philosophy that Deleuze takes to be 
persuasive. The second statement of affiliation is made in 1967, during the 
discussion (mentioned above) following Deleuze’s presentation to the Société 
française de philosophie. As noted above, in response to Alquié’s suggestion that his 
presentation lacked specifically philosophical content, Deleuze responded: ‘I do 
believe in the specificity of philosophy’; ‘and’, he continues, ‘I’ve inherited this 
conviction from you yourself’ (DI, p. 149/p. 106 [translation modified]). Thus, 
despite a sense of mutual philosophical incomprehension between the two men that 
                                                 
37
 Deleuze (1956) also speaks approvingly of Alquié’s work in another 1956 book review published in 
Études philosophiques, on Alquié’s Philosophie du surréalisme. Here Deleuze (1956) discusses the 
importance of signs in art in a way that will clearly influence his later work on Proust, and attributes 
to Alquié ‘a rationalism which is not system-building and which is enriched by the double content of 
desire and signs’, ‘a metaphysics that is strangely living’ (p. 316). 
38
 Interestingly, this was Guéroult’s accusation against Alquié: that he insisted on using philosophy’s 
‘mighty dead’ as vectors for the transmission of his own philosophical message (Peden 2011, p. 371). 
39
 It is likely that Deleuze was already at this point working with a fairly well-developed version of 
his secondary doctoral dissertation on Spinoza, since the latter ‘was practically finished in the late 
1950s’ (Dosse 2010, p. 118), and his attitude to Cartesianism in this work is distinctly critical. Indeed, 
Spinozism is part of an ‘Anticartesian reaction’ undertaken in the name of ‘a new “naturalism”’ (SPE, 
p. 227/p. 207), a point to which I will return in chapter 4. 
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would only grow in the time following the second pronouncement noted above,
40
 it 
seems that Deleuze adopts from Alquié, and subsequently maintains, certain core 
ideas concerning the nature and value of philosophy and its specificity in relation to 
other kinds of intellectual activity. 
 It is possible to get a clearer sense of the conception of philosophy in 
question here by returning to Deleuze’s aforementioned 1956 review of Alquié. The 
conception of philosophy Deleuze praises in the context of this review frames 
philosophy’s specificity in terms of its surpassing the limitations of scientific 
thought, understood as the exemplar of objective, rational, conceptual knowledge. 
‘Descartes saw the original condition of his project of a universal and certain 
science: Nature, as a spatial, actual and mechanical system, was deprived of its 
thickness [épaisseur], of its potentialities [virtualités], of its qualities, of its 
spontaneity’; and yet this rationally cognisable world – a world without qualities – is 
a world deprived of ‘being’, insofar as it is this ‘thickness’ which is proper to that 
experience of being ‘the evidence for which is primary in any mind’ (FAD, p. 474).41 
That is, there is a richness of determination that is manifest in pre-conceptual 
experience and yet which is necessarily suppressed as a condition of the possibility 
of scientific knowledge: ‘If Nature [i.e. the object of science] is not being, Being is 
                                                 
40
 By the time of the defence of his thesis in 1968, Deleuze would describe the distance that had 
opened up between himself and Alquié, as much personal as philosophical, as an ‘abyss’ – a remark 
made in a letter to his friend and fellow philosopher, François Châtelet (as cited in Dosse 2010, p. 
178). As Bianco (2005) notes, Deleuze would ultimately come to refer to Alquié with ‘merciless 
sarcasm’, and would not contribute to the hommage to him edited by Jean-Luc Marion (p. 92). 
41
 This notion of ‘thickness’ (épaisseur) would appear to be one that Deleuze takes from Jean Wahl 
(1932), who speaks of a ‘worship of reality in its thickness [épaisseur]’ (a term he finds in Whitehead 
and William James) as characteristic of that ‘empiricism in the second degree’ which he likewise 
attributes to Bergson (pp. 6-7).   
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not nature, and is not scientifically understood, but must be conceived 
philosophically’ (FAD, p. 474). Philosophy is the endeavour to elucidate without 
eliminating this ‘thickness’ which is the ‘being’ of the world as we experience it, this 
plenitude of determination which is experientially available though it resists 
scientific, rational or objective conceptualisation. 
Alquié’s is thus a philosophy dedicated to the notion of an irreducibly 
subjective experience of being, beyond the limits of conceptual thought; to the 
ultimately ineffable character of such experience; and to the dangers of its 
obfuscation at the hands of the will to expand scientific knowledge into all available 
domains.
42
 Thus, philosophy’s task, conceived explicitly in opposition to the guiding 
concerns of modern science, is to cultivate this universal ontological experience: 
‘Properly philosophical knowledge [savoir] explicates a fundamental experience, a 
non-conceptual presence of being to consciousness’ (Alquié 1950, p. 148). This 
notion of a philosophy built around a conceptually indeterminable and hence 
ultimately ineffable experience of ‘subjective universality’ (as cited in Peden 2011, 
p. 372) is one Alquié claims to discern in the essentially personal experience of 
Cartesian doubt and process of Cartesian ‘meditation’; the cogito, and the 
consequent re-establishment of a connection between the pursuit of knowledge and a 
relationship with the divine, marking, for him, the irruption of a metaphysical excess 
into the previously closed edifice of objectifying reason that had characterised 
Descartes’ pursuit of a ‘universal science’.   
Deleuze, in his review, seems to align himself with this experiential excess, 
and with the limitations on conceptual knowledge it implies. It is worth noting that 
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 ‘Science is the constitution of objectivity by rejecting subjectivity’ (Alquié 1957, p. v [my 
translation]). 
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he also foregrounds a certain non-conformism in Alquié’s conception of philosophy 
that is bound up with this notion of an excavation of a pre-conceptual experience 
(FAD, p. 474). If philosophy essentially involves a break with established 
intellectual conventions and presuppositions, this is insofar as these underpin the 
conceptual apparatus that keeps us at arm’s length from ontological experience. This, 
according to Alquié, is the reason that the movement of Cartesian meditation is 
paradigmatic of the movement of philosophical thought in general: Descartes’ 
rejection of scholastic doctrine in favour of a fundamental reconstruction of 
knowledge through the powers of intuition and reason alone is the movement 
through which all philosophy passes. While Deleuze does not embrace every aspect 
of this Cartesian image of philosophical non-conformism,
43
 what he does seem to 
take up from Alquié is the idea that philosophy’s specificity lies in its breaking with 
the intellectual conventions and paradigms of its time through an experiential 
encounter with the extra-conceptual ‘thickness’ of being, which it tries to find a 
means to express without simply obscuring. 
Focusing on Deleuze’s debt to Alquié, Badiou’s assessment might seem to 
ring true. But what of Deleuze’s parallel filiation with Guéroult? Deleuze published 
a positive review of the first volume of Guéroult’s study of Spinoza in the Revue de 
métaphysique et de morale in 1969, in which he praises Guéroult for having 
‘establishe[d] the genuinely scientific study of Spinozism’ (DI, p. 216/p. 155). 
However, his sympathy for Guéroult’s approach to the history of philosophy runs 
deeper than this, and stems from much earlier. As Bianco (forthcoming, pp. 11-13) 
notes, several of Deleuze’s university classmates have recorded in memoirs and 
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 See Deleuze’s discussion of Descartes’ unfinished dialogue, ‘The Search for Truth by Means of the 
Natural Light’, in chapter 3 of Difference and Repetition. 
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interviews his enthusiastic attendance at Guéroult’s courses at the Sorbonne and the 
Collège de France, and a debt to Guéroult’s structural conception of philosophical 
texts is evident in Deleuze’s own early forays into the history of philosophy.  
In contrast to Alquié, Guéroult rejects any identification of the logical 
movement of a philosophical text with the personal ‘meditations’ of its author. A 
philosophical text is a structure or system, and the work of the historian of 
philosophy – as a ‘technician’ of philosophical texts – is to analyse the internal logic 
of this structure. ‘[W]hat is strictly philosophical’ in philosophical texts on 
Guéroult’s view, as recounted by his former student Jean-Christophe Goddard, ‘is 
precisely the autonomous reality of the work’s structures’ (Dosse 1997a, p. 80). As 
François Dosse (1997a) notes, Guéroult criticised Kant and Fichte for having failed 
to construct a satisfactory form of idealism, because, ‘having remained prisoners of 
realities and their representations’, they failed to appreciate the ‘self-sufficiency’ of 
conceptual systems understood as hermetically sealed structures (p. 81). 
In his emphasis on the autonomy and self-sufficiency of the internal logic of 
conceptual systems, independent of the subjective movement of the minds of their 
authors, Guéroult’s position recalls that of Cavaillès in the posthumously published 
manuscript, Sur la logique et la théorie de la science, in which he first proposes the 
idea of a ‘philosophy of the concept’ that Foucault will adopt in his historical 
schema. Cavaillès’ (1970) complaint against the ‘philosophy of consciousness’, 
exemplified by Husserl’s philosophy of mathematics, is that in seeking to ground the 
meaning and limits of the development of mathematical concepts in lived or concrete 
experience, such a philosophy cannot do justice to the autonomous development of 
concepts beyond these limits, as evidenced in the conceptual innovations of Cantor’s 
transfinite set theory and its rigorous formalisation of infinity (p. 409; see Peden 
 72 
 
2014, chap. 1). Likewise in Guéroult, the idea that the meaning of conceptual 
constructions must be indexed to the lived experience of the thinker who constructs 
them is dismissed in favour of the autonomy of structural idealities from the 
‘realities’ of their genesis. If any position in postwar French philosophy deserves 
Cavaillès’ title of ‘philosophy of the concept’, it is surely Guéroult’s. 
In embracing such a ‘structural’ method, which can be seen at work in 
Deleuze’s early histories of philosophy (and, as I will explore in more detail 
presently, in his theory of ‘Ideas’), Deleuze seems to push back decisively against 
Badiou’s suggestion that he has no interest in doing justice to the power of 
conceptual thought to break with the ‘concrete’ realities of lived experience. But 
how can Deleuze’s apparent sympathy for Guéroult’s rationalistic idealism be 
squared with his professed sympathy for Alquié’s philosophy of sub-conceptual 
ontological experience, Alquié’s literary model of philosophy as a struggle to 
express the inexpressible with Guéroult’s quasi-scientific model of philosophy as the 
logical analysis of ideal structures? 
 
2.2 Between logic and existence: Hyppolite’s Hegelianism 
In the previous section, I suggested that Deleuze’s philosophical allegiances are best 
seen, pace Badiou, as divided between the two poles of the postwar French 
philosophical field as mapped out by Foucault, between a ‘philosophy of experience’ 
and a ‘philosophy of the concept’. On the one hand, Deleuze expresses and displays 
affinities with Guéroult which seem to place him on the side of a quasi-scientific 
model of philosophy tied to the autonomous dynamics of conceptual systems and 
ideal structures; whilst on the other hand, he expresses a more explicit, yet 
conflicted, affinity with Alquié, which seems to pull him towards a literary model of 
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philosophy tied to the exploration of a sub-conceptual ontological experience. If 
Deleuze cannot be placed comfortably at either pole of the field so structured, on 
either side of Foucault’s ‘dividing line’, then where on the spectrum of positions in 
between does he seek to position himself?  
Deleuze’s relation to a third figure will help to clarify his position in this 
respect: namely, Jean Hyppolite. It is with Hyppolite’s philosophy that Deleuze 
seems ultimately to associate his own project most strongly at this time, at the same 
time as it is the work of extricating himself from Hyppolite’s Hegelianism that gives 
to this project its distinctive form. Hyppolite’s approach to the divisions in the 
philosophical field reflected in Foucault’s schema is reconciliatory. Indeed, 
Hyppolite’s postwar work is marked, as Bianco (2013) notes, by an ongoing effort 
‘to reconcile the rigour of the investigation of the forms and systems of rationality 
[…] with the exploration of lived, pre-reflective experience, open to the non-
philosophical’ (p. 18 [my translation]). This effort of reconciliation or synthesis is 
apparent in the mutating series of conjunctions by which Hyppolite designates the 
objects of his philosophical concern – structure and genesis (Hyppolite 1974),44 logic 
and existence (Hyppolite 1997), logic and history (Hyppolite 1971, p. 1008), truth 
and existence (Hyppolite 1971, p. 1014), structure and existence.
45
 In each new 
work, what is aimed at is a demonstration of the irrevocable entanglement of the 
ideal and the concrete. 
                                                 
44
 On the impact and origins of Hyppolite’s use of this particular conjunction, see Bianco (2013, pp. 
23-24 n. 36). 
45
 The announced theme of a planned project, never completed in Hyppolite’s lifetime (Bianco 2013, 
p. 20). 
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 Deleuze’s project of transcendental empiricism models its approach to the 
diverging demands of the philosophies of ‘experience’ and ‘concept’ on that of 
Hyppolite – that is to say, it proposes a ‘synthesis’. Like Hyppolite, Deleuze seeks to 
occupy a region of philosophical space in which the philosophies of experience and 
of the concept become indiscernible. Deleuze formulates his approach, however, as 
an alternative to Hyppolite’s, and it will prove central to Deleuze’s motivations to 
avoid the pitfalls he diagnoses in the Hegelian approach adopted by Hyppolite. In the 
remainder of this section, I will briefly outline Hyppolite’s approach (as presented by 
Deleuze), before going on, in the next section, to outline Deleuze’s critique of 
Hegelianism and the way in which his alternative synthesis is supposed to function. 
Having thus clarified Deleuze’s position within the reconfiguration of the 
philosophical field associated with the emergence of philosophical structuralism, I 
will be in a position to return to the question of what conclusions can be drawn from 
this regarding Deleuze’s attitude to the significance of the sciences and scientificity 
for the nature and value of philosophy. 
 In December 1963, on the occasion of his inaugural lecture as Chair of the 
History of Philosophical Thought at the Collège de France (previously occupied by 
Guéroult, during whose tenure the position was entitled the Chair of the History and 
Technology of Philosophical Systems), Hyppolite provided a précis of his 
reconciliatory intent in terms of an attempt to do justice to the philosophical 
concerns of both Guéroult and Merleau-Ponty. ‘Philosophy’, he states in this 
connection, ‘can renounce neither rigour, demonstrative form in general, nor its 
relation with the real, with experience’ (Hyppolite 1971, p. 1013 [my translation]). 
Philosophy must indeed take the form of a ‘logic’, a rationally constructed system of 
conceptual relations; but this should be ‘a transcendental logic, […] a reflection that 
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recuperates, or tries to recuperate, our originary relation to lived experience, to 
existence and to being’ (Hyppolite 1971, p. 1013 [my translation]). The significance 
of Hegel for such a project is emphasised throughout. 
 If Hegelianism strikes Hyppolite as a productive way of approaching the 
division between the philosophy of the concept and the philosophy of experience, it 
is insofar as Hyppolite’s approach exploits certain Kantian resonances of the tension 
highlighted by Foucault’s schema. The question of how to reconcile the demands of 
concrete experience with the rights of the concept (and with it, the question of how 
philosophy should relate to the two intellectual cultures between which it finds itself 
torn, that of the humanities and that of the sciences) can be mapped onto the 
problematic of Kant’s critical philosophy: that is, this question can be construed as 
one of determining the nature of the relation between sensibility and conceptual 
thought. Hegel, of course, offers what he presents as a fuller and more robust 
solution than Kant’s own, which risks positing the heterogeneity of concept and 
intuition without adequately accounting for how these terms then come into relation 
with one another (I will return to this point shortly, in the context of explaining 
Deleuze’s position). Hyppolite embraces Hegel’s critique of Kant and goes on to 
formulate an essentially Hegelian reconciliation of the philosophies of the concept 
and of experience. 
 In terms of Hyppolite’s influence on the formation of Deleuze’s 
transcendental empiricism, the key statement of Hegelianism as a reconciliation of 
‘logic’ (Guéroult) and ‘experience’ (Merleau-Ponty) is the 1953 monograph, Logic 
and Existence. The latter was an important text in the life of Hegel’s reception in 
France, insofar as it provided a reading of Hegel sensitive to the concerns of those 
philosophers whose view of Hegel had soured along with the decline in standing of 
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the philosophical anthropology and ‘humanism’ with which, due to the interpretative 
work of Kojève and others, Hegel had come to be associated in the 1930s and ’40s.46 
It is in a 1954 review of this work by Hyppolite, published in the journal Revue 
philosophique de la France et de l'étranger, that Deleuze outlines his understanding 
of Hyppolite’s project, its importance, but also its limitations and the need to reject 
some of its key assumptions.  
 The central claim that Deleuze identifies in Hyppolite’s ‘essential book’ is 
the following: ‘Philosophy must be ontology […]; but there is no ontology of 
essence, there is only an ontology of sense [sens]’ (DI, p. 18/p. 15 [original 
emphasis]).
47
 Philosophy, then, is in some sense an attempt to grasp being in thought 
(i.e. ontology). While Deleuze’s presentation in the review is undoubtedly dense, he 
does make some clarificatory remarks regarding the components of this claim. 
Firstly, that ‘“philosophy is ontology” means […] that philosophy is not 
anthropology’, or ‘empirical knowledge [savoir empirique]’ (DI, p. 18/p. 15, p. 21/p. 
17). Secondly, sense here refers to the ‘identity of being [l’être] and difference’ (DI, 
p. 22/p. 18). This conception of being as difference, or as self-differing,
48
 is required, 
                                                 
46
 On the significance of Hyppolite and Logic and Existence for Deleuze’s generation of French 
philosophers, see Lawlor (2003, chap. 1). 
47
 The present sketch of Deleuze’s presentation of Hyppolite’s Hegel will be fairly brief. For a fuller 
discussion, see Bianco (2005, pp. 96-101), Kerslake (2002), Tissandier (2013, pp. 70-77) and Widder 
(2003). 
48
 ‘Speculative difference is self-contradictory Being. The thing contradicts itself because, 
distinguishing itself from all that is not, it finds its being in this very difference’ (DI, p. 22/p. 18 [my 
emphasis]). 
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Deleuze states, in order to ‘understand what being is with respect to the [sensible] 
given’ (DI, p. 20/p. 16).49 
 How does Deleuze understand this ‘empirical knowledge’ from which 
properly philosophical knowledge must be distinguished and with which it must 
break in order to achieve its ontological task of ‘thinking’ being? In what respects 
does it hinder ontology? The problem with empirical knowledge, according to 
Deleuze – and this is also its defining characteristic – is that ‘the speaker [or subject 
of knowledge] and the object of his speech [or knowledge] are separate’ (DI, p. 18/p. 
15). ‘Reflection is on one side, while being is on the other’ (DI, p. 18/p. 15). 
Consequently, when thought operates in this mode, ‘knowledge [connaissance] […] 
is not a movement of the thing [known]’, but ‘remains outside the object’ in a 
‘reflection [that] is merely external and formal’ (DI, p. 18/p. 15 [translation 
modified]). The inadequacy of this ‘external’ relation between conceptual thought 
and its sensible object as a basis for ontology lies in the inability of thought to grasp 
the being of its object. The concepts thought applies to the given in its attempt to 
render it intelligible are essentially heterogeneous to their object, such that the 
determinations thought discerns in its object belong more to thought than to being. 
Kant’s critical idealism indicates the way beyond empirical knowledge in conceiving 
‘the synthetic identity of subject and object’ – that is, the identity of the conditions of 
possibility of knowledge and the conditions of possibility of objects of knowledge – 
yet fails to grasp being by restricting this identity to ‘an object relative to the subject’ 
(DI, p. 19/p. 15 [translation modified]). Being, for Kant, remains outside thought in 
                                                 
49
 Deleuze’s subsequent formulation, according to which ‘difference is that by which the given is 
given […] as diverse’, and thus ‘the very being of the sensible’ (DR, p. 286/p. 222, p. 80/p. 57 
[original emphasis]), is already present in germ in this phrase. 
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the extra-representational realm of noumena. Speculative idealism, however, 
succeeds in superseding the limitations of empirical or ‘anthropological’ knowledge 
by recognising the heterogeneity of thought and being as ‘the internal difference of 
Being that thinks itself’ (DI, p. 21/p. 17). Philosophy is able to take up the mantle of 
ontology insofar as philosophical discourse is not a discourse about being, but the 
site at which being expresses itself in thought. 
 It thus also becomes somewhat clearer why Hyppolite, according to 
Deleuze’s presentation, insists on conceiving being in its relation to the sensible 
given, that is, as ‘the sense [sens] of this world’ (i.e. the sensible world) rather than 
as an ‘essence beyond appearances’ (DI, p. 20/p. 16). In embracing and radicalising 
(by jettisoning the idea of the thing-in-itself) the Kantian notion that the sensible 
constitutes the horizon of conceptual knowledge, Hyppolite’s Hegel makes being 
something available to thought, not locked away behind the impenetrable surface of 
the sensible given. Ontology, tasked with grasping being in thought, makes explicit 
the rational structure and movement (or ‘logic’) within the sensible which renders 
the latter meaningful, which constitutes its meaning or sense – which ‘makes sense’ 
of the sensible. 
Arising out of Deleuze’s rather tightly packed summation of Hyppolite’s 
position is the idea of philosophy as a ‘logic of sense [logique du sens]’ – where, as I 
have indicated above, the significance of meaning or sense is directly indexed to the 
inescapability of sensible experience as the horizon for conceptual thought (DI, p. 
20/p. 16). This idea manifests the Hyppolitean synthesis which renders indiscernible 
the supposed dividing line between a philosophy of rationality or of the concept and 
a philosophy of experience or meaning. Sense and the sensible too have a logic, a 
rational structure, if only implicitly or obscurely, and it is philosophy’s task to render 
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it clear and explicit. From the opening of the Phenomenology to the close of the 
Logic, Hegel provides us with an account of the journey from ordinary experience to 
the heights of philosophical thought, from the concrete to the ideal, which serves to 
close the gap between the two, showing it to have been only a necessary appearance. 
The ideal is always contained within the concrete and vice versa. Foucault’s 
opposition would seem to find itself aufgehoben. 
 Deleuze, writing in 1954, praises the conception of philosophy he discerns in 
Hyppolite’s work, and the persistence of its influence is nowhere clearer than in the 
title of his 1969 work, Logic of Sense. However, he also takes his distance from 
Hyppolite in ways that in retrospect seem to constitute a proposal of the project that 
will come to fruition in Difference and Repetition. In the next section, then, I will 
outline how Deleuze situates his own position in relation to Hyppolite and 
Hegelianism, both in the 1954 review and in subsequent work. What are the 
problems with Hyppolite’s reconciliation of ‘experience’ and ‘concept’, and how, 
correspondingly, does transcendental empiricism provide a more convincing 
synthesis? 
 
3 Transcendental empiricism: synthesis and schematism 
Deleuze’s project participates in a problematic that it shares with the late eighteenth- 
and early nineteenth-century German reception of Kant’s work. Acknowledging as a 
starting point the significance of the Kantian separation of receptivity and 
spontaneity, the human being’s sensuous nature and its intellectual nature, ultimately 
the theoretical separation of the domains of nature and freedom, these post-Kantian 
projects sought to take up and complete the work of reuniting these divided terms 
 80 
 
(begun by Kant in the Third Critique).
50
 Transcendental empiricism is thus an 
attempt to ‘overcom[e …] the Kantian duality between concept and intuition’, 
thought and experience (DR, p. 224/p. 173). Hyppolite sees the Hegelian incarnation 
of this project as a way of building bridges between apparently divergent orientations 
within French philosophy. Insofar as Deleuze’s project attempts to build a bridge 
between Alquié’s and Guéroult’s conceptions of philosophy, he follows Hyppolite in 
mapping the project of overcoming Kant’s duality onto the project of bridging the 
gap within French philosophy represented by the dispute between these two figures. 
 
3.1 Against the dialectic 
Why does Deleuze not regard Hegelianism, as presented by Hyppolite, as providing 
a satisfactory way to reconcile his apparently conflicting affinities? In his review of 
Hyppolite’s Logic and Existence, Deleuze delineates those aspects of Hyppolite’s 
project of which he approves from the point at which ‘Hyppolite shows himself to be 
altogether Hegelian [tout à fait hégélien]’ (DI, p. 22/p. 18 [Lawlor and Sen’s 
translation, as cited in Hyppolite 1997, p. 195]). Hegelianism, according to Deleuze, 
can account for neither the singular (the uniqueness of individual things) nor the new 
(fundamental transformations in what there is and how we think).
51
 As such, 
Hegelianism fails to grasp being in its relation to the sensible, or ‘the being of the 
sensible’ (DR, p. 80/p. 57). The problem, for Deleuze, is that the intelligible order 
that Hegel claims to discern in the sensible is an abstract conceptual order: the 
                                                 
50
 See Beiser (1987, esp. chap. 10; 2002); Guyer (2000). 
51
 The account of Deleuze’s critique of Hegel sketched here will be quite brief. For fuller accounts, 
see Baugh (1992) and Somers-Hall (2012a), as well as the essays collected in Houle and Vernon 
(2013). 
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movement of the dialectic is a movement in which general determinations show 
themselves to be complicit with the opposing determinations which (in accordance 
with an Aristotelian logic) are supposed to constitute their fixed identities, such that 
these identities show themselves to be unstable. The being of sensible things is 
determined as a series of internalised contradictions, each determination being fully 
realised only insofar as it comes to contain everything that it is not.  
Whilst claiming to discern a dialectical conceptual order within the sensible, 
Hegelianism, according to Deleuze, in fact grasps in the sensible only that in it which 
conforms to conceptual form, losing sight of (or rather excluding a priori) those 
aspects of the sensible that do not so conform – singularity, novelty, difference.52 
Here, Deleuze seems to take issue with the very beginning of the Hegelian dialectic, 
the inaugural move whereby (in the Phenomenology of Spirit) the sensible 
immediacy of pure particularity (the ‘this’-‘here’-‘now’ of sense-certainty) collapses 
in the face of the realisation of the inherent generality and emptiness of these 
apparent particularities. His comments in Difference and Repetition on this point are 
worth quoting at length: 
 
The imprint of the Hegelian dialectic on the beginnings of the Phenomenology has 
often been noted: the here and the now are posited as empty identities, as abstract 
universalities which claim to draw difference along with them, when in fact 
difference does not by any means follow and remains attached in the depths of its 
own space, in the here-now of a differential reality always made up of singularities. 
[… Hegel] creates movement, […] but because he creates it with words and 
representations it is a false movement, and nothing follows. […] One can always 
mediate, pass over into the antithesis, combine the synthesis, but the thesis does not 
follow: it subsists in its immediacy, in its difference which itself constitutes the true 
movement. Difference is the true content of the thesis, the persistence of the thesis. 
                                                 
52
 Representation, Deleuze states, ‘retains in the particular [i.e. the sensible given] only that which 
conforms to the general [i.e. the concept]’ (DR, p. 56/p. 38). Hegelianism, he claims, ‘in the last resort 
[…] does not free itself from the principle of identity as a presupposition of representation’ (DR, p. 
70/p. 49 [original emphasis]). 
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The negative and negativity do not even capture the phenomenon of difference, only 
the phantom or the epiphenomenon. The whole of the Phenomenology is an 
epiphenomenology. 
(DR, pp. 73-74/pp. 51-52) 
   
This, in Deleuze’s estimation, is what goes wrong in Hegel’s reasoning.53 Hegel (on 
Hyppolite’s reading) seeks to reconcile conceptual thought and the being of the 
sensible by showing the particularity and immediacy of sensible intuition to be only 
apparent, a moment in the unfolding of the concept. According to Deleuze, however, 
Hegel begins from a misapprehension of the nature of ‘real experience’ – the 
sensible as it is presented in the dialectic of sense-certainty is already subjected to 
the requirements of conceptualisation. Consequently, Hegel is operating with only an 
abstract image of the sensible, and misses the real movement of the sensible that 
evades the movement of the concept, namely the movement of difference.
54
 Deleuze 
reads Hegel as approaching the sensible from the standpoint of conceptual thought, 
seeking to reconcile the former to the demands of the latter. He will recommend 
instead the inverse procedure: philosophy must start from ‘individual existences’ 
(DI, p. 33/p. 25)
55
 in order to discern each singular thing’s ‘internal difference’ or 
nuance (its singular essence) – a sufficient reason ‘reach[ing] all the way to the 
individual’ – and on this basis construct ‘the concept that fits only the object itself’ 
(DI, p. 44/p. 32, p. 49/p. 36). In other words, it must be shown how it is that concepts 
                                                 
53
 I am not attempting here to vindicate Deleuze’s reasoning – only to explain it. There are no doubt 
numerous responses the Hegelian could make to such a critique, especially given that it is a style of 
criticism with which Hegelianism has been greeted fairly consistently. For a thorough account of how 
Hegel might respond to Deleuzian criticisms of his account of the movement of the dialectic, see 
Somers-Hall (2012a, esp. chap. 7). 
54
 ‘The immediate is precisely the identity of the thing and its difference’ (DI, p. 33/p. 25). 
55
 Deleuze is quoting Bergson here. 
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can be made to conform to the demands of the sensible, understood as a field of non-
conceptual differences.
56
 (I will elaborate on these points when I examine Deleuze’s 
own position below.) 
 The likely source of the line of criticism of Hegel adopted by Deleuze is Jean 
Wahl.
57
 ‘Hegel’, Wahl (1932) recounts in the preface to Vers le concret, ‘tells us at 
the start of the Phenomenology that that which is thought to be particular and 
concrete is in reality the most abstract and the most general, that that to which the 
empiricist and the realist attribute the greatest richness is in reality that in the world 
which is poorest’ (p. 1 [my translations throughout]). In this way, ‘he has given one 
of the most profound motifs of idealist thought its most striking form’; this motif is a 
mainstay of idealism, which ‘will always say that that which is supposedly concrete 
is only an abstraction and a fiction’ (Wahl 1932, p. 1). But Hegel’s argument, Wahl 
continues, relies explicitly and openly on language, that is, on the inscription (one 
might say re-presentation) of the ‘this-here-now’ of sense-certainty by which I 
recognise what is presented as what it is, whereby I recognise it as ‘this’, ‘here’, 
‘now’. That the dialectical movement of the Phenomenology – the movement which 
purports to carry us, if only we exert the effort required to suspend our 
presuppositions and attachments to any given moment of this movement, to the 
identity of thought and being in ‘absolute knowing’ – relies on language (or more 
                                                 
56
 Deleuze makes similar critical remarks apropos Hegel in Nietzsche and Philosophy: ‘The being of 
Hegelian logic is merely “thought” being [l’être seulement pensé], pure and empty’ (NP, p. 210/p. 
183); ‘[o]pposition can be the law of the relation between abstract products, but difference is the only 
principle of genesis or production’ (NP, p. 181/p. 157). 
57
 In a 1972 letter, quoted by Deleuze’s biographer, François Dosse (2010), Deleuze describes Wahl 
as ‘the one who led the reaction against the dialectic when Hegel was in full vogue at the university’ 
(p. 110). Deleuze seems also to have found support for such an argument against Hegel in Feuerbach 
(see Somers-Hall 2015). 
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generally on the inscription whereby a moment is recognised as the moment it is) 
raises, according to Wahl (1932, p. 1), the following dilemma: ‘should we conclude, 
following Hegel, that language thus reveals the unreality of the concrete’; or, 
‘[s]hould we not instead say that language, far from revealing the real, reveals itself 
in its impotence?’ Wahl (1932) embraces the latter option, praising those 
philosophers – whom he terms ‘second degree’ empiricists – who ‘demand the rights 
of the immediate’ (Whitehead, William James, Gabriel Marcel and, crucially for 
Deleuze, Bergson) (p. 3; see also Wahl 1944, p. 14).
58
 Deleuze effectively 
reproduces Wahl’s argument in Difference and Repetition: Hegel’s ‘sublation’ of 
sensible particularity in the generality of concepts fails to grasp sensible particularity 
as such, because, beginning already at the level of words and concepts (i.e. 
representations), Hegel’s dialectic ‘retains in the particular only that which conforms 
to the general’ (DR, p. 56/p. 38). The non-conceptual differences between singular 
individuals – as well as the deeper field of non-conceptual differences which 
Deleuze will posit as the ‘reason’ of these individuals, that is, as that which accounts 
for their individuation – is thus passed over by the movement of the dialectic. 
 The root of the problem with Hegel’s position, for Deleuze, is that his 
blinkered focus on the abstract movement of concept leads him to deny ‘the 
existence of non-conceptual differences’ (DR, p. 23/p. 13); he ‘take[s] difference to 
be conceptual difference, intrinsically conceptual’ (DR, p. 39/p. 26). According to 
Deleuze, the sensible determinations for which the movement of the Hegelian 
                                                 
58
 Wahl (1932) uses the terms ‘first degree’ and ‘second degree’ empiricism to refer to empiricisms 
which do not and do, respectively, pose the question of being, the latter therefore being an empiricism 
that could legitimately claim to have ‘surpassed [dépassé]’ rationalism rather than being simply naïve 
to its metaphysical concerns (pp. 6-7). 
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dialectic fails to account are precisely non-conceptual differences. Deleuze finds 
persuasive, in this connection, a number of cases of what, in the introduction to 
Difference and Repetition, he calls conceptual ‘blockage’ (DR, p. 20 ff./p. 11 ff.). A 
concept is ‘blocked’ when it encounters a difference that it cannot specify; and this is 
precisely what happens, according to Deleuze, when conceptual thought is 
confronted by ‘differences of nature’ between individuals of the same general type, 
in other words, distinct individuals that instantiate the same concept (DI, p. 44/p. 
33). Deleuze refers to such cases as cases of ‘bare repetition’ (DR, pp. 36-37/pp. 23-
24). Bare repetition thus testifies to the capacity of sensible individuals to ‘block’ 
conceptual thought, ‘a power peculiar to the existent, a stubbornness of the existent 
in intuition, which resists every specification by concepts no matter how far this is 
taken’ (DR, p. 23/pp. 13-14). Perhaps his key example is drawn from Kant 
(specifically from Kant’s dispute with Leibnizianism concerning the reducibility of 
spatial relations to logical relations), and concerns so-called ‘incongruent 
counterparts’. This argument, and its significance for Deleuze’s disagreement with 
Hegel, has been elucidated in some detail elsewhere (see Somers-Hall 2013; 
Kerslake 2009, pp. 133-134, pp. 138-142, p. 227), so I will not rehearse these details 
here. The essential point is that given that the spatial structure of the sensible field is 
‘defined from the point of view of an observer tied to that space, not from an 
external position’, objects in this field exhibit enantiomorphic properties (i.e. 
asymmetry or ‘incongruence’ between left-handed or right-handed versions of an 
otherwise identical figure) (DR, p. 281/p. 218).
59
 Deleuze follows Kant in taking the 
                                                 
59
 This point about the connection between the non-conceptual determinations of sensible things and 
the perspectival character of the sensible field will prove important for Deleuze’s discussion of the 
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sensible discernibility of such determinations to indicate that there are differences 
which entities possess in virtue of their existing in a spatio-temporal milieu, 
differences that are sensibly discernible but not conceptually specifiable.
60
 He also 
follows Kant in taking this inability of conceptual thought to fully determine the 
differences between sensible objects to be indicative of the inability of purely 
conceptual thought to properly account for the difference between abstract or ideal, 
that is to say, merely conceived, objects, objects of thought, and concrete, sensible, 
spatio-temporally situated existents. For Deleuze, this heterogeneity of conceptual 
thought and sensibility indicates the inability of conceptual thought alone (and 
hence, Hegel’s dialectic) to grasp things in their being. 
 It is worth noting in passing that at this point, Deleuze may have been 
tempted to embrace a nominalist position, concluding from the heterogeneity of 
conceptual thought and sensibility that the application of general concepts to 
particular things is a matter of grouping the latter in an ultimately arbitrary, or at 
least contingent, manner; and that the determinations of bare particulars are strictly 
speaking external to their inherent natures or being. Deleuze does not, however, opt 
for this route. He has, as I have outlined, been convinced by Hyppolite that an 
‘internal’ grasp of things is indeed possible, that is, that it is possible to grasp things 
in their being, in their essential or ‘inner’ determinations, and not only (in the 
                                                                                                                                          
spatial syntheses in chapter 5 of Difference and Repetition, where it underlies his use of the concept of 
‘depth’ (see Somers-Hall 2015, pp. 111-121). 
60
 ‘What indeed can be more similar to, and in all parts more equal to, my hand […] than its image in 
the mirror? And yet I cannot put such a hand as is seen in the mirror in the place of its original; for if 
the one was a right hand, then the other in the mirror is a left […] Now there are no inner differences 
here that any understanding could merely think; and yet the differences are inner as far as the senses 
teach, for the left hand cannot, after all, be enclosed within the same boundaries as the right (they 
cannot be made congruent), despite all reciprocal equality and similarity’ (Kant 2004, pp. 37-38). 
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manner of ‘anthropology’ or ‘empirical knowledge’) to reflect on the determinations 
that are imposed on them from outside by our conventions or by the nature of our 
cognitive apparatus.
61
 Equally, he might have been tempted to follow Alquié in 
acknowledging the possibility of an intuitive revelation of the being of things, yet 
conceiving this experiential manifestation of being as essentially indeterminate and 
inexpressible.
62
 Whilst, Deleuze is attentive to the limitations of conceptual thought 
in the face of ontological experience and the consequent difficulties of conceptually 
articulating this experience in its ‘thickness’, he is no more satisfied with mysticism 
(pace Hallward (2006)) than he is with nominalism or ‘anthropology’. He believes, 
rather, that it is possible to answer the challenge posed by the limitations of 
Hyppolite’s realisation of his own project by conceiving the being of the sensible in 
another manner: namely, in such a way as to overcome the limitations of Hegel’s 
approach and account for the relation between concept and experience without 
failing to do justice to the latter. 
 Hegel’s understanding of philosophical thought in terms of a dialectical 
movement of contradiction is, according to Deleuze, symptomatic of a 
misunderstanding of the relation between philosophical thought and ordinary 
cognition. Dialectical thought, insofar as it follows the movement of concepts 
without paying proper heed to their relation to real experience, still moves within the 
parameters of empirical cognition. Thus, Hegel is, for Deleuze, guilty of a perplexing 
(if, according to Deleuze, historically common) dual crime with regard to the 
                                                 
61
 On this nominalist temptation in Deleuze’s thought, see Bryant (2008, p. 146) and Bell (2009, pp. 
3-4; 2011). 
62
 This is, interestingly, the sort of position Hyppolite (1997, p. 95) attributes to Bergson in Logic and 
Existence, on the basis of which attribution he argues for the superiority of Hegel’s ontology to that 
which he reads in Bergson. 
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empirical: insofar as the empirical is understood as real experience, or the sensible in 
its ‘concrete richness’ (Deleuze and Parnet 2006, p. 54) or ‘thickness’, the movement 
of the Hegelian dialectic takes place at too great a distance from the empirical; yet, if 
the empirical is understood in its opposition to the transcendental, as the normal or 
everyday operation of the faculties (‘natural consciousness’), then Hegel’s 
philosophy fails to take a sufficient distance from the empirical, remaining confined 
within its presuppositions.
63
 (This aspect of Deleuze’s critique of Hegelianism will 
appear more clearly in the light of the discussion undertaken in the next chapter, 
where I will distinguish more precisely between philosophical and ‘empirical’ uses 
of conceptual thought.)  
 The most disconcerting consequence of this Hegelian approach, for Deleuze, 
is its conformism. This aspect of Deleuze’s critique of Hegel (as an instance of 
representational philosophy) will also be explored in more detail in the next chapter, 
but for now it is sufficient to note that insofar as Hegel’s philosophy disconnects 
conceptual thought from real experience, it closes thought off from that which 
accounts for the formation and transformation of concepts. ‘The dialectic is […] 
powerless to create new ways of thinking and feeling’, according to Deleuze, 
because it isolates thought from that which is not already in conformity with its own 
established requirements (NP, p. 183/p. 159). This can be seen in the way in which 
the transformations that concepts undergo through thought’s dialectical movement 
are construed by Hegel as implicit determinations becoming explicit; the novelty of 
                                                 
63
 Anne Sauvagnargues (2009) has noted this dual character of the empirical in Deleuze: ‘“empirical” 
in the first case [as a pejorative term applied to Kant’s transcendental philosophy] designates the 
forms of common experience, a doxic and representational usage in Deleuze’s terminology; whilst in 
the second case [i.e. the concept of transcendental empiricism] “empirical” is a philosophical concept 
designating real experience’ (p. 232 [my translation]).  
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these concepts is not a genuine creation but only a presentation under a new form (a 
re-presentation) of something already constituted. 
For these reasons, Deleuze will seek to reconcile ‘concept’ and ‘experience’ 
in a non-Hegelian way. In what follows, I will examine the nature of this alternative 
reconciliatory position in more detail, before proceeding to draw some conclusions 
regarding what such a position seems to imply for Deleuze’s conception of the 
relation between philosophy and the sciences. 
 
3.2 ‘Superior empiricism’: concepts, Ideas, dramatisation 
Deleuze’s aim, recall, is to reconcile the philosophy of the concept and the 
philosophy of experience, or more precisely to reconcile the divergent philosophical 
orientations he derives from Ferdinand Alquié and Martial Guéroult. He follows 
Hyppolite, not only in this reconciliatory character of his project, but in framing such 
a project in terms of a post-Kantian problematic of responding to the dualism of 
Kant’s critical philosophy and its limitations. His transcendental empiricism is an 
attempt to find an alternative way of overcoming this dualism to that offered by 
absolute idealism. 
 Deleuze’s attempt to extricate Hyppolite’s reconciliatory approach to 
‘concept’ and ‘experience’ from Hegelianism thus takes the form of an attempt to 
construct a new kind of empiricism – ‘an empiricism’, as Baugh (1992) has 
described it, ‘that would be immune to Hegel’s critique of empiricism’, ‘a post-
Hegelian empiricist metaphysics’ (p. 133). Deleuze seeks to construct an empiricism 
in the same vein as that which Jean Wahl (1932) discerns in Schelling, Whitehead, 
William James and Bergson, among others: an ‘empiricism that would have gone 
through rationalism and thereby gone beyond it’ (p. 7). It is indicative of the extent 
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to which Deleuze is indebted to Wahl in conceiving his non-Hegelian reconciliation 
of Alquié and Guéroult in this way that he likely derives the very term 
‘transcendental empiricism’ from Wahl’s work.64  
‘Empiricism’, Deleuze states, ‘is by no means a reaction against concepts, 
nor a simple appeal to lived experience’ (DR, p. 3/p. xx). (Contra, it would seem, 
Badiou’s construal of Deleuze’s position.) Rather, this post-Hegelian empiricism 
‘undertakes the most insane creation of concepts ever seen or heard’, although 
crucially these concepts ‘receive their coherence from elsewhere’, from ‘a moving 
horizon […] which repeats and differenciates them’ (DR, p. 3/pp. xx-xxi). This 
horizon, as I will clarify presently, is experience; or more precisely the sensible field 
insofar as it is composed of dynamic spatio-temporal determinations that ‘express’ 
(or ‘incarnate’) certain ideal structures.65 This idea of an empiricism in which 
thought’s relation to experience engenders a production of new concepts will prove 
central to Deleuze’s attempt to account for the relation between concepts and 
experience in a non-Hegelian manner, insofar as the ‘conformism’ of Hegelianism 
(noted above) consists in its inability (or refusal) to create concepts that are 
                                                 
64
 ‘The weakness of empiricism and realism is to have left to idealism the prestige of higher thought, 
of difficult reflection. Setting out from the Kantian affirmation that to be is to be posited [l’être est 
position], it is possible to move towards a positive philosophy analogous to that of Schelling, and 
towards a higher empiricism. It is possible to have, as Schelling shows, a transcendental empiricism, 
seeking the conditions under which experience is, not possible, but real. This realism will be founded 
on the critique of the idea of possibility, and on the reality of contingency’ (Wahl 1944, p. 18 [my 
emphasis]). 
65
 Deleuze derives this notion of expression from Spinoza (avowedly) and from Leibniz (somewhat 
more subliminally); it is the subject of his early study of Spinoza. In that study, Leibniz’s role in the 
construction of the notion of expression is downplayed, but various commentators have noted his 
important for Deleuze’s thinking on this point (see Bowden 2010; 2011, p. 56 ff.; and Tissandier 
2013). For a general overview of Deleuze’s use of this idea, see de Beistegui (2010, chap. 2). For 
present purposes, ‘expression’ and ‘actualisation’ can be taken as synonyms. 
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genuinely new – that is to say, that do not simply raise to the level of the concept 
determinations that are supposed to already exist at the level of ordinary experience, 
if only ‘implicitly’. This creation of concepts is, however, the terminus of the 
movement of philosophical thought for Deleuze. In order to clarify this point, and 
the way in which concepts are supposed to draw their coherence and meaning from 
experience, it is necessary first to outline the way in which Deleuze works through 
the (post-)Kantian problem of the relation between concept and experience. 
 
3.2.1 THE LIMITATIONS OF THE SCHEMATISM 
The Hegelian solution to the Kantian problem posed above, endorsed by Hyppolite, 
is, as I have discussed, to seek to demonstrate that sensible determinations are, in the 
last instance, conceptual determinations. The apparent particularity and immediacy 
of sensible determinations shows itself to be a form of mediated generality, and thus 
of conceptual order. In this respect, the Hegelian approach to bridging the gap 
between concept and experience is, in effect, to dissolve the difference between 
them, or at least to reveal it to be merely apparent. Deleuze is not satisfied with this 
solution. He is not satisfied with it, as I have shown, because he believes there to be 
sensible determinations that are not conceptually specifiable. The ‘thickness’ of 
experience is composed of non-conceptual differences, and the attempt to conflate 
these with conceptual differences only produces a distorted image of their nature. It 
is on the basis of this point that Kant argues for the heterogeneity of general concepts 
and singular intuitions, and correspondingly the distinction between conceptual 
thought and sensibility. If one accepts this heterogeneity between the singular and 
the general – the sensible and the conceptual – then Hegel’s dissolution of the 
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singular in the general is ruled out as a way of accounting for the relation between 
concepts and experience. 
 I have noted above that Deleuze sympathises with these aspects of Kant’s 
position. He will deviate from Kant, however, in how he responds to this 
heterogeneity of the conceptual and the sensible. How does Kant propose to account 
for ‘the harmony of the understanding [i.e. conceptual thought] and sensibility’ (DR, 
p. 281/p. 218)? His suggestion is that this harmony is ensured by what he calls 
‘schemata’.66 A schema is ‘a rule for the determination of our intuition in accordance 
with a certain general concept’ (Kant 1998, p. A141/B180) or, in Deleuze’s words, 
‘a rule of determination for time and of construction for space […] conceived and 
put to work in relation to concepts understood in terms of logical possibility’ (DR, p. 
281/p. 218). These are rules for relating the spatio-temporal relations found in 
sensible intuition to the logical relations of conceptual thought, for ‘bring[ing] 
spatio-temporal relations into correspondence with the logical relations of the 
concept’ (DR, p. 281/p. 218).  
Deleuze does not find Kant’s notion of schematism terribly convincing. 
Given his view that there are sensible differences that are not conceptual differences, 
and consequent rejection of the (rationalist) reduction of sensible differences to 
conceptual differences, Deleuze does see the need for something that could do the 
work done in Kant’s philosophy by schemata: namely, a determination of sensibility 
and a specification of concepts that accounts for their relation to one another. But 
                                                 
66
 Deleuze also notes Kant’s further attempt to account for the relation between the sensible and the 
intelligible in the Third Critique (DR, p. 282 n. 1/p. 328 n. 30), and although there are certain aspects 
of the picture Kant presents here towards which Deleuze is favourably disposed (DI, p. 79 ff./p. 56 
ff.), his attitude is ultimately critical (see Kerslake 2009). 
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Kant ultimately fails, in Deleuze’s estimation, to give a sufficiently full and concrete 
account of how this mechanism is supposed to work. ‘This schematism of our 
understanding’, we are told, ‘is a hidden art in the depths of the human soul’ (Kant 
1998, pp. A141/B180-181; see Deleuze 2008b, pp. 17-20). But so long as it remains 
hidden, the source of this power is obscure. 
The problem here, according to Deleuze, lies in the limitations that Kant 
imposes on his own philosophy. For Kant, the necessity for conceptual forms to be 
supplemented by the ‘matter’ of the sensible given if they are to be cognitively 
contentful implies certain boundaries on the reach of thought. Thought cannot grasp 
the being of things, but only the determinations given to them by and within the 
forms of appearance – which are, of course, the forms of our cognitive apparatus. As 
a consequence of this inaccessibility of the inner natures of things to human 
cognition, the determinations we apply to things in virtue of the nature of our minds 
cannot be rooted in the determinations that these things have ‘absolutely’; nor can 
the structure of our cognition be grounded in the nature of things so as to ensure 
some manner of correspondence between thought and being. Consequently, the 
heterogeneity of concepts and intuitions, and of the general and the singular, must be 
taken simply as a brute fact; it is not possible to delve any deeper into the nature of 
things in order to seek out a common source of their singular and general 
determinations. When the distinction between the singular and the general is taken, 
in this way, as a brute given, the functioning of the schematism inevitably remains ‘a 
hidden art’, unable to ‘account for the power with which it acts’ (DR, p. 281/p. 218). 
The need for some ground for the harmony between the singular and the general is 
acknowledged, but the limitations of our cognitive powers mean that the nature of 
this ground is unclear. 
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 Deleuze follows the post-Kantians – in particular, his approach is indebted to 
Maimon
67
 – in taking this approach to be unsatisfactory. The epistemic boundaries 
Kant imposes on thought, which he takes to be at the core of the critical project, in 
fact endanger this project, according to Maimon. Once the heterogeneity of concepts 
and intuitions has been assumed as a given ‘fact of reason’, rather than seeking to 
account for the ‘genesis’ of this difference, a satisfactory answer to the question of 
‘by what right’ particular concepts are applied to particular sensible manifolds in real 
experience is blocked. Maimon in effect takes the distinction between intuitions and 
concepts to replicate the transcendental realist’s distinction between the conditions of 
knowledge and the conditions of the existence of the objects of knowledge, 
rendering the purported gains of transcendental idealism moot.
68
 However, if ‘the 
being of the sensible’, that is, the being of sensible things, can be accounted for in 
terms of an ‘internal genesis’ (DR, p. 40/p. 26) of the singular and the general, then it 
can be explained how conceptual thought and sensibility can relate to one another in 
‘real experience’. This genesis can be explained, Deleuze suggests, by seeing these 
(‘differenciated’ or ‘actual’) determinations (both singular and general) as the 
                                                 
67
 While the centrality of Maimon’s thought to the development of Deleuze’s early philosophy is not 
undisputed (see Rölli 2003, p. 70), it seems to me that this emphasis is correct; and indeed, that it may 
even be appropriate up to a point to speak with Beth Lord (2011) of ‘[t]ranscendental empiricism as 
Maimonism’ (p. 131). As Smith (2012b) has noted, Maimon’s presence can be felt even in works 
where he is not mentioned directly, specifically Nietzsche and Philosophy – ‘the central theme of 
[which] is that Nietzsche was the first philosopher to have truly managed to fulfil Maimon’s post-
Kantian demands’ – and Deleuze’s early works on Bergson (pp. 68-69). On Deleuze’s ‘Maimonism’, 
see Jones (2009), Kerslake (2009, pp. 138-147, p. 189), Lord (2011, chap. 6), Smith (2012b, chaps 4 
and 6) and Voss (2011; 2013b, p. 92 ff.) 
68
 For a fuller discussion of Maimon’s critique of Kant as it pertains to Deleuze, see Voss (2011; 
2013, chap. 2); Smith (2012b, chaps. 4 and 5); see also Beiser (1987, chap. 10). 
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manner in which ‘virtual Ideas’ are ‘expressed’ in the context of dynamic spatio-
temporal environments. (I will clarify these terms of art presently.) 
So, like Kant, Deleuze believes that accounting for the concrete existence of 
sensible things – which is to say, the difference between concrete existents and 
merely ideal objects or objects of thought – requires us to situate them in a spatial 
and temporal context that is not reducible to conceptual determinations. He thus 
embraces Kant’s critique of (Leibnizian) rationalism, and is unconvinced that 
Hegel’s attempt at a post-Kantian recuperation of rationalism succeeds. Deleuze 
deviates from Kant’s account of the way in which non-conceptual determinations 
make the difference between ideal objects and concrete objects, however. For 
Deleuze, it is important that the spatio-temporal milieu that determines concrete 
existents actually makes a difference, that is, that coming into being is a formative, 
determining process for the entity in question – a creative process – and not simply 
the addition of the empty matter of ‘brute existence’ to a form that is already fully 
determined (if only ideally or abstractly, as a ‘possibility’). This ‘creativity’ of the 
genesis of concrete existents can be accounted for, however, only insofar as thought 
ventures ‘beneath’ the surface of the sensible given in order to grasp the latter’s 
genetic conditions (its sufficient reason). In this respect, then, Deleuze rejects the 
limits on the intelligibility of reality that Kant takes to follow from his critique. Like 
Maimon, Deleuze sees a transgression of the limits which Kant’s formulation of the 
critical project places on thought as the best way to salvage this very project.
69
 
                                                 
69
 For an exploration of Deleuze’s early work from this point of view, see Kerslake (2009). It is 
interesting to note that Deleuze takes up here an idea that can be found in the thought of both 
Guéroult (see above) and Jules Vuillemin (1962, §§25 and 60), namely that some kind of 
transgression of the constraints placed on thought by Kant is necessary in order to salvage the critical 
project. It is perhaps no coincidence, then, that Deleuze’s reading of the post-Kantians and of the 
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3.2.2 VIRTUAL IDEAS AND THEIR ACTUALISATION 
I have said that Deleuze conceives the determinations of concrete existents as the 
expressions of virtual Ideas in a dynamic spatio-temporal context. It will be helpful 
here to clarify some of these notions in order to make clearer both the precise nature 
and stakes of Deleuze’s position and how it differs from the idealism of Hegel 
idealism (as read by Deleuze via Hyppolite) and Kant.  
I have noted that Deleuze rejects Hegel’s attempt to conceive the being of the 
sensible in terms of an inherent conceptual order. In order to see how Deleuze’s 
position differs, it is necessary to determine what Ideas are, and how they are 
supposed to differ from concepts. In ‘The Method of Dramatisation’, Deleuze states 
that the difference between Ideas and concepts is best understood in terms of the 
different ways in which they are related to concrete particulars. The difference here 
can be expressed in terms of the difference between ‘virtual’ and ‘actual’ on the one 
hand, and ‘possible’ and ‘real’ on the other. Ideas are virtual structures that are 
actualised in concrete individuals; whilst concepts are possible forms that are 
instantiated by real things.
70
 What exactly is the difference here supposed to be? The 
notion of realisation, as Deleuze understands it, corresponds to a conception of 
possibilities as fully constituted, lacking only existence. The only difference between 
                                                                                                                                          
limitations of Kant’s philosophy is especially indebted to the historiographical work of these two 
thinkers (see NP, p. 58 n. 2/p. 205 n. 12). 
70
 Deleuze’s discussion of possibility draws on that of Bergson (1946, chap. 3). For an outline of 
Deleuze’s and Bergson’s discussions of the virtual and the possible, see Ansell Pearson (2002, chap. 
3). 
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the concept of a thing and the thing itself is the reality of the latter.
71
 On this view, 
‘we are forced to conceive of existence as a brute eruption’, ‘the same as but outside 
the concept’ (DR, p. 273/p. 211). The actualisation (or expression) of a virtual Idea, 
by contrast, ‘is always creative with respect to what it actualizes’ (DI, p. 141/p. 101); 
‘actualisation […] is always a genuine creation’ (DR, p. 272/p. 212). The 
determinations of an actual thing are not simply a reproduction of determinations 
that already exist ‘ideally’ or ‘abstractly’ – as ‘possibilities’ – in the Idea. Ideas are 
determinate, Deleuze states, but these determinations ‘do not resemble’ the actual 
determinations of the thing whose existence expresses the Idea (DR, p. 212/p. 163). 
Virtual Ideas are determined in a different way to actualities. 
I have suggested that the actualisation of Ideas is a creative process, for 
Deleuze, insofar as the Idea is determined in a different way to that in which its 
actual expressions are determined. How do these two regimes of determination 
differ? Terminologically, Deleuze will mark this difference by describing Ideas as 
differentiated, whilst actualities are described as differenciated (DR, p. 267/p. 207). 
Whilst fully actualised or ‘differenciated’ entities possess identities that persist 
through change and time, and properties in virtue of which they resemble to a greater 
or lesser degree other entities, Ideas are determined purely differentially. They are 
ideal structures composed of differential relations that determine a distribution of 
                                                 
71
 It is clear that Deleuze has in mind here Kant’s (1998) claim that ‘[b]eing is […] not a real 
predicate, i.e., a concept of something that could add to the concept of the thing’ (p. A589/B626). 
Kant (1998) uses a monetary example: ‘A hundred actual dollars do not contain the least bit more 
than a hundred possible ones’ (p. A599/B627). Consequently, ‘the actual contains nothing more than 
the merely possible’ (Kant 1998, p. A599/B627). 
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‘pre-individual singularities’ or ‘singular points’.72 If virtual Ideas are ideal ‘space[s] 
of variation’ (Bryant 2008, p. 250), then the patterns of singularities that compose 
the Idea map the tendencies of available trajectories (Deleuze will sometimes refer to 
them as ‘lines’) of actualisation of the Idea.73 These are ‘points where something 
“happens”’ within the structure of the Idea (Smith 2012b, p. 247), ‘points which 
exhibit remarkable properties and thereby have a dominating and exceptional role’ in 
determining how the Idea is actualised (Duffy 2013, p. 22). While Deleuze’s initial 
presentation of these concepts is mathematical, he means for them to be applicable 
more generally. To take a couple of examples from the Deleuze scholar Daniel Smith 
(2012b), ‘the point where a person breaks down in tears, or boils over in anger’ is a 
singularity in Deleuze’s terminology just as much as is the point at which ‘water 
boils or freezes’ or the ‘four corners or extrema’ that define the geometrical figure of 
a square (p. 247).
74
  
What is important about these pre-individual singularities, for present 
purposes, is that they are not themselves determinate, but are reciprocally 
                                                 
72
 Deleuze takes this notion of singularity from Albert Lautman’s discussion of Poincaré qualitative 
theory of differential equations (Lautman 2011, pp. 178-182), although his characterisation of them as 
‘pre-individual’ derives from his reading of Gilbert Simondon’s work (see DI, p. 120 ff./p. 86 ff.; also 
Bowden 2012).  
73
 A very much longer and more involved discussion would be necessary in order to cash out fully the 
mathematical background required for a more detailed presentation of Deleuze’s use of the concept of 
singularity. For such a discussion, see Bowden (2011, chap. 3); DeLanda (2002, chap. 1); Duffy 
(2013, esp. chaps. 1 and 4); and Smith (2012b, chaps 3 and 14). 
74
 This drift whereby mathematical terms are put to use beyond the parameters of their mathematical 
uses (a movement which I will qualify as one of metaphor) will be discussed in chapter 3. For now, 
suffice it to say that it is my view that the precise mathematical formulations of these concepts are 
only suggestive of the less precise meanings these terms take on in the context of Deleuze’s 
philosophy. 
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determined by the differential relations of which the multiplicity is composed.
75
 This 
notion of reciprocal determination of terms within a structure of differential relations 
is significant for Deleuze because, he contends, the ‘indetermination’ of the terms 
taken independently of their reciprocal determination by their differential relations to 
one another ‘renders possible the manifestation of difference freed from all 
subordination’ to some prior identity – that is, they are ‘pre-individual’ (DR, p. 
237/p. 183). In this way, the determination of Ideas does not presuppose the kinds of 
determinations possessed by actual entities, which are individuals with persisting 
identity conditions and instantiating general types.  
Conceiving of ‘actual’ determinations (both singular and general) as arising 
from the reciprocal determination of otherwise indeterminate terms in the context of 
a differential relation allows us, according to Deleuze, to conceive of these actual 
determinations not as brute givens but as the creative expressions of virtual 
determinations. It allows him, in other words, to conceive of a reality that is 
determined, but not in the way in which actuality is determined, so that the move 
from Ideas to actual things produces new determinations not previously existent, 
even as idealities. It is in this sense that actualisation, unlike realisation, is a 
genuinely creative process. 
 I have shown how Deleuze reconceives the ideal so that it is not simply a 
mirror image of the concrete – nor, conversely, the concrete a mirror image of the 
ideal. This is part of his attempt to show, contra Hegel, that the move from the ideal 
                                                 
75
 ‘The Idea is […] defined as a structure’, a ‘set of relations’ between ‘elements reciprocally 
determined by these relations’, elements which, since these ‘reciprocal relations […] allow no 
independence whatsoever to subsist’, are indeterminate outside of their differential determination in 
relation to one another (DR, p. 237/pp. 182-183). 
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to the concrete makes a substantive difference, so that the latter cannot be reduced to 
a ‘moment’ of the former. But this is not the whole picture. Recall that Deleuze 
concurred with Kant about the role played by space and time in making this 
difference. Thus, for Deleuze, it is space and time, understood as milieux composed 
of non-conceptual determinations (or differences), that effect this creative 
determination whereby Ideas express themselves in concrete individuals. Deleuze 
will criticise Kant, however, for treating space and time as indifferent, homogeneous 
media, unable to account for the work of determination they are supposed to carry 
out (DR, p. 298/p. 231). This criticism is connected to a conflation of the possible 
and the virtual: if the difference that spatio-temporal determinations are supposed to 
make is the difference between the possible and the real, then the need for space and 
time to be conceived in such a way that they can make a substantive contribution to 
the determination of concrete sensible existents is evaded, since these existents are 
already fully determined in the abstract space of conceptual possibility. If, however, 
what space and time need to account for is the production of actual determinations 
that ‘do not resemble’ the virtual determinations of the Idea of which they are an 
expression, then space and time will have to be conceived in such a way as to be able 
to make such a substantive contribution. Deleuze will thus suggest that space and 
time ought to be conceived as dynamic, as ‘pure spatio-temporal dynamisms’; not as 
static and homogeneous forms, but as composed spatially of ‘directions’, 
‘movements and orientations’ and temporally of ‘differential rhythms’, ‘rates’, 
‘paces’, ‘decelerations or accelerations’ (DR, p. 277/p. 215, pp. 278-280/pp. 216-
217). It is these dynamic spatio-temporal environments that Deleuze is seeking to 
describe in chapters 2 and 5 of Difference and Repetition, when he discusses a series 
of ‘temporal syntheses’ (habit, pure memory and eternal return) and ‘spatial 
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syntheses’ (explication, implication or depth, and the pure spatium) (DR, p. 296/p. 
230). Deleuze describes this milieu of dynamic processes of spatio-temporal 
determination (or synthesis) as a ‘field of individuation’ (e.g. DR, p. 318/p. 247): this 
is the sub-conceptual sensible field as the site of the production of individuals 
(individuation) and of the determination of their singular and general determinations 
(differenciation). 
 
3.2.3 THE DRAMATISATION OF CONCEPTS 
It is necessary at this stage to relate these ideas back to our initial question, namely: 
how should the duality introduced by Kant between concepts and experience be 
overcome? Where do concepts belong in the picture sketched so far? Recall 
Deleuze’s dissatisfaction with the Kantian notion of schematism. Having 
acknowledged the heterogeneity of concepts and intuitions, Kant posits the 
procedure of schematisation, carried out by the imagination, which applies concepts 
to intuitions. But the way in which concepts and intuitions are supposed to be able to 
relate to one another remains mysterious. In particular, the problem, for Deleuze, is 
that Kant begins with given, fully determined concepts and seeks to ascertain how 
they come to be applied to determinations of a quite different kind. Deleuze’s 
(Maimonist) solution, as I have said, lies in trying to get behind the heterogeneity of 
these fully determined instances – concepts and intuitions – to grasp the genesis of 
these determinations. Rather than working back from fully constituted concepts in 
order to try to account for how they can be applied to a heterogeneous sensible field, 
Deleuze proposes that the determination of concepts be viewed as itself a product of 
this processes of spatio-temporal synthesis that accounts for the determination of the 
sensible field. There is, thus, a co-genesis of concepts and intuitions, such that the 
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concept and the object to which it refers come into being together, both products of 
the syntheses of experience. It is only insofar as concepts are specified by sub-
conceptual experience in this way that they can come to be specified enough to be 
capable of grasping singular things. Deleuze will refer to this specification of 
concepts by experience as ‘dramatisation’: ‘pure spatio-temporal dynamisms have 
the power to dramatize concepts, because first they […] incarnate Ideas’ (DI, p. 
138/p. 99). Rather than a Kantian schema, which realises conceptual relations in 
spatio-temporal relations, the dynamic spatio-temporal milieu in which Ideas are 
expressed forms a ‘drama’ which animates concepts, makes and remakes them, 
giving them a determinacy and a specificity that pure concepts, in their generality, 
lack. 
 Concepts are thus in some sense the products of experience, for Deleuze. 
This dependence of concepts on their relation with sub-conceptual experience does 
not, however, imply a constraint on the creative power of conceptual thought. 
Rather, it is because experience exceeds conceptuality in the richness of its 
determinations that conceptual thought is constantly driven to create new concepts. 
As Deleuze states, ‘the search for actual concepts can be infinite’ precisely because 
‘there is always an excess of virtual Ideas animating them’ (DI, p. 154/p. 110). 
Conceptual thought is capable of an endless reconfiguration of its parameters and 
production of new resources, but only as a result of its determination by sub-
conceptual experience and the Ideas it expresses. 
 I am now in a position to clarify the manner in which Deleuze’s 
transcendental empiricism proposes to reconcile the philosophy of the concept and 
the philosophy of experience, or Guéroult and Alquié. Recall Peden’s (2011) 
formulation of the dispute between these two thinkers as one between ‘a philosophy 
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which emphasizes the limits of rational thought to the profit of a more primordial, 
ineffable experience or intuition, and a philosophy which insists upon the capacity of 
rationalism to transgress the limits of lived experience in order to articulate 
conceptual insights of a universal or indeed absolute variety’ (p. 365). Badiou 
suggests that Deleuze’s post-Hegelian empiricism depreciates the power of 
conceptual thought in favour of a quasi-phenomenological study of concrete 
experience. It is, however, precisely such an opposition between the power of 
conceptual thought and ‘the concrete richness of the sensible’ that Deleuze’s 
transcendental empiricism is seeking to undermine. The ‘thickness’ of the sensible 
does present a ‘limit’ to conceptual thought and determine its ‘meaning’ (sens), but 
this relation to the sensible as a site of Ideas turns out to be what provokes in thought 
a conceptual creativity that is not constrained by the limits of ‘lived experience’ (i.e. 
conscious experience of actualities).
76
 Thus, the plasticity of conceptual thought – in 
the sense of its creative power to reconfigure its own structure and parameters – is a 
consequence of its relation to a sensible order that is not conceptual and which 
thought cannot grasp exhaustively. It is in this way that transcendental empiricism 
seeks to reconcile ‘the philosophy of experience’ and ‘the philosophy of the 
concept’: experience exceeds conceptuality, but does so insofar as it incarnates 
(quasi-conceptual) ideal differential structures; concepts are determined by 
experience, but determined to be created and recreated with boundless plasticity. In 
this way, Deleuze rejects a brute separation between concepts and experience, but 
equally a dissolution of the distinction between concepts and experience, arguing 
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 ‘[L]imit (πέρας) no longer refers to what maintains the thing under a law, nor to what delimits or 
separates it from other things. On the contrary, it refers to that on the basis of which it is deployed and 
deploys all its power’ (DR, p. 55/p. 37). 
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instead for a complicity between the creative dynamic of concepts and experience as 
a field of differential syntheses and structures. It seems, then, that Deleuze best sums 
up his reconciliatory position in the lines on transcendental empiricism quoted 
above, which can now be read with a fuller understanding of their meaning: 
‘Empiricism is by no means a reaction against concepts, nor a simple appeal to lived 
experience’, but demands a ‘creation of concepts’, with the caveat that these 
concepts must ‘receive their coherence from elsewhere’, namely from experience 
understood as a series of passive spatio-temporal syntheses expressing ideal 
differential structures (DR, p. 3/p. xx). 
 
Conclusion 
I began this chapter by outlining the centrality for metaphilosophical debates in 
French philosophy of questions pertaining to philosophy’s relation to the sciences. 
Interconnected with philosophers’ attitudes towards the sciences, I have suggested, 
are their positions on the relation between conceptual thought and experience. 
Having explored the stakes of Deleuze’s conception of philosophy in terms of his 
diverse filiations, what conclusions can be drawn concerning his conception of 
philosophy’s relation to the sciences?  
It is helpful at this point to recall Frédéric Worms’ formulation of the two 
types of relation between philosophy and the sciences typical in twentieth-century 
French philosophy: philosophy can be concerned to delineate the boundaries of 
legitimate scientific activity by studying that in reality or experience which resists 
scientific thought; or philosophy can be concerned to facilitate the ongoing progress 
of scientific thought through a critique of that within scientific thought which tends 
towards dogmatism and stagnation. What sort of attitude does Deleuze’s position 
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suggest? Is philosophy’s task to facilitate the unlimited expansion of scientific 
knowledge, or to demarcate its a priori limits? Shifting away from talk of scientific 
thought for a moment, and substituting conceptual thought in general, it becomes 
apparent that Deleuze’s position – as might be expected given his reconciliatory 
ambitions – straddles this contrast. Deleuze is committed to the view that conceptual 
thought is limited in principle by real experience, which refuses to conform to 
strictly conceptual order. However, the ‘dramatising’ relation to this extra-
conceptual experience is what permits conceptual thought, according to Deleuze, to 
mutate and reconfigure itself – and, as I will explain in more detail in the next 
chapter, it is part of philosophy’s task (the ‘critical’ aspect of its task) to keep this 
possibility of transformation open. Transcendental empiricism’s relation to 
conceptual thought is thus dual, as is reflected in the two uses or modes of 
conceptual thought I will discuss in the next chapter. Before any firm conclusions 
concerning Deleuze’s conception of the relation between philosophy and the 
sciences can be drawn, however, some more work will need to be done to clarify 
what sort of relation exists between scientific thought and conceptual thought more 
generally, which is to say, where science lies, according to Deleuze, in relation to the 
distinction between the two modes of conceptual thought. 
 It is possible to note already at this stage, nevertheless, that Deleuze does not 
seem to be concerned to take the sciences as a model for philosophy. Rather, he 
embraces a creative conception of philosophy that seems hard to square with the 
exigencies of scientific research. Deleuze’s conception of the power and 
unboundedness of conceptual thought focuses on creativity rather than analytical 
acumen or the autonomy of conceptual thought from experience. In this respect, it 
seems that a ‘Guéroultian’ structuralism is placed in the service of something more 
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like Alquié’s literary model of philosophy. His embrace of a notion of the plenitude 
of sub-conceptual experience and its resistance to conceptualisation seems to pull 
him away from philosophies, such as Cavaillès’ or Bachelard’s, that would identify 
the development of the sciences with the very movement of thought. This tentative 
conclusion will need to be rendered more solid, however, by considering in more 
detail what sort of conception of the relation between science and conceptual thought 
can plausibly be attributed to the early Deleuze, as well as how the scientific 
conceptual resources on which Deleuze draws are being put to use in the context of 
this philosophy so focused on creation and creativity. It is these questions that I will 
address in the next two chapters.  
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Chapter 2 
Cognition, Creation and Critique 
The Task of Philosophy and the Limits of Science 
 
 
 
Introduction 
As discussed in the introduction, what I am calling the scientistic reading of Deleuze 
– originally offered by Manuel DeLanda and subsequently developed by John 
Protevi, and in relation to which the present thesis is offered as a corrective – 
effectively collapses the distinction between philosophy and science in such a way 
that philosophy’s contribution is hard to discern. It is thus important for the purposes 
of this corrective to get clear about where the faultlines between philosophy and 
science lie in Deleuze’s early thought. I have noted in the previous chapter that, in 
the context of a philosophical field in the process of renegotiating its borders with 
the sciences, and for some, of questioning the need for such borders, Deleuze insists 
on the specificity of philosophy in relation to the sciences. However, I have also 
noted that he does not make at all clear how such a demarcation is to be conceived; 
and indeed, his discussion of structuralism seems not to respect any such border.  
In the present chapter, then, I will suggest a plausible way to formulate the 
distinction Deleuze is envisaging between philosophy and the sciences when he 
proclaims the former’s ‘specificity’. I will seek to do this by exploring the distinction 
he draws between (what I will call) knowledge production on the one side and the 
conjoined processes of problematisation and concept formation on the other. (I will, 
following Deleuze’s own terminology, speak of ‘critique’ and ‘creation’ respectively 
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as shorthand for these dual features of ‘thinking’.) I will clarify how Deleuze 
conceives the difference between these two kinds of process in terms of two different 
kinds of relation between concepts and Ideas (problems). Having done this, I will 
plot the relation between philosophy and the sciences onto this distinction. This will 
not result in a neat identification of philosophy with problematisation and concept 
creation and science with knowledge production. But it will show how this 
distinction can illuminate the different concerns, motivations and stakes of 
philosophy and the sciences as Deleuze conceives them in his early work. In this 
way, I will clarify where the scientistic reading goes astray in losing sight of the 
importance for Deleuze of these differences. 
 The discussion by which I will arrive at these conclusions will be structured 
as follows: In §1, I will outline Deleuze’s understanding of cognition as 
representational and explain how he takes cognition and representation to be 
associated with a transcendental illusion. In §2, I will look at Deleuze’s conception 
of philosophical thinking as critical and creative by situating it in relation to 
representation and its transcendental illusion. Finally, in §3, having outlined both the 
representational and the critical-creative uses of conceptual thought, I will discuss 
how these modes of thought seem to be related to science in Deleuze’s work, and 
attempt to reconstruct a plausible account of Deleuze’s early view of the nature of 
scientific thought. My conclusion will be that whilst the sciences manifest both 
representational and critical-creative dimensions, certain key features of the 
scientific enterprise keep it bound to representation, by contrast with philosophy’s 
constitutive antagonism towards representation. I offer some initial explanation as to 
why philosophy and science might differ in this manner in their relation to the 
different modes of conceptual thought. 
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1 Representation and the transcendental illusion of the self-
sufficiency of concepts 
1.1 The representational structure of cognition 
Cognition, Deleuze suggests, has a ‘representational’ structure, which can be thought 
of, at least initially, as a propositional structure, consisting of a subject and a 
property or predicate. (As will become apparent in what follows, Deleuze’s notion of 
the representational character of cognition will ultimately prove to be a good deal 
more complex than this.) By ‘cognition’ here I mean to refer, in a Kantian mould, to 
a certain kind of experience, namely the sort of cognitively ‘contentful’ experiences 
that are in a position to play a rational (and not merely causal) role in the ongoing 
rectification of our body of beliefs and knowledge.
1
 Kant argues that such 
experiences involve the contributions of two distinct mental faculties or capacities: 
sensible intuition and conceptual understanding.
2
 These faculties collaborate in the 
production of cognition (cognitively contentful experience), the given sensible 
content providing the ‘matter’ to which the understanding applies conceptual ‘form’. 
Deleuze will follow Kant in conceiving of cognition as the product of a 
‘collaboration’ of diverse faculties or capacities. He refers to this collaboration as 
                                                 
1
 In recent Anglophone philosophy, John McDowell (1996) must perhaps be credited for having 
foregrounded (and foregrounded as a Kantian notion) this conception of the cognitive, rather than 
merely causal, role of experience in our economy of belief, and the (again Kantian) idea that for 
experience to play such a role it must be propositionally structured – although it should be noted that 
more recently McDowell (2009) has altered his position on these points. 
2
 ‘Our cognition arises from two fundamental sources in the mind, the first of which is the reception 
of representations (the receptivity of impressions), the second the faculty for cognizing an object by 
means of these representations (spontaneity of concepts) […] Intuition and concepts therefore 
constitute the elements of all our cognition’ (Kant 1998, p. A50/B74). 
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‘common sense’ (DR, p. 174/p. 133). It is common sense as the form of cognition 
that lies at the root of the cognition’s representational structure. A clarification of 
common sense, and of his conception of the nature of cognition more generally, will 
thus allow us to clarify further what, for Deleuze, characterises cognition as 
representational. 
Deleuze characterises cognition as ‘the harmonious exercise [l’exercise 
concordant] of all the faculties upon a supposed same object [un objet supposé 
même]’ (DR, p. 174/p. 133). Hence, cognitive experience is polarised: it stretches 
between the identity of the subject on the one hand and the identity of the object on 
the other.   
Let us first consider the object of cognition.  Deleuze refers to the basic 
mental act characteristic of cognition of an object as ‘recognition’.3 An act of 
recognition is the subjective act of grasping something as being something, either in 
the sense of identifying it as the particular thing that it is, or else in the sense of 
identifying what type of thing it is. This is an extremely familiar procedure: I see or 
perhaps hear something; I perceive that it is a cat. I also perceive it as having certain 
properties (colour, size, etc.). Perhaps on this basis I am able to perceptually identify 
the breed of cat. Perhaps I grasp that this cat is not just an instance of the kind ‘cat’, 
                                                 
3
 It is worth noting that the French term that Deleuze uses to designate this operation, récognition, is 
less usual and more technical than the word reconnaissance, which would perhaps have been a more 
natural choice all else being equal. It seems likely, then, that Deleuze’s choice of récognition over 
reconnaissance is meant as an allusion to Kant’s use of the term recognition – or Rekognition in 
German, as in die Synthesis der Rekognition im Begriffe, the third synthesis of the A-Deduction – 
which is generally translated into French as récognition. Kant’s discussion here of the unification of 
the sensible manifold by its subjection to a rule (which is to say, a concept) and the role played by the 
transcendental unity of apperception in this operation clearly marks Deleuze’s understanding of the 
nature of cognition. 
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nor even of a certain breed of cat which I am capable of identifying, but even a 
particular cat, namely my cat. In what is, in the context of Deleuze’s often 
conceptually ‘baroque’ corpus, a rare moment of terminological tranquillity, it is 
little linguistic strain for us to characterise cognitive activity of this sort as 
‘recognition’ – indeed, we would no doubt happily describe this situation as 
‘recognising that this is a cat’, or ‘recognising my cat’.4 
Deleuze distinguishes two aspects of such mental acts.  Firstly, there is a 
capacity to identify and track – hence, re-identify – a particular object across distinct 
experiential instances. This is not yet the case of recognising a particular as an 
instance of a type, nor even as a specific particular, but rather simply the capacity to 
pick out from the ‘flux’ of experiences some as yet indeterminate object as the same 
object, as persisting – that is, of maintaining its identity through time and change – 
and consequently as capable in principle, should it vanish from our experiential field, 
of reappearing in it at some later point.
5
 Secondly, there is a capacity to specify such 
enduring, (re)identifiable objects, determining them by subsuming them as given 
particulars under given general types (that is, under concepts).   
Making a distinction within his initial notion of common sense, Deleuze will 
ultimately reserve this term itself for the first aspect of recognition, referring to the 
second aspect as ‘good sense’. Common sense, then, is ‘the form of the unspecified 
                                                 
4
 The distinction between recognising something to be a certain way and recognising that things are 
thus-and-so, that is, the distinction between perceptual knowledge of things and of state of affairs, is 
not important for the purposes of Deleuze’s discussion. Insofar as perception-of is a perception of a 
persisting, self-identical object qualified by a set of properties, it exhibits propositional structure just 
as much as perception-that, for Deleuze. 
5
  It should perhaps be noted that identification without conceptual specification would still not count 
as cognition of an individual for Deleuze, since the identity of the unspecified object  is, he will claim, 
precisely a general form and not constitutive of the individuality of an entity.  
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object’ (DR, pp. 174-175/pp. 133-134) which provides ‘the identity of whatever 
object serve[s] as a focus for all the faculties’ – and hence the basic structure of 
(re)identification – whilst good sense ‘determine[s] the indeterminate object as this 
or that’ – and is thus the basic dynamic of conceptual or predicative (i.e. 
representational) specification (DR, p. 291/p. 226). As noted above, in reality, 
common sense and good sense form a composite (namely cognition): hence, ‘we 
never confront a formal, unspecified, universal object but only this or that object’, 
and ‘conversely, qualification operates only given the supposition of the unspecified 
object’ (DR, p. 175/p. 134). There can be no specification without an object to 
specify, and yet the perceptible object is always perceptually given as specified (we 
are never experientially confronted by an ‘object in general’). 
So much for the object of cognition – what of its subject? With regard to 
characterising the subject of cognition, common sense – or the identity of the subject 
– is perhaps the more important aspect. Recall that cognition involves a ‘harmonious 
exercise of the faculties’ (DR, p. 174/p. 133). I have shown that, on the side of the 
object, cognitive experience displays a certain unity, namely the unity of the object 
of cognition as persisting across distinct moments of experience. But this unity of the 
object also extends between faculties. As Deleuze states, ‘[a]n object is recognised 
[…] when one faculty locates it as identical to that [i.e. the object] of another’ (DR, 
p. 174/p. 133).
6
 This inter-facultative character of the identity of the object implies 
‘the unity of a thinking subject’, of which Deleuze suggests ‘the other faculties’ be 
                                                 
6
 Deleuze suggests that all the faculties need to be coordinated in each act of recognition, but this 
seems to me an unnecessarily strong claim. All he really needs to claim is that all the faculties that are 
involved in any given act of recognition maintain a certain kind of relationship, and that more than 
one faculty must be involved in any such act. 
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considered ‘modalities’ (DR, p. 174/p. 133). The identity of the subject can thus be 
conceived as that which underlies the possibility of distinct faculties’ ‘triangulation’ 
on a ‘supposed same’ object.   
Another way to think about this would be to see the identity of the subject as 
that in virtue of which we can speak of a unified consciousness to which all the 
faculties contribute. If the field of objects of experience is a field, this is insofar as it 
is – in Heidegger’s (1996) apt phrase – ‘in each case mine’ (p. 108). If each act of 
recognition belongs to a stream of consciousness, it is a stream in virtue of its 
belonging to a subject, and in turn insofar as the faculties that collaborate in each act 
of recognition belong to this same subject.   
This is common sense as the subjective form of cognition. Good sense, in its 
subjective aspect, is the specification of ‘empirical selves’ (DR, p. 175/p. 134), the 
‘individualising [of] the self’ whereby it is determined as a concrete person (DR, p. 
291/p. 226). It would seem in keeping with the general tenor of Deleuze’s position to 
think of this specification of the self, in a Humean fashion, in terms of the ongoing 
constitution of a person’s ‘character’ (or personality) through the acquisition of a set 
of habits.   
The field of cognition constituted by the dual forms of the identity of the 
subject and the identity of the object, and the dual dynamics of the ongoing 
conceptual specification of objects and the ongoing specification of the character of 
the self, is what Deleuze refers to as ‘the world of representation’ (DR, p. 179/p. 
137). I am now in a position to give a richer characterisation of the sense in which 
this world has a propositional, or subject-predicate, structure: at both poles of 
cognitive experience – the subject and the object – what we see is a specified (i.e. 
predicatively qualified) identity (i.e. subject or substance). Both subject and object 
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are determined by predicative qualifications (good sense) within a general form of 
identity (common sense), and thus go to make up an experiential field with 
propositional structure and conceptual or cognitive content (representation). 
 This brings us to a point about Deleuze’s characterisation of cognition as 
representational which will be crucial for his conception of philosophy as bound up 
with a critique of representation: namely, it is not important for Deleuze how we 
conceive the relations of ontological priority between the subject and the object of 
cognition. Thus, whether subjectivity and objectivity are conceived as equally brute 
existences, or the structures of subjectivity conceived as dependent upon a world of 
mind-independent objects, or the objectivity of cognition conceived as a function of 
structures of subjectivity, these conceptions are still operating within the framework 
of representation. (Likewise, if one airs on the side of the subject as the source of the 
objectivity of cognition, it is not a significant move to shift from thinking of this 
subjectivity in terms of an individual subject to thinking in terms of social 
cognition.)  So long as one continues to operate within the parameters of 
representational structure, according to Deleuze, the same problems will arise. This 
helps us to clarify the appeal, for Deleuze, of empiricism, and the reasons why he 
sees a (transcendentalised) empiricism as a superior approach to that of 
transcendental idealism (in either its Kantian or phenomenological modes). Whilst 
on various occasions Deleuze seems to suggest that he takes subjectivism (idealism) 
to be a superior approach to objectivism (realism), this does not seem to be an 
essential feature of his view (in chapter 3 of Proust and Signs, for example, Deleuze 
points to objectivism and subjectivism as two equally flawed attempts to discern the 
source of the meaning of a sign). Nevertheless, in a milieu in which the subjective 
construction of objectivity has become a dogma, transcendental empiricism’s 
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challenge is to show that subject and object alike are the dual figures of a 
representational structure the genesis of which will have to be accounted for.
7
 
In the light of its propositional structure, the world of representation is 
ordered in terms of generalities.  The forms of identity proper to the subject and the 
object of cognition are, as already noted, general forms, shared by any subject or 
object insofar as they are a subject or an object respectively; furthermore, the 
specifications applied to these objects and subjects by good sense are generalities, 
shareable attributes, assigning the self or object in question to a type. (Deleuze will 
also note that membership of these types is assigned on the basis of resemblances 
between distinct objects, and consequently again by reference to general, i.e. 
shareable, features.) Consequently, the basic mechanism of determination at the 
heart of recognition is one of subsumption. Particulars are determined by being 
subsumed under general types, whilst these general types themselves are determined 
in turn by their subsumption under higher-level types. Deleuze will refer (at each 
level of determination) to the higher-level types as ‘genera’ and the subsumed types 
as ‘species’. The representational structure of cognition is thus a subsumptive 
structure of nested generalities. At each level of the taxonomic hierarchy, a number 
of mutually exclusive (opposed) species are subsumed under the identity of a genus, 
until we reach ‘the infima species’ (DR, p. 47/p. 31), that is, the level of particulars, 
at which point the hierarchy of identity and opposition bottoms out in a play of 
                                                 
7
 If Deleuze is most concerned to oppose his transcendental empiricism to (transcendental) idealism, 
this is no doubt due to the dominance of idealist or subjectivist tendencies – phenomenology, but also 
Cartesianism, Kantianism and Hegelianism – in the intellectual milieu into which his writings were an 
intervention. This is perhaps why his initial presentation of empiricism in Empiricism and Subjectivity 
focuses on empiricism’s capacity to account for the genesis of subjectivity: since its foil is various 
modes of transcendental idealism, the book feels at liberty to take for granted the need for objectivity 
too to be constructed. 
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resemblances. It is the structure of this subsumptive hierarchy that Deleuze 
characterises through his descriptions of the ‘quadripartite fetters’ of representation: 
identity, analogy, opposition and resemblance (DR, p. 180/p. 138; see also pp. 44-
45/p. 29, p. 337/p. 262).
8
  
Generality, as the manner of ‘distributing’ determinations proper to the 
‘economy’ of representation,9 should be thought of, according to Deleuze, as having 
both a temporal and a spatial aspect. From a temporal point of view, generality is 
inseparable from a certain movement of homogenisation, whereby the movement 
from the past to the future appears as a movement from like to like. Likewise, 
spatially, the explication of differences in extensity and in the qualities that fill this 
extensity is inseparable from their disappearance behind these extensities and 
qualities. The space and time corresponding to the representational order of 
generalities are consequently indifferent, homogeneous media.  Spatial and temporal 
determinations appear to make no difference to the general types under which 
particulars are subsumed.  
This last point should already begin to indicate the way in which the 
perspective of representation is permeated by illusion, since, as I noted in the 
                                                 
8
 I have omitted from my presentation for the moment the notion of analogy, which pertains to the 
status of the highest genera (or ‘categories’), that is, those most general determinations that do not 
form the species of a still higher genus. The question of the status of the categories is ultimately, for 
Deleuze, a question of the status of being and the nature of its ‘distribution’ among the various levels 
of the hierarchy. I will have reason to return to the question of the analogy of being in chapter 4, 
where the significance of Deleuze’s early notion of ‘immanence’ for his conception of the relation 
between philosophy and science will be considered. For now, however, I believe that a general 
presentation of the critique of representation can, for the sake of succinctness, be made with reference 
only to the problem of the being of individuals. 
9
 The economic metaphor is Deleuze’s (see DR, p. 7/p. 1). 
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previous chapter, Deleuze rejects this conception of time and space as homogeneous 
media. Having sketched the representational structure of cognition in this first 
section, I will go on in the coming section to outline the way in which representation 
is bound up, for Deleuze, with transcendental illusion.  
 
1.2 Representation as the site of transcendental illusion 
‘Representation’, Deleuze will argue, is ‘the site of transcendental illusion’ (DR, p. 
341/p. 265 [translation modified]).
10
 If there is a transcendental illusion tied to 
representation, it lies in the way in which the ‘createdness’ of concepts, and 
correspondingly the relation between concepts and their production by spatio-
temporal syntheses and as expressions of Ideas, is inevitably obscured from the point 
of view of the cognising subject, with the consequence that the significance of 
concepts, and of the activity of conceptual thought, comes to be identified with the 
use of concepts within the economy of generality proper to representation. Insofar as 
representation consists in the operation of conceptual thought within the horizon of 
this transcendental illusion, representation or cognition can be identified with ‘pure’ 
conceptual thought. That is to say, conceptual thought operates representationally or 
cognitively when it is separated from real experience and the Ideas it expresses. 
What will prove to be most important about this illusion, for Deleuze, is that 
through it, ‘thought is covered over by an “image” made up of postulates which 
distort both its operation and its genesis’ (DR, p. 341/p. 265). This is the case, as I 
will illustrate in more detail shortly, insofar as what Deleuze will term ‘thought’ or 
                                                 
10
 Here Deleuze’s statement that representation is le lieu of transcendental illusion is no doubt 
intended to echo Kant’s (1998) description of ‘pure reason’ as the ‘seat’ (der Sitz) of transcendental 
illusion (p. A298/B355). 
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‘thinking’ is, he claims, a process with an essential relation to sub-conceptual 
experience and the Ideas it expresses. If this relation between concepts and 
experience is obscured, then so is our capacity for thinking (and thus for 
philosophising). 
In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant seeks to show the illusions and errors 
that conceptual thought falls into when it operates solely in accordance with its own 
demands. Concepts, he argues, can only yield synthetic a priori knowledge to the 
extent that these concepts are applied to singular sensible intuitions, and thus 
constrained by the limits of space and time as the a priori forms of sensible intuition. 
Deleuze, in turn, can also be seen to offer a critique of pure conceptual thought, 
conceptual thought left to its own devices. Conceptual thought, for Deleuze, falls 
into illusion when it tries to use its concepts outside of the context of dynamic 
sensible milieux (spatio-temporal syntheses) incarnating ideal problematic structures. 
In both case, then, what is at stake is, in some sense, conceptual thought’s ambition 
to operate in separation from the sensible.  
The operation of thought I have just described – knowing or cognising – is 
what happens, according to Deleuze, when concepts lose their moorings in Ideas and 
begin to operate in isolation from the vital experiential milieux that imbue them with 
meaning and ‘movement’ (one might say ‘life’). 
This illusion has its roots in the representational structure of our cognition.  
To qualify an illusion as ‘transcendental’ is, for Deleuze (following Kant), to qualify 
it as inevitable given the nature of our thought itself. In order to see why this illusion 
is an inevitable illusion (for creatures like us, at least), recall the polarised structure 
of the field of representation. As subsumptively structured, this field is ordered in 
terms of persisting, qualified objects and the unity of a subject. But in each case I am 
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that subject. What it is to be a subject, for Deleuze, to be an ego or a person, is to be 
a pole in a subsumptively structured field of consciousness. The view from within 
representation is the perspective that I am as a constituted subject of experience.
11
 
Given Deleuze’s understanding of the relation between representation and 
subjectivity, therefore, it is hardly surprising that the limits of representation should 
present themselves as the limits of what is conceivable or thinkable for a subject, 
since I remain a constituted subject, according to Deleuze, only insofar as my mind 
continues to operate within these limits.  
This relation between representation and subjectivity is, then, a feature of the 
nature of our cognition. What is interesting about this, for Deleuze, is that it means 
that when we cognise, whenever we cognise, we do so within the horizon of an 
illusion. This is a sort of pathology within the normal functioning of cognition, not as 
a consequence of malfunction. Deleuze praises Kant for having developed this 
notion of ‘internal illusions, interior to reason’, which he juxtaposes to the notion 
(which he takes Descartes to exemplify) that thought is diverted from the course of 
truth only from without (DR, p. 178/p. 136). Thought qua thought, according to 
Descartes, has no ‘misadventures’ (DR, p. 194/p. 149). Rather, ‘thought has an 
affinity with the true’, in that ‘it formally possesses the true and materially wants the 
true’ (DR, p. 172/p. 131). On the ‘material’ side of this formulation, Deleuze seems 
                                                 
11
 Deleuze will point to what he will term a ‘larval subject’ or ‘passive self’ that is sub-
representational, and can be identified with the minimal integrity of experience implied by the 
unconscious and strictly speaking sub-personal dynamic of habit through which the fully formed 
subject is constituted (DR, pp. 96-108/pp. 70-79). He will identify the thinker with such a sub-
personal ‘self’ (e.g. DR, p. 325/p. 253). But the fully constituted ego or subject is distinct from this 
sub-personal proto-subjectivity; it is a general structure, a structure of any given individuated field of 
experience insofar as it bears the structure of constituted, representational subjectivity (common 
sense). This is what Deleuze means when he claims that ‘I is an other’ (DR, p. 116/p. 86). 
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to be pointing to a natural inclination to ongoing self-correction, a concern to rectify 
our body of beliefs, a will not to be deceived (which insofar as it is inseparable from 
a will to expand the sphere of what is cognisable, and insofar as cognition operates 
within the parameters of transcendental illusion, paradoxically reveals itself as a will 
to be deceived). On the ‘formal’ side, he is pointing to the structural isomorphism 
between the objects of the world of representation and its subject, such that the 
former appear as in principle available for cognition by the latter. Re-presented 
experience is experience insofar as it conforms to the general forms of conceptual 
thought’s subsumptive hierarchies.  
Cognition can of course fall into ‘error’ on this view, where error is 
conceived as a local failure of recognition, the failure of some particular act of 
recognition to grasp its object veridically.  However, such acts of misrecognition 
leave the general representational structure of cognition intact.
12
 But where error is a 
particular misrecognition within the general economy of recognition, the 
transcendental illusion of representation is a ‘misadventure’ engendered by the very 
nature of cognition. The idea of a transcendental illusion associated with conceptual 
thought’s tendency to treat subsumptive determination as the only kind of 
determination thus takes up the Kantian idea that cognition is strictly speaking only 
possible at all against the background – in Christian Kerslake’s (2009) apt phrase – 
of a ‘mirage’, the ‘projected totality’ of ‘a world fully representable by concepts’ (p. 
191 [emphasis removed]). 
In this section, I have outlined the way in which thought functions when it 
functions cognitively, and I have indicated the nature of the transcendental illusion 
                                                 
12
 Deleuze will gloss error as ‘a kind of failure of good sense within the form of a common sense 
which remains integral and intact’ (DR, p. 193/p. 149).  
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that Deleuze takes to develop out of this mode of functioning. With this background 
in place, it is now possible to turn to the movement of philosophical thought and 
how it deviates from this cognitive economy and escapes the illusion that 
accompanies it. Having done this, I will turn to the question of how the sciences fit 
into this picture. 
 
2 Philosophy as critique and creation 
Deleuze distinguishes cognising (or knowing) from thinking.
13
 ‘Thinking’ 
corresponds to what I have been calling problematisation and concept formation, or 
critique and creation. Philosophy is a species of thinking. I have already outlined 
conceptual thought’s cognitive use, and the way in which Deleuze takes this to be 
associated with transcendental illusions which mask the relation between concepts 
and their genesis in experience. In this section, then, I will look more closely at 
‘thinking’, understood as the critical-creative operation of conceptual thought in 
which the relation between concepts and experience is active and effective. How do 
thought and concepts function when their relation to experience and the Ideas it 
incarnated is not disavowed and submerged? 
Philosophy, as conceived in Deleuze’s early work, can be seen to have two 
moments (or movements): critique and creation. In its critical movement, 
philosophical thought passes from a confrontation with a singular object back to the 
Idea that it expresses, tracing its path back through the syntheses that produced it. In 
                                                 
13
 A gesture presumably of Heideggerian inspiration. In Nietzsche and Philosophy, for example, 
Deleuze links the idea of thinking as ‘the activity of thought’ with ‘its own ways of being inactive’ to 
Heidegger’s declaration in What Is Called Thinking? that ‘we are not yet thinking’ (NP, p. 123/p. 
108). See also DR, p. 188/p. 144. For an account of the role of Deleuze’s reading of What Is Called 
Thinking? across his oeuvre, see Dillet (2013). 
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its creative moment, philosophical thought returns to the surface with a flurry of 
concepts. A critique of representation on the one hand, then, aimed at extricating 
thought from the transcendental illusion of self-sufficient conceptuality engendered 
by the re-presentational, re-cognitive character of our cognition, and indeed our very 
selfhood; on the other hand, a creation of concepts, which can simultaneously be 
seen to involve the cultivation of a new relationship with concepts whereby their 
created and indeed creative character is not eschewed or obscured but embraced. If 
critique and creation in these senses are, for Deleuze, two moments of the same 
activity of thinking or philosophising, it is insofar as ‘[t]he conditions of a true 
critique and a true creation are the same: the destruction of an image of thought 
which presupposes itself and the genesis of the act of thinking in thought itself’ (DR, 
p. 182/p. 139). 
 
2.1 Critique 
Philosophy’s ‘project’, Deleuze states, is one ‘of breaking with doxa’ (DR, p. 175/p. 
134). Doxa, as Deleuze defines that term, is to be understood in terms of 
presupposition. Deleuze does not, however, have in mind primarily ‘objective 
presuppositions’, those ‘concepts explicitly presupposed by a given concept’, but 
what he terms ‘subjective presuppositions’ (DR, p. 169/p. 129). By subjective 
presuppositions – presuppositions ‘contained in opinions rather than concepts’, and 
thus ‘simply known implicitly without concepts’ – Deleuze means to indicate those 
horizons of expectation or anticipation that underlie our generalisations (DR, pp. 
169-170/p. 129). That is, he is pointing to the passive syntheses of habit, the 
‘foundation [fondation]’ (e.g. DR, p. 107/p. 78) upon which the representational 
structure of our cognition is based. Thus, habit might be thought of as the 
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presuppositional dynamic underlying the ongoing articulation of representational 
structure: re-presentation is ‘founded’ on pre-supposition insofar as generality is the 
product of habit.
14
 Deleuze makes it clear that it is this dynamic itself with which 
philosophy needs to break, and not any particular set of intellectual habits or 
conceptual scheme: ‘No doubt [dogmatic] philosophy refuses every particular doxa 
[…] Nevertheless, it retains the essential aspect of doxa – namely the form’ (DR, p. 
175/p. 134). Thus, if philosophy must ‘break’ with doxa, understood as the 
presuppositional dynamic of representation, it seems that philosophy must break 
with habit. Philosophy stands opposed to the transition from a distribution of 
determinations governed by the economy of difference and repetition (expression) to 
a distribution governed by the economy of generality (subsumption). 
 This is philosophy’s ‘critical’ moment.  Critique as a project of 
‘presuppositionlessness’ is not Deleuze’s innovation – indeed, as Alberto Toscano 
(2010) notes, it is a project ‘with an incontestable Cartesian pedigree’ (p. 8). 
However, it is Deleuze’s contention that prior attempts at critique – and he has in 
mind in particular Descartes and Kant (though perhaps also Hegel and Husserl) – 
have failed insofar as they have effectively carried out a ‘rationalisation’ of doxa 
(both in the sense of a rational justification and in the more psychoanalytic sense), 
erecting the parameters placed on thought by representational structure into an ‘ideal 
orthodoxy’ (DR, p. 175/p. 134), a set of criteria for ‘good usage’ (DR, p. 179/p. 137).   
I have indicated that it is part of the transcendental illusion of common sense 
to conceive conceptual thought as having a ‘natural affinity’ with truth, in and of 
itself; as materially desiring and formally possessing truth. It is this ‘good nature’ of 
                                                 
14
 Habit ‘draws something new from repetition – namely […] generality’ (DR, p. 101/p. 73). 
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representational subjectivity to which these failed attempts at critique appeal, 
according to Deleuze. Hence, for the Cartesian, thought is perverted from its natural 
course by ‘external forces capable of subverting [its] honest character […] from 
without’ – and this because ‘we are not only thinkers’, but also beings imbued with 
senses (DR, p. 194/p. 149 [my emphasis]). Critique – in this case the method of 
doubt – is therefore to be understood as returning the thinker to a sort of intellectual 
‘state of nature’, in which thought is beholden only to what is self-evident, that is, 
what cannot be doubted. The problem here, from Deleuze’s perspective, should be 
clear: what is self-evident to a subject, what she finds herself incapable of wilfully 
doubting, is determined by those sub-reflective expectations that underwrite the very 
fabric of her subjectivity in the form of a meshwork of intellectual and perceptual 
habits. But it is this pre-suppositional, sub-conceptual dynamic that founds thought’s 
tendency to be deceived by the transcendental illusion upon which its cognition 
relies, and consequently which must be the very object of critique, not its terminus. 
Kant’s transcendental idealism moves beyond Descartes’s appeal to a state of 
intellectual nature by recognising the role of illusion in the formation of cognition 
itself. Hence, Kant recognises thought’s ‘natural’ exercise as shot through with 
illusion. Consequently, as Kerslake (2009) has emphasised, for Kant, ‘the critique of 
reason’ – insofar as it is meant to liberate us from deception by the illusions 
inevitably and inextricably interwoven with our cognition – ‘involves the founding 
of an institution which articulates our transcendence of the state of nature’ (p. 64; see 
Deleuze 2008b, p. 23). The Kantian critique, as Deleuze notes, establishes a whole 
judiciary in the mind: ‘Critique has everything – a tribunal of justices of the peace, a 
registration room, a register’ (DR, p. 179/p. 137). However, what lies behind these 
juridical metaphors is the notion that, although ‘in its natural state, thought confuses 
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its interests and allows its various domains to encroach upon one another’, 
engendering illusion, ‘[t]his does not prevent thought from having at its base a good 
natural law’, and that it is this law – which refers us to the ‘natural interests of 
reason’ – ‘on which Critique bestows its civil sanction’ (DR, p. 179/p. 137).15 
Consequently, Kant too ultimately sees critique as referring thought back to the 
subject and its identity (its synthetic unity), and consequently as validating thought’s 
constraint within the parameters set for it by totalised representation. In Kant’s case 
in particular, as Deleuze emphasises in Nietzsche and Philosophy, the issue is that 
the ‘object of […] critique is justification’: ‘it begins by believing in what it 
criticises’, and consequently conceives ‘critique as a force which should be brought 
to bear on all claims to knowledge and truth, but not on knowledge and truth 
themselves’, likewise ‘on all claims to morality, but not on morality itself’ (NP, p. 
102/pp. 83-84). Insofar as cognition, and the subjectivity and objectivity from which 
it is composed, are inseparable from the transcendental illusion of totalised 
representation, Kant’s commitment to the justification of cognition and its 
components leads him to a justification of totalised representation as well. 
If transcendental empiricism re-envisages critique in a manner that is 
liberated from these representationalist missteps, it is insofar as the movement of 
critique is one whereby thought confronts the insufficiency and fragility of 
                                                 
15
 With regard to this resurgence of the ‘naturalness’ of thought in Kant, Deleuze cites two passages 
from the Critique of Pure Reason: (i) ‘The ideas of pure reason can never be dialectical in themselves; 
rather it is merely their misuse which brings it about that a deceptive illusion arises out of them; for 
they are given as problems for us by the nature of our reason, and this highest court of appeals for all 
rights and claims of our speculation cannot possibly contain original deceptions and semblances’ 
(Kant 1998, p. A669/B697); (ii) ‘in regard to the essential ends of human nature even the highest 
philosophy cannot advance further than the guidance that nature has also conferred on the most 
common understanding’ (Kant 1998, p. A831/B859). 
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representational structure and of the structures of subjective presupposition upon 
which it is based. Such a dissolution of the apparent self-sufficiency of conceptual 
thought begins with what Deleuze terms ‘a fundamental encounter’ (DR, p. 182/p. 
139). In the encounter, ‘[s]omething in the world forces us to think’ (DR, p. 183/p. 
139). If ‘the object of the encounter’ forces ‘the genesis of the act of thinking in 
thought itself [l’acte de penser dans la pensée même]’, it is insofar as it exceeds the 
limits of representation (DR, p. 182/p. 139). As such, it cannot be recognised: ‘it can 
only be sensed’ (DR, p. 182/p. 139). This is the stubbornness of the unique object 
which blocks the concept, which I discussed in chapter 1. ‘In recognition’, recall, 
‘the sensible is not at all that which can only be sensed, but that which bears directly 
upon the senses in an object which can be recalled, imagined or conceived’, in other 
words, ‘which may not only be experienced other than by sense, but may itself be 
attained by other faculties’ (DR, p. 182/p. 139). This is the triangulation of the 
faculties on a supposed same object which characterises the objective aspect of 
common sense, and correlatively recognition as the subjective act corresponding to 
this common sense. In the encounter, on the other hand, what the mind confronts is 
something ‘in a certain sense […] imperceptible [insensible]’, specifically ‘from the 
point of view of recognition’: namely an absolutely singular individual (DR, p. 
182/p. 140). This, as I have shown in chapter 1, is the source of the phenomenon of 
‘bare repetition’.  
Thought’s critical movement does not stop at blockage by bare repetition, 
however. Thought is provoked by the stubbornness of singular existents to seek ‘the 
reason for the blockage of concepts’ (DR, p. 37/p. 24), and this leads it to plumb the 
sub-conceptual depths of experiential synthesis out of which the object emerges, 
eventually arriving at the Idea the object expresses. It is a movement away from the 
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constituted structures of representation and towards the transcendental processes and 
differential structures that determine them. Just as for Kant the taxonomy of forms of 
judgement would function as a ‘clue to the discovery of all pure concepts of the 
understanding’,16 that is, to the conceptual structure of the transcendental, the 
singular object of the encounter – insofar it ‘functions as a sign of the transcendental, 
announcing an internal difference within intuition whose structure and essence must 
be unfolded’ (Bryant 2009, p. 13) – might be thought of as playing an analogous role 
as a ‘clue’ to the structure of the transcendental in Deleuze’s own transcendental 
philosophy.  
In this manner, Deleuze claims that thought’s critical movement begins with 
the incapacity of the mind to (re)cognise a sensibly discernible unique object and 
then descends towards the Idea this object expresses, the ‘internal difference’ that 
defines the being of the object in its individuality. The critical movement of thought 
is thus a movement from concepts to problems. The encounter ‘“perplexes” [the 
mind] – […] forces it to pose a problem: as though the object of encounter, the sign, 
were the bearer of a problem – as though it were a problem’ (DR, p. 182/p. 140). The 
problems in question cannot simply be conflated with the incapacity of conceptual 
thought to grasp individuals; this would rob the notion of a movement of thought of 
its meaning. Rather, it is ‘Ideas’, Deleuze tells us, that ‘are essentially “problematic”’ 
– indeed, ‘problems are Ideas’ (DR, p. 218/p. 168). Hence, the problem towards 
which thought is driven by the ‘stubbornness’ of the individual is not ‘a subjective 
determination marking a moment of insufficiency in knowledge’ (DR, p. 89/p. 63), 
                                                 
16
 See the first chapter of the Analytic of Concepts (Kant 1998, p. A66/B91 ff.). 
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but an ideal structure with ‘an objective value’ (DR, p. 219/p. 169.).17 The problem 
that provokes and orientates an act of thinking is not the conceptual blockage as 
obstacle, but the Idea as the reason of this obstacle. 
The critical movement of thought manifest what Deleuze calls, appropriating 
a Freudian term, a death instinct (see DR, pp. 26-30/pp. 16-19, pp. 145-53/pp. 109-
116, p. 333/p. 259). There is ‘an experience of death’ (DR, p. 150/p. 114) associated 
with the mind’s confrontation with the spatio-temporal dynamisms that determine 
the world of representation, and it is this experience that is undergone by thought 
when the encounter forces it to confront the illusory character of the fixed world of 
representation it takes itself to inhabit in its cognitive mode. In other words, the 
critical movement of thought is a movement of ‘de-differenciation’, of the 
decomposition of those generalities in accordance with which representation orders 
experience. What Deleuze means to indicate by associating this process with death is 
that, given the way in which our subjectivity – our status as fully actualised, 
constituted and organised minds – is determined by the economy of generality, the 
critical decomposition of generalities necessarily involves a kind of 
‘desubjectivation’ or loss of identity. ‘[E]very Idea turns us into larvae’, Deleuze 
states, ‘having put aside the identity of the I along with the resemblance of the self’ 
(DR, p. 283/p. 219); our subjectivity is reduced to an embryonic state in which the 
fixity of its general determinations (as the subject of common sense) dissolves and 
the mind can be reformed in new ways, outside the parameters of common sense. 
                                                 
17
 Deleuze will coin the term ‘objecticities [objectités]’ (DR, p. 206/p. 159) in order to characterise the 
objectivity of Ideas. His intent seems to be to characterise them as objective, in the sense that they are 
not subjective, whilst noting that they are not ‘objects’ in the same manner as the actualities that 
express them. 
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2.2 Creation 
The movement of thought is not only destructive, however. ‘To think is to create’ 
(DR, p. 192/p. 147). Thus, philosophy, as a mode of ‘thinking’, is a mode of 
creation; it is creative. In particular, ‘the philosopher creates concepts’ – ‘the 
medium [élément] in philosophy is the concept’ (DI, p. 196/p. 141). Indeed, ‘[a] 
philosophy’s power is measured by the concepts it creates, or whose meaning it 
alters, concepts that impose a new set of divisions on things and actions’ (SPE, p. 
299/p. 321). Philosophy is thus identified by Deleuze as concept formation.
18
 How 
should the relation between this creative moment and philosophy’s critical moment 
be understood? 
 Philosophy, as just noted, is, for Deleuze, a mode of conceptual thought. 
However, the way in which conceptuality functions in philosophical thought cannot 
be the same as in representation. The critical movement of philosophical thought is 
triggered by representational conceptuality’s confrontation with its own incapacity to 
(re)cognise an individual. And yet, ‘philosophy’s ideal’ (DI, p. 44/p. 33), according 
to Deleuze, is to construct a concept tailor-made for its singular object, a bespoke 
concept that does not simply place this object under a general type alongside other 
objects that it resembles, but which expresses this individual object’s being, the 
reason for its being ‘this object rather than another of the same kind’ (DI, p. 50/p. 
36). Philosophical thought, in its creative movement (to quote a phrase from Bergson 
                                                 
18
 This notion of philosophy as the creation of concepts will, of course, be a persistent one in 
Deleuze’s work, finding its final and perhaps most explicit formulation in 1991 in What Is 
Philosophy?. This is not to say, however, that the precise sense of this notion similarly persists, and 
one should be cautious about reading the metaphilosophy of Difference and Repetition through that of 
the ’91 text. 
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that Deleuze also cites) ‘cuts for the object a concept appropriate to the object alone, 
a concept one can barely say is still a concept, since it applies only to that one thing’ 
(Bergson 1946, p. 206). Concepts can only approach this degree of specificity – and 
it is unclear whether it is ever really achieved, or rather remains, for Deleuze, an 
ideal or a tendency
19
 – insofar as they are dramatised by spatio-temporal dynamisms 
and thereby express Ideas. This critical movement extricates philosophical 
conceptuality from its correlation with the world of representation, allowing the 
creative power of concepts as expressions of the transcendental production of a 
world to shine through. Concepts become philosophical when, rather than simply 
providing a window onto a world of objects, they begin also ‘to allow singularities to 
come out from under individuated realities, to surface and speak’ (de Beistegui 2008, 
p. 52) – in other words, when they express rather than obscure their own relation to 
real experience and transcendental genesis. In the wake of critique, philosophy can 
be understood as a mode of conceptual thought disabused of deception by 
transcendental illusion. The difference that critique makes can be understood as a re-
establishment of the essential relation between these concepts and the Ideas and 
spatio-temporal dynamisms that they express. 
This has two consequences regarding the status attributed to these concepts: 
Firstly, they do not primarily refer to a world of representation, but do so only 
insofar as they first express a world of difference. Thus, these concepts can be seen 
as drawing their meaning from the problems to which they provide singular and 
partial solutions. Secondly, the creative character of these concepts becomes 
apparent, that is, that they make a substantive contribution to the way in which the 
                                                 
19
 ‘This is why the search for actual concepts can be infinite, there is always an excess of virtual Ideas 
animating them’ (DI, p. 154/p. 110). 
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world appears for us (this character of ‘aspectual’ presentation is the sense of 
concepts, over and above their reference). In a sense, then, what becomes apparent to 
us through critique is the way in which an array of concepts serves to compose a 
singular perspective on the objectively problematic reality by which we are 
confronted. We are no longer misled by the structure of our conceptuality into 
regarding these concepts as a window onto a conceptually structured world, but 
rather come to appreciate the power of sub-conceptual syntheses to creatively 
construct such a world, and to produce the concepts that structure it. Furthermore, we 
are forced to confront the partial and transient character of any such construction: 
the concepts thought creates in its attempt to express that which it encounters 
provide only one possible actualisation of the virtual; and this construction is always 
open to dissolution in the face of new encounters. 
None of this is meant as a concession to the excesses of what Levi Bryant 
(2009) has referred to as ‘a sort of dogmatic enthusiasm or Schwärmerei’ (p. 12) to 
which Deleuze’s philosophy might seem to play host. That is to say, this notion of 
creative conceptuality freed from transcendental illusion should not be understood as 
a renewed, radicalised transcendental subjectivism, shorn of even the constraints of a 
regulative objectivity. The creation of concepts is beholden to the experience of an 
encounter through which the mind confronts its obscure unconscious of differential 
Ideas, and Deleuze takes this to provide an ‘objective’ instance (in the sense of the 
‘objecticity’ of problems) conditioning and constraining (at the same time as it 
facilitates) thought’s creativity. Indeed, insofar as there is a whole process of sub-
representational selection, through the spatio-temporal syntheses, underlying concept 
formation, it seems that a great deal of the creativity of the process is carried out 
below the level of the conscious, concept-manipulating, active subject. Thus, the 
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liberation from transcendental illusion that critique permits, considered from the 
perspective of the conscious subject engaging actively in philosophy, must primarily 
be a question of attitude towards concepts, a question of cultivating a disillusioned 
attitude which views concepts not as representations but as expressions of the sub-
conceptual formation of a way of seeing and thinking. It is this, I would suggest, that 
Deleuze has in mind in Nietzsche and Philosophy when he states that ‘[t]he point of 
critique is not justification but a different way of feeling: another sensibility’ (NP, p. 
108/p. 88). 
To extricate concept formation from the ‘image’ imposed on it by its 
correlation with the objectivity of the world of representation, I would argue, is 
effectively to extricate it from cognition. The role of the concept is not to represent – 
that is, re-present, present again – a pre-existing world; concepts are rather the 
farthest end of a process of constructing an actual world as a partial expression of the 
virtual space of Ideas. 
With a certain inevitability, however, these concepts come to be 
acquisitioned in the interests of representation. The sense of concepts is determined 
by the problematic context in which they are enveloped by thought’s encounter with 
the stubbornness of an individual. The ‘meaning [sens]’ of concepts – and here 
Deleuze means to invoke the Fregean distinction between meaning or sense (Sinn) 
and reference (Bedeutung) – ‘is located in the problem itself’ (DR, p. 204/p. 157 
[translation modified; my emphasis]). It is from their status as ‘solutions’ to a 
problem (from their dramatisation) that concepts derive their meaning or sense. If 
concepts’ relation to problems is obscured, as it is by transcendental illusion, they 
are robbed of the horizon of virtuality from which they draw their ‘sense’ and take 
on a purely ‘designatory’ status, picking out or referring (through acts of 
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recognition) to actual objects in the world of representation, whilst disavowing their 
expressive character (DR, p. 211/p. 163). Conceptual thought, when set in motion by 
a problematic confrontation which provokes it to explore the Ideas that singular 
things express, creates concepts the meaning of which is determined by this 
problematic context. But once these new concepts have been constructed, they 
remain available to conceptual thought, regardless of whether it continues to operate 
within the horizon of this problem or not. A transition is thus possible, whereby 
concepts cease to be deployed within the problematic horizon from which they 
originally drew their sense and are rather redeployed within an economy that 
distributes determinations quite differently, namely that of representation and its 
active syntheses. One might designate this drift the transition from ‘created’ (or 
‘new’) to ‘established’ concepts. 
In relation to the established and the new, Deleuze makes the following 
remark (which, although it does not pertain directly to concepts but rather to values, 
can legitimately be extended to concepts): the ‘distinction between the creation of 
new values and the recognition of established values should not be understood in a 
historically relative manner, as though the established values were new in their time 
and the new values simply needed time to become established’ (DR, p. 177/p. 136). 
Rather, ‘the difference is one of kind, like the difference between the conservative 
order of representation and a creative disorder or inspired chaos’ (DR, p. 77/p. 54). 
‘[T]he new – in other words, difference – calls forth forces in thought which are not 
the forces of recognition, today or tomorrow, but the powers of a completely other 
model, from an unrecognised and unrecognisable terra incognita’ (DR, p. 177/p. 
136). The point of these remarks, then, is that the distinction between created and 
established concepts, in Deleuze’s sense, is not primarily a matter of how recently 
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these concepts have been constructed. It is a difference in what, following Deleuze, I 
have called the economy of determination in which these concepts are deployed. 
Created concepts aim to designate individuals in their internal difference, and are 
able to do so only insofar as they express problems; whereas established concepts 
subsume particulars under generalities, and have become separated from problems. 
Concepts, once created, are able to come loose of their moorings in a problematic 
context, in which they are specific solutions determined by the conditions of the 
problems, and be redeployed as general types subsuming particular tokens. 
Philosophy is an ongoing battle to wrestle concepts free of this drift whereby they 
become established and thereby lose their problematic sense and vitality. 
 
3 Thinking and knowing in the sciences 
In the previous part, I have argued that Deleuze conceives philosophy as the activity 
of conceptual thought liberated from deception by the transcendental illusion that 
obfuscates the creativity of thought and the relation between concepts and sub-
conceptual experience. The question now is: where should science be situated in 
relation to the two regimes of conceptuality discussed above? Philosophy, according 
to Deleuze, is only worthy of its name when it operates critically-creatively; 
representational ‘philosophy’ is no philosophy at all. But what of science? While the 
answer here is not straightforward, since there is textual evidence indicating that 
Deleuze takes scientific activity to be traversed by both representational and critical-
creative tendencies, ultimately I will suggest that there are ways in which the 
sciences depend upon representation which set them apart from philosophy’s 
constitutive break with representation. The reasons for this difference in attitude or 
orientation further help to clarify the essential divergence between scientific and 
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philosophical thinking: namely, whilst the scientific enterprise is epistemic and 
pragmatic in its aims, philosophy, for Deleuze, is at base an ethical exercise – if in a 
quite idiosyncratic sense.  
For a thinker so engaged with specific progressions of conceptual 
development in the history of the sciences, what is notable by its absence from 
Deleuze’s mature statements of his early thought is a properly developed philosophy 
of science, in the sense of a reflection on the philosophical consequences and proper 
interpretation of the nature of science as a body of knowledge, a distinctive cognitive 
activity or a social practice. Despite Manuel DeLanda’s admirable attempts to 
reconstruct a plausibly Deleuzian position on such issues as the ontological status of 
the modal claims involved in causal explanation, or the epistemic status of models in 
science, attributing such positions to Deleuze himself seems exegetically farfetched. 
Deleuze’s early texts offer us little by way of a consolidated account of the nature of 
scientific endeavour.   
 Therefore, in order to glean something like a view of the nature and status of 
science from Deleuze’s writing, it is necessary to follow the few clues his texts do 
present and work from the way in which these remarks fit into the rest of Deleuze’s 
philosophy in order to construct a plausibly (early) ‘Deleuzian’ account of science. 
Considering Difference and Repetition, then, it can be seen that although direct 
references to science as such or in general are few, Deleuze does comment on certain 
things that can plausibly be taken to be key features of science in general; in 
particular, he will comment on (i) laws of nature, (ii) scientific experiment and (iii) 
prediction.   
 That Deleuze’s comments on these three phenomena have some bearing on 
his view of science seems fairly uncontroversial. The sciences would seem to be 
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concerned with making and testing predictions, both as an important epistemic 
capacity of which they are a development and as an integral part of the process of 
attempting to empirically confirm scientific theorising. Experiment provides an arena 
in which predictions can play a confirmatory role in relation to theories. On both of 
these points, there is room for additional nuance, or for some critical scrutiny of 
these commonplaces regarding the sciences. Apropos prediction, developments in 
both quantum mechanics and nonlinear thermodynamics have forced scientists and 
philosophers to question the limits (not only de facto but de jure) of prediction, that 
is, the limits of the predictability of physical systems (and a fortiori systems at other 
‘scales’ of reality, since physical systems having provided for modern science the 
paradigm of predictability).
20
 Apropos experimentation, prompted by theoretical 
physics’ ongoing search for a viable theory of quantum gravity in spite of the de 
facto inaccessibility to experiment of the phenomena under investigation, some 
philosophers of science are beginning to raise questions about the centrality of 
experiment to the confirmation of scientific theory.
21
 However, while these sorts of 
cases present reasons to be cautious in giving to either experiment or prediction an 
overly essential role in the definition of science (assuming, for the sake of argument, 
that anything like a definition of science in general is possible), it would seem too 
strong a conclusion to try to divorce the sciences from these things altogether. That 
sciences are still expected to be able to predict the behaviour of systems and 
phenomena about which they claim knowledge – even if only in the sense of 
providing a set of probabilities for various possible outcomes – seems a reasonably 
                                                 
20
 See Prigogine (1997). 
21
 See Dawid (2013). 
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uncontroversial statement;
22
 while the integral role of experiment, as scientific 
knowledge’s tie to ‘observation’ (however distant that operation might be from a 
simple act of looking), likewise seems hard to discard altogether. (One might suspect 
that even those physicists working in the most purely theoretical areas of the 
discipline would not wish to see their work as a priori in principle, but rather as 
working at some distance from the sorts of phenomena we have as yet figured out 
ways to subject to experimental conditions). 
 The role of laws of nature in scientific knowledge is by no means a 
philosophically uncontroversial issue. There is controversy first of all regarding what 
laws of nature are,
23
 and secondly about whether the sciences are indeed best 
characterised as seeking to discover natural laws at all.
24
 However, even in the light 
                                                 
22
 A relatively recent example comes from the social sciences: when the financial crisis began in 
2008, the incapacity of the economists of the US Federal Reserve to predict the banking collapse that 
triggered the crisis has indeed led to renewed hand-wringing about the purported ‘scientific’ status of 
economics. See, for example, the contributions to the conference on ‘The Economic Crisis and Its 
Implications for the Science of Economics’ held at the Perimeter Institute for Theoretical Physics in 
Waterloo, Ontario in Canada on 1
st
 May 2009 (videos available at <http://pirsa.org/C09006> 
[accessed 25 August 2015]). Thus, that there is some strong connection between the capacity to make 
predictions and the scientific character of a body of knowledge seems to be an appealing thesis, even 
in the social sciences, where the complexity of the systems involved has long rendered strict 
predictability a fantasy.  
23
 What is the scope of the claims codified in these laws: do they range over only observed cases, only 
actual cases, or over all possible cases? And if the latter, what kind of possibility is involved – 
physical, metaphysical…? 
24
 DeLanda (2002, chap. 5) emphasises the work of philosophers of science such as Nancy 
Cartwright, who has argued for the strict falsity of laws of nature. DeLanda’s reasons for doing so 
relate to his attempt to disentangle the sciences from ‘representation’ so as to demonstrate an affinity 
between the conclusions of Deleuze’s philosophy and those of the scientific study of nonlinear 
systems. But DeLanda overstates the case in claiming that Cartwright and similarly inclined 
philosophers of science represent a new orthodoxy. 
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of these concerns, it is possible to make the following observation: that insofar as we 
acknowledge that there are laws of nature, that is, that nature behaves in a law-like 
manner, it would seem to be the sciences that are charged with providing knowledge 
of what these laws are. So, although there is room to dispute whether the sciences are 
concerned to discover laws of nature, if there are laws of nature, then it is the 
sciences that are tasked with discovering them. Hence, I think it is justifiable to read 
Deleuze’s discussion of laws of nature as providing a characterisation of scientific 
knowledge – at least insofar as Deleuze can be taken to embrace the thesis that 
empirical reality (the objects of actual experience, the world of representation) 
behaves in a law-like manner.   
 It seems, then, that Deleuze does in fact provide the building blocks of a 
description of scientific knowledge: scientific knowledge is knowledge of laws of 
nature (which is not to say that it is exclusively knowledge of laws of nature – it may 
involve other knowledge); obtained through a process of confirmation involving 
submitting experience to experimental conditions; the process of confirmation 
involves the making and testing of predictions, in addition to which the scientific 
knowledge obtained permits us to make predictions about the behaviour of the world 
around us. This is a philosophically minimal characterisation of scientific knowledge 
in general that can be reconstructed from Deleuze’s pronouncements in Difference 
and Repetition – this characterisation, I submit, is already enough to suggest that the 
sciences are, for Deleuze, intimately bound up with the representational economy of 
cognition. 
Given the minimal characterisation of scientific knowledge provided above, 
it might seem that Deleuze takes science to conform to the representational structure 
of cognition. The crucial point here, with regard to all the various aspects of 
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scientific knowledge we have highlighted, is that scientific knowledge, like all 
knowledge, consists of generalisations, that is, claims involving the subsumption of 
something under a generality. 
 Consider first scientific experiment, as this is perhaps Deleuze’s most 
straightforward discussion. Scientific experiment involves the establishment of a 
controlled space in the context of which the behaviour of the entities involved can be 
understood in terms of a small number of interacting determinations: 
‘experimentation constitutes relatively closed environments in which phenomena are 
defined in terms of a small number of chosen factors’ (DR, p. 9/p. 3). This is a 
situation in which measurement is possible. ‘In these conditions’, Deleuze continues, 
‘phenomena necessarily appear as equal to a certain quantitative relation between the 
chosen factors’ (DR, p. 10/p. 3). These constraints proper to the experimental 
situation are important for two reasons: (i) in order to ensure that the experiment 
allows for a rigorously quantifiable measurement of phenomena and for a similarly 
quantified measure of the variations in their behaviour resulting from controlled 
variations in the experimental conditions; (ii) in order to ensure that the experiment 
is repeatable, in the sense that its conditions can be replicated.
25
 Measurable and 
repeatable: both of these factors are central to the epistemic role played by 
experiment, which can be understood as placing constraints on observation such that 
it can be seen to yield systematic and thus cognitively contentful results.   
Deleuze understands this constraint in terms of an imposition on experience 
of the condition required for a certain register of representational determination: 
‘Natural phenomena are produced in a free state, where any inference is possible 
                                                 
25
 This is what Deleuze refers to as allowing for ‘the identification of a phenomenon under the 
particular conditions of the experiment’ (DR, p. 10/p. 3). 
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among the vast cycles of resemblance […] Experimentation is […] a matter of 
substituting one order of generality for another: an order of equality for an order of 
resemblance’ (DR, p. 10/p. 3). Against the background of perception’s apprehension 
of innumerable similarities between particulars, the imposition of experimental 
conditions allows us to make the kind of inferences necessary to move from this 
perceptual apprehension of similarities to scientific knowledge, that is, to infer that 
‘in similar situations one will always be able to select and retain the same factors’ 
(DR, p. 10/p. 3). This ‘hypothetical repetition’, Deleuze states, ‘represent[s] the 
being-equal of the phenomena’, that is, the basis of its subjection to a law of nature 
(DR, p. 10/p. 3). 
 What marks experiment out as complicit with representation, for Deleuze, is 
thus that it renders phenomena comprehensible by submitting them to generalities, 
and thereby renders them substitutable for one another. When a scientist performs an 
experiment, she carries out a procedure at a particular time and place; it is a unique 
event. The phenomena under investigation in this specific experiment are likewise 
unique events: particle collisions,
26
 chemical reactions, physiological reactions, 
answers provided by psychological test subjects. But the understanding that the 
scientist gains of these phenomena from the experiment pertains entirely to the type 
of phenomenon in question: she learns about the behaviour of this type of chemical 
interaction, of this type of physiological or psychological response. If these and 
future individual instances can be explained or comprehended on the basis of 
experimentally tested theorising, therefore, it is only insofar as they are particular 
                                                 
26
 This claim is disputable in the case of particle collisions, since the applicability of the PII to 
subatomic particles is a live debate in the philosophy of quantum theory. 
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cases subsumable under generalities. The particular as such, the individual in its 
individuality, remains undetermined. 
 Already considering experiment the way in which scientific knowledge 
trades in generalities is apparent. This is also apparent from a consideration of laws 
of nature. Laws of nature can be understood as general claims about the behaviour of 
types of entities. More specifically, laws of nature make claims about the correlation 
between one type of phenomena and another type. 
 It thus seems clear that Deleuze is right to associate laws with generality.
27
 
‘[L]aw’ – and here Deleuze means to characterise both laws of nature and the 
juridical framework of a social group – ‘determines only the resemblance of the 
subjects ruled by it, along with their equivalence to terms which it designates’ (DR, 
p. 8/p. 2). Laws of nature, qua general claims about types of things, are concerned 
with the persistent behaviour of groups; unique events in the lives of unique 
individuals are simply not within the purview of laws. Insofar, then, as science is 
concerned to discover the nomological structure of nature, it does indeed seem that 
individuals as such, in their uniqueness, fall outside its remit. The individuality of 
the individual is not that aspect of it which stands to be of explanatory value.   
 Perhaps the most interesting case is prediction. What is interesting about it is 
how directly Deleuze takes the act of prediction to reflect the presuppositional 
dynamic of our cognition, such that scientific knowledge’s predictive character 
seems to associate it quite closely with that structure. That is no doubt why those 
commentators most interested in stressing a continuity between Deleuzian 
philosophy and the sciences have placed so much emphasis on the arguments of Ilya 
                                                 
27
 ‘[G]enerality belongs to the order of laws’ (DR, p. 8/p. 2). 
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Prigogine et al. regarding the significance of certain twentieth-century developments 
in the physical sciences, arguments to the effect that the recognition of the 
prevalence in nature of nonlinear systems serves to disrupt the ‘Laplacean’ ideal of a 
completed scientific knowledge as a tool for perfect prediction. While the nature and 
role of prediction in science is certainly transformed by these developments, it seems 
to me ultimately implausible to suggest that prediction does not continue to play a 
crucial role in the confirmation of scientific claims and in the ongoing demonstration 
of their empirical adequacy. 
 The conclusion towards which these points seem to be leading is that science, 
for the early Deleuze, operates within the parameters of the representation. The 
picture is more complex, however. In the course of Difference and Repetition, 
Deleuze points out certain currents of scientific thought that seem to be consonant 
with the kind of ‘thinking’ that occurs in philosophy, or something nearer to it than 
to recognition.
28
 Let us consider a few places where Deleuze makes this kind of 
claim, and try to determine what sort of status he takes such episodes of critical-
creative thinking in scientific thought to have. 
One example comes from Deleuze’s discussion of the debate between the 
early nineteenth-century French zoologists Georges Cuvier and Étienne Geoffroy 
Saint-Hilaire. It is not necessary to recount the details of Cuvier and Geoffroy Saint-
Hilaire’s dispute in the field of comparative anatomy and its impact on the 
subsequent development of evolutionist ideas (see Rehbock 1990). All that needs to 
                                                 
28
 I am concerned here with Deleuze’s discussions of episodes in the history of scientific thought in 
which it seems that Deleuze takes ‘thinking’ to have occurred. This should be distinguished from the 
topic of the next chapter, which considers what is going on when Deleuze appropriates scientific 
concepts as tools in the development of his own project. 
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be noted here is that Deleuze praises Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire’s transcendental 
anatomy, with its attempt to explain structural ‘homologies’ across anatomical 
variation between animal species in terms of variations on an ideal archetype of the 
structure of the organism, opposing it favourably to Cuvier’s functionalist 
explanation. Deleuze speaks of Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire’s ‘genius’ in having 
constructed ‘a structuralism in biology’ that prefigures, he suggests, the view of 
biological diversity presented by modern genetics (DR, p. 240/p. 185). 
Transcendental anatomy and genetics represent, for Deleuze, a line of thought in the 
history of the life sciences that allow us to conceive ‘the organism as [a] biological 
Idea’: ‘An organism is a set of real [i.e. actual] terms and relations (dimension, 
position, number) which actualises on its own account, to this or that degree, 
relations between differential elements’ which compose the virtual Idea of the 
organism, or the ‘“essence” which is the Animal in itself’ (DR, p. 239/p. 185). Here, 
it is clear that Deleuze takes Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire to have achieved a grasp of 
problems or Ideas, as a consequence of which his thought cannot be regarded as 
operating within a purely conceptual (i.e. representational) sphere. 
 A number of examples can also be drawn from the history of mathematics. In 
particular, Deleuze highlights the search – in various branches of mathematics, but 
particularly in group theory – for a way to show that the ‘“solvability” [of a 
mathematical problem] […] must be determined by the conditions of the problem, 
engendered in and by the problem along with the real solutions’ (DR, p. 210/p. 162). 
In this connection, Deleuze notes the work of the nineteenth-century mathematicians 
Niels Henrik Abel and Évariste Galois on the solvability of polynomial equations.
29
 
                                                 
29
 For a brief but lucid explanation of Abel’s and Galois’ work, set in the context of Deleuze’s 
references to it in Difference and Repetition, see Duffy (2013, pp. 84-88). Deleuze notes the influence 
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Abel ‘provided the first accepted proof of the insolubility of the quintic, or fifth 
degree polynomial equations’, that is, polynomial equations containing variables 
raised to the power of five (Duffy 2013, p. 84). ‘What Abel’s proof shows is that 
even though a solution can be provided in certain special cases, a solution to a 
special case is not generalizable, that is, a general formula for a solution with the 
same form as the solution for special cases does not exist’ (Duffy 2013, p. 85). 
Rather, in order to determine ‘whether a given equation is solvable’, it is necessary 
to ‘determine the conditions of the problem’, such that ‘solvability must follow from 
the form of the problem’ (DR, p. 233/p. 180) (where the form of the problem is 
determined by ‘the specific permutations of the roots of the polynomial equation’ 
(Duffy 2013, p. 85)). Galois’ contribution is to have formalised this notion of the 
conditions or form of the problem in group-theoretical terms, such that ‘the question 
of the solvability of any polynomial equation was related to the structure of a group 
of permutations of the roots of that equation’ (Duffy 2013, p. 86). Setting aside the 
technical details here, what is significant about these moments in the history of 
mathematics for Deleuze, as with the case of Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, is that they 
indicate occasions on which scientific thought (categorising mathematics amongst 
the sciences, for present purposes) grasps problems as such, and deploy concepts in 
an attempt to express problems and in direct correlation with the determination of 
problems. 
                                                                                                                                          
on his discussion of that of Jules Vuillemin (see Vuillemin 1962, chaps 3 and 4). It seems to be from 
Vuillemin that Deleuze receives the idea that ‘[w]ithout this reversal [in the dependency relation 
between problems and their solvability], the famous Copernican Revolution [i.e. Kant’s] amounts to 
nothing’ (DR, p. 210/p. 162); see Vuillemin (1962, esp. §§25 and 60). See n. 69 to chapter 1 above. 
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 It would also be possible to mention a couple of examples from the social 
science, namely the economics and sociology of Karl Marx (at least, as read by 
Althusser and his collaborators on the Reading Capital project) and the sociology of 
Gabriel Tarde, which Deleuze seems to take to be cases of the discovery of ‘social 
Ideas’ (e.g. DR, p. 104 n. 1/p. 313 n. 3, pp. 240-241/p. 186). However, here the 
waters are muddied, particularly in the case of Tarde, by Deleuze’s identification of 
these figures as philosophers – a move made possible by the instability of the 
boundary between philosophy and social science at the time of these nineteenth-
century thinkers.  
 What status should we attribute to these examples, and what do they indicate 
regarding the way in which Deleuze situates science in general in relation to the 
distinction between representational thought and critical-creative thought? 
 One first point to note is that there is a question as to whether there is a 
difference between mathematics and the empirical sciences (both natural and social) 
that is salient in the context of this chapter’s discussion. Mathematics seems to have 
a particularly prominent status in Deleuze’s presentation of Ideas or problems. 
Furthermore, if it is the sciences’ attachment – insofar as they are part of an 
epistemic and pragmatic enterprise – to empirical, objectively determinate entities 
and types that entangles them in representation, then mathematics, with its 
attachment only to ‘ideal’ objects, may fall into a different category. Consequently, I 
will set mathematics aside for the moment (returning to it in chapter 4), and focus on 
the empirical sciences. 
 It seems, then, that Deleuze is open to the idea that scientific thought is not 
necessarily cut off from problematic Ideas. Furthermore, it does not seem plausible 
to deny that science engages in the creation of concepts (given that, at this early 
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stage of his work, Deleuze has not formulated a technical idea of concepts as 
specifically philosophical, as he and Guattari will in What Is Philosophy?).
30
 To 
deny this would be a peculiar move, given the vast number of new concepts with 
which theoretical developments in the sciences have provided us. This association 
between science and conceptual creativity is perhaps not all that surprising, given the 
tradition of history and philosophy of science that was dominant in France during the 
period in question and the sorts of assumptions about science associated with this 
tradition. Philosophy of science in France at this time is dominated by Bachelardian 
thinking, which places a heavy emphasis on the way in which the sciences’ 
experimental engagement with external reality is mediated by concepts, 
‘problematics’ and theories. In particular, it is interesting to note that one of the core 
problems faced by Bachelardian philosophy of science is an attempt to balance a 
rejection of a naïve or so-called ‘chosiste’ realism with the maintenance of a concept 
of scientific objectivity not simply reducible to social norms and consensus within 
the scientific community.
31
 This problem persists in Canguilhem’s post-Bachelardian 
history of philosophy, and the problem is even aggravated by Canguilhem’s 
scepticism towards the stability of Bachelard’s distinction between the scientific and 
the non-scientific (despite Canguilhem’s more explicit focus on the origins of norms) 
(Gutting 1989, p. 42, pp. 50-52). In this respect, this tradition places a heavy 
emphasis on the sorts of considerations that have led to a rejection of scientific 
                                                 
30
 On the development of Deleuze’s separation of the products of science from ‘concepts’, see Smith 
(2012b, pp. 386-387 n. 20). 
31
 On the difficulties for Bachelard and Canguilhem caused by this tension, see Gutting (1989, chap. 
1, esp. pp. 25-32 and pp. 50-52) and Tiles (1984, pp. 39-65). For an attempt to defend the claim that 
Bachelardian epistemology has a satisfactory response to these difficulties, see Lecourt (1975, pp. 7-
19). 
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realism, objectivity and progress in the work of Anglophone philosophers such as 
Kuhn and Feyerabend, at the same time as there is a desire to preserve these notions 
and reject the kind of relativism they embrace.  
 Consequently, it would have been quite unorthodox for Deleuze to embrace 
the sort of strong scientific realism whereby scientific knowledge is a discovery of 
pre-determined ‘facts’, as opposed to acknowledging the role of problems and 
conceptual creativity in constructing the objects of science. Nevertheless, it is 
important to emphasise that even from this Bachelardian perspective, which 
acknowledges the complex status of scientific cognition and its relation to its object, 
there are clear differences between the sort of creativity and the sort of break with 
accepted intellectual norms that Deleuze associates with philosophy and the way in 
which Bachelard takes these aspects of thought to function in the sciences.  
For one thing, looking more closely at the Bachelardian idea of a 
problematic, which has distinctly Deleuzian resonances (and which Deleuze refers to 
approvingly at one point in Difference and Repetition), it becomes apparent that it in 
fact resembles far more closely Deleuze’s description of experimental conditions and 
prediction as constraining the sensible field within a representational order than it 
does Deleuze’s notion of problems as virtual differential structures.  
What is a problematic for Bachelard? It pertains, he states, to ‘acquisition’ of 
scientific knowledge (as opposed to its post facto justification) (Bachelard 1966, p. 
50; 2012, p. 27). If scientific knowledge is to be produced from the crucible of the 
experimental encounter with reality, then the object the experiment allows us to 
‘observe’ (bearing in mind the very broad use of the term ‘observation’ in the 
experimental context) cannot simply manifest itself as a brute presence, as ‘the 
immediacy of a non-self opposed to a self’, but must be ‘presented in the light of its 
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definition, after the self is already engaged in a particular kind of thought’ 
(Bachelard 1966, pp. 50-51; 2012, p. 27). That is to say, the experimental setting is 
one in which the world is able to yield intelligible patterns because it is a setting in 
which what is able to present itself is subjected to a certain regime of intelligibility. 
What Bachelard is pointing to here is the oft-noted requirement that some selection 
of relevant factors be made if the observation of the world is to produce anything so 
systematic as scientific knowledge, and that furthermore in the context of science it 
is existing scientific knowledge (whether this be understood as theoretical knowledge 
or the ‘know-how’ of the experimenter) that will inevitably play the primary role in 
this selection – along with hypotheses and projected models pertaining to the results 
the experiment has been designed to obtain.  It is this array of hermeneutic baggage 
guiding the sciences’ extraction of information from observable reality that 
Bachelard seeks to adequately characterise in terms of a ‘problematic’, which he 
describes as ‘an approach structure [une structure-approche]’, ‘a preliminary 
protocol of laws’ organising and rationalising phenomena so that they are capable of 
providing thought with something that is actually of interest to it (an intelligible 
pattern) (Bachelard 1966, pp. 50-51; 2012, pp. 27-28). 
Secondly, the Bachelardian tradition’s conception of the way in which the 
scientific mind’s relation to reality is mediated by problematics and conceptual 
constructions is essentially tied to social norms and the dynamics of critique within 
scientific communities. Socially embedded norms place significant constraints on 
concept creation in a way that seems to pull against Deleuze’s picture of the break 
with ‘doxa’. In particular, Deleuze emphasises a connection between community or 
sociality and representation, referring, for example, to ‘the reflected representation of 
a “for-us” in the active syntheses’ (DR, p. 98/p. 71). Creativity, for Deleuze, seems 
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to involve rather a withdrawal from sociality, and even from subjectivity, rather than 
anything socially mediated. 
 Ultimately, even for a tradition of philosophy of science committed to a 
critique of positivism and overly simplistic forms of realism, there remains a sense 
that it would undermine the scientific enterprise should we conclude that it is not 
pursuing objective knowledge of a mind-independent world.  
 Science cannot be conflated with its most revolutionary moments. There is a 
division of intellectual labour in science (specialisation), and an attempt at 
piecemeal, cumulative research. Researchers try to build on the work of others, 
taking certain results and, crucially, certain concepts and ways of posing problems, 
as given. Thus, there are certain norms pertaining to clarity of communication in the 
sciences which seem to be in tension with the anti-communicative character of 
concept creation as Deleuze conceives it. To subject concepts to the requirements of 
intersubjectivity, it seems, is, for Deleuze, already to begin to let them drift into the 
realm of the established. Each new work of scientific research cannot, however, 
strive to reframe the whole field in which it works. It may be helpful to adopt a 
Kuhnian lexicon in expressing this point: while the best science is perhaps not 
‘normal’ science, normal science has, nonetheless, scientific value; nor, furthermore, 
can science function in a purely ‘pre-paradigmatic’ state indefinitely. Whilst we may 
question the Kuhnian notion that ‘normality’ and its maintenance is the ideal of any 
given science or would-be science, it nevertheless seems that the sort of cumulative 
epistemic progress at which science aims is not possible without a certain amount of 
consensus-building and intra-paradigmatic activity. 
 Recognition takes concepts as givens and deploys them in the cognition of a 
world of given particulars. Problems, likewise, are given – given negatively as 
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deficiencies in our capacity to cognise something. Science, however, constructs 
concept, and operates within an appreciation of the way in which the view of reality 
reached is in important part determined by a ‘problematic’ (which feeds into 
experiment design and ‘observation’). However, there is a minimal realism that 
seems to be a presupposition of the scientific enterprise – the alternative being a kind 
of instrumentalism. From the point of view of our present discussion, this would 
seem to be a difference that makes no difference, since in both cases science is 
attempting to cognise a pre-formed world and predict its behaviour. Furthermore, it 
seems that science must cultivate ‘good habits’, that is to say, standards or norms of 
good epistemic practice. Science is thus perpetually at risk of ‘stupefaction’ – but 
science wholly subject to such a state (science ‘normalised’) is dead science. Science 
does well to keep itself free of ‘moralism’, at the same time as a certain ‘policing’ of 
the mind is essential if science is not to lose its necessary stringency. Science thus 
plays a dangerous game: in seeking to meet the challenges of cognising the external 
world, or even just of predicting the behaviour of the observable world, it is drawn to 
exploit the creative powers of the mind that exceed the economy of recognition; at 
the same time as the very nature of science as an epistemic and/or pragmatic 
enterprise, consequently directed towards the actual, constantly threatens to draw it 
into the horizon of transcendental illusion. 
 Science, unlike philosophy, involves both moments of critical creativity – 
moments at which it recognises the need to reframe a domain of inquiry by posing a 
new problem or posing a problem in a new way, breaking with established 
approaches and creating new concepts – and moments of consolidation and progress 
relative to ‘established’ frames of reference. Philosophy, by contrast, is in the 
business of critique and of concept formation. The history of philosophy is the 
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history of a series of singular works of construction. Each philosopher begins again, 
‘repeating’ aspects of prior systems in a way which does not build on them 
cumulatively, but rather transforms their meaning. 
 What lies at the root of this difference in philosophy’s and the sciences’ 
respective relations to critical-creative thinking? The most plausible root of this 
divergence, I would argue, is their divergent aims and motivations. Science is 
primarily an epistemic and pragmatic enterprise. That is to say, the sciences aim at 
the production of knowledge, with a view to gaining a certain degree of control over 
our environment. This is the complicity between science and technology that many 
philosophers and historians of science have noted, if in a variety of different ways. 
Different thinkers have emphasised these aspects and their relation in different ways, 
and they have no doubt different weightings depending on the area of science in 
question and its mode of institutionalisation. (Some scientific research programmes 
are more explicitly directed towards technological outcomes, either because of the 
nature of the domain of inquiry or because of institutional factors affecting the way 
in which the research is carried out; whilst others, theoretical particle physics being 
perhaps the most striking example, seem to be as close as we come in reality to 
exemplars of the ideal of the disinterested search for knowledge.) Philosophy’s aims 
and motivations, as Deleuze sees them, would seem to be quite different. 
 What is the point of philosophy, for Deleuze? Why break with doxa and 
delve into the differential unconscious only to return to the surface with a flurry of 
conceptual creativity? What drives the creation of concepts, once it is severed from 
the rationale of ongoing epistemic development and self-correction? On the one 
hand, as we have seen in the previous chapter, Deleuze claims that philosophy is 
‘ontology’. Philosophy seeks to think beings not as units in the economy of 
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generality, but in their being. Being, according to Deleuze, is such that it demands a 
new conceptualisation each time it is approached. Each philosophical system is a 
singular construction, but it is constructed precisely as an attempt to ‘interpret’ an 
‘encounter’ with being in the problematic form in which it can be sensed. There is 
thus an experience of being at the heart of the construction of each singular system of 
philosophical concepts. Being is this ‘thickness’ – the ‘coloured thickness of a 
problem’ (DR, p. 214/p. 165) – that conceptual thought endlessly interprets without 
ever exhaustively capturing its meaning. If philosophy is opposed to the 
crystallisation of intellectual habits and the mirage of conceptual self-sufficiency, 
then, it is insofar as these obfuscate the being of singular things. 
 On the other hand, there is an ethical dimension to the work of critique. We 
can see the emergence in Deleuze’s early thought of the ethical strand that will be 
taken up more explicitly subsequently in his collaborative works, such as Anti-
Oedipus. That is, if the creation of concepts is no longer motivated by a striving for 
accurate representation, it seems that it takes on a role in the thinker’s cultivation of 
their own capacities, the cultivation of the ‘vitality’ of the mind as a site of creative 
thinking.
32
 In Nietzsche and Philosophy, Deleuze addresses this question directly: 
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 As de Beistegui (2010) notes, ‘transcendental empiricism is not just a theoretical or ontogenetic 
enterprise, but one that is also immediately practical or experimental’, this practical aspect involving 
‘seek[ing] ways of experiencing the transcendental field itself’ so as to ‘counter-actualise the 
movement of organisation and individuation, or loop back into a state of thought, feeling and 
perception that is not yet codified, fixated or bound’ (pp. 113-114). If ‘much of the history of 
ontology is actually a systematic subordination of ontology to morality, […] or an onto-theology’, 
insofar as ‘much of the history of ontology and metaphysics is in fact moved and motivated by moral 
values’ (‘a diagnosis [which] is of course deeply Nietzschean’), then ‘[b]y freeing ontology from 
morality and transcendence […], Deleuze also and de facto frees up the possibility of ethics’ as ‘a 
matter of power, not duty’, a ‘question […] of knowing what [a given mode’s] powers are, what it can 
do, or of what it is capable’ (de Beistegui 2010, pp. 106-107) 
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When someone asks “what’s the use of philosophy?” the reply must be aggressive, 
since the question tries to be ironic and caustic. Philosophy does not serve the State 
or the Church, who have other concerns. It serves no established power. The use of 
philosophy is to sadden. A philosophy that saddens no one, that annoys no one, is 
not a philosophy. It is useful for harming stupidity, for turning stupidity into 
something shameful. […] Is there any discipline apart from philosophy that sets out 
to criticise all mystifications, whatever their source and aim, to expose all the 
fictions without which reactive forces would not prevail? […] Creating free men, 
that is to say men who do not confuse the aims of culture with the benefit of the 
State, morality or religion. […] Who has an interest in all this but philosophy? 
Philosophy is at its most positive as critique, as an enterprise of demystification. 
(NP, pp. 120-121/p. 106) 
 
What is foregrounded here, I would suggest, is philosophy’s ultimately ethical 
purpose. At the heart of representation is ‘a disturbing complacency’ (DR, p. 177/p. 
136) which it is philosophy’s task, as ‘an enterprise of demystification’, to combat 
(DR, p. 121/p. 106). This is a thematic that we will have a chance to explore in more 
detail later in the thesis. 
    
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that it is a mistake to read the early Deleuze as 
conflating science and philosophy, or as taking them to be methodologically 
continuous with one another. Rather, although both deploy and even create concepts, 
only philosophy can be understood to arrive at its manipulation of concepts via a 
movement of critique.  This critical movement extricates philosophical conceptuality 
from its correlation with the world of representation, allowing the creative power of 
concepts as expressions of the transcendental production of a world to shine through. 
Concepts become philosophical, therefore, when instead of simply referring to a 
world of objects, they bring out the virtuality that gives these objects their sense and 
their being – in other words, when they express rather than obscure the work of 
transcendental synthesis. 
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 For now, we can simply note that critique, and the way in which it transforms 
conceptuality’s relationship with problems or Ideas, lies at the root of the difference 
between philosophy and science. If the proponents of the scientistic reading tend to 
lose sight of this difference in Deleuze’s work, then it is insofar as they (i) fail to 
grasp the full significance of the critical moment in Deleuze’s conception of 
philosophy; and consequently (ii) conflate science’s exit from the classical 
Newtonian paradigm, or from an exclusive focus on linear causality, with its 
becoming critical in Deleuze’s sense. I have argued that science, whilst it exhibits 
moments of critical-creative thinking in Deleuze’s sense, is ultimately bound to 
representation by its epistemic aims. Philosophy, on the other hand, pursues a kind 
of perpetual revolution in thought which ultimately has an ethical purpose, namely 
the maintenance of thought’s ‘vitality’. 
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Chapter 3 
Becoming Philosophical 
The Philosophical Appropriation of Scientific 
Concepts 
 
 
 
Introduction 
In the present chapter, I will continue my investigation into the question of the place 
of science in the metaphilosophical concerns of Deleuze’s work of the 1950s and 
’60s by examining what might plausibly be thought of as the root of the notion that a 
certain complicity between philosophy and particular developments in twentieth-
century mathematics and physics is of central importance for Deleuze’s renewal of 
philosophy, namely his use of scientific (under which heading I include, for present 
purposes, mathematical
1
) concepts. 
 As I have noted in the introduction, the stimulus for the present thesis is the 
impact on the reception of his thought of readings of Deleuze’s early thought that 
construe his transcendental empiricism as dependent upon or essentially responding 
to developments in twentieth-century physics and mathematics. Furthermore, I have 
noted that a crucial motivation behind these readings is the desire to take Deleuze’s 
use of scientific concepts ‘seriously’; the exegetical power of doing so is then taken 
to indicate the need to see Deleuze’s development of philosophical concepts as 
essentially dependent upon or responding to the development of these particular 
                                                 
1
 Whilst this inclusion of mathematics under the mantle of ‘science’ may seem slightly idiosyncratic 
in an Anglophone context, in the Francophone context in which Deleuze worked this is normal 
practice. 
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scientific conceptual resources. Most broadly, the ultimate upshot of this strategy of 
reading is to construe Deleuze as a ‘materialist’ or even ‘naturalist’ philosopher, in a 
way which suggests a position which rejects or at least obscures the specificity of 
philosophy in favour of a continuity between philosophy and the sciences – a 
position which, as I have already suggested in the introduction – I take to be 
implausible as a reading of Deleuze’s early work. As I have explicated in the 
previous chapter, this reading loses sight of the critical and ethical character of that 
philosophy and the consequent specificity of philosophy in relation to the ultimately 
epistemic and pragmatic concerns of the sciences. 
 The present chapter seeks to build on the case against such a reading which I 
have been constructing in the course of this thesis by turning some critical attention 
to the status of some of the specific scientific concepts put to use in Deleuze’s 
philosophical discourse. What sort of relationship between philosophy and science, 
or between philosophical concepts and scientific concepts, is evidenced by Deleuze’s 
use of scientific concepts?   
‘We are […] well aware’, Deleuze states in the preface to Difference and 
Repetition, ‘unfortunately [malheureusement], that we have spoken about science in 
a manner which was not scientific’ (DR, p. 4/p. xxi [my emphasis]). Let me begin by 
insisting that we not take this malheur seriously. Deleuze has no intention of 
speaking about science, or more specifically of deploying scientific concepts, 
scientifically; and if he has (and indeed he has) failed to do so, this is not due to 
ignorance on his part, but is rather intrinsic to the way in which these concepts are 
being re-deployed quite deliberately by Deleuze in a philosophical register. 
 In what follows, I will show how Deleuze distances scientific concepts from 
their original scientific contexts. As I have already shown, even DeLanda notes the 
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need for such a distancing, but in my view does not pay sufficient attention to what it 
involves or to its implications for philosophy’s relation to the sciences in Deleuze’s 
work. Thus, in the present chapter, my aim will be to clarify Deleuze’s 
understanding of this movement of concepts between contexts. I will do this through 
a close reading of Deleuze’s use of scientific concepts in chapters 4 (‘The Ideal 
Synthesis of Difference’2) and 5 (‘The Asymmetrical Synthesis of the Sensible’) of 
Difference and Repetition.  
In these two chapters, Deleuze articulates his account of Ideas as virtual 
structures and the process of their actualisation. It is thus here that much of the 
conceptual work is done to substantiate the claims made in chapter 1 of that work, 
namely, that the traditional philosophical – ‘ousiological’, to borrow a term from de 
Beistegui (2004, chap. 1) – notion of essence must be supplanted by a new concept 
of multiplicity or structure (Idea) if we are to evade certain persistent difficulties 
surrounding the role of difference in categorisation which expose the limitations of 
the ousiological schema.
3
 It is in articulating these new concepts, or in this 
reworking of prior concepts, that Deleuze draws on scientific conceptual resources.   
In particular, I will be concerned with his engagements with two sets of 
conceptual resources: (i) his use of mathematical concepts, drawn from the field of 
differential calculus, in the elucidation of the notion of the ‘different/ciation’ of Ideas 
in chapter 4 of Difference and Repetition; and (ii) his critical discussion of physical 
concepts drawn from the field of classical thermodynamics in relation to the process 
of actualisation of Ideas in chapter 5.   
                                                 
2
 Slightly idiosyncratically translated by Paul Patton as ‘Ideas and the Synthesis of Difference’. 
3
 For a comprehensive account of these difficulties, see Somers-Hall (2012a, chap. 2).  
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The conclusion for which I will argue is that an examination of how Deleuze 
seeks to situate philosophy and the philosophical use of scientific conceptual 
resources in relation to those resources themselves exhibits an operation of 
extraction, distancing and extension. Deleuze puts to use aspects of scientific 
concepts, thematics and problematics that he finds illuminating for the purposes of 
his own concept construction, and in relation to his own problems and questions, in 
such a way that it becomes apparent that his philosophical agenda is external and 
different to the agendas of the scientific fields from which these concepts are drawn. 
Given the way he positions his engagements with these concepts in relation to the 
fields from which they are drawn, it becomes difficult to see his aim as that of 
contributing to furthering the explanatory aims of these scientific fields themselves – 
or, indeed, of clarifying, explicating or extending their conceptual resources for 
science’s sake. This discussion will thus serve to illustrate more concretely the 
conclusions of chapter 2, which examined how Deleuze distances his general 
philosophical approach from the epistemic demands of ‘scientificity’ as he sees 
them. 
 
1 Deleuze’s use of mathematical concepts: differential calculus 
Does Deleuze’s engagement with mathematical concepts demonstrate that his 
philosophy is attempting to respond to a need to reform basic philosophical concepts 
and problems demanded by the development of these conceptual resources 
themselves? I would argue that it does not. What we see instead, I want to suggest, is 
Deleuze encountering differential calculus as an opportunity, a resource to further a 
project which – even if it could be argued that it is inspired by the development of 
these conceptual resources – is nevertheless independent of them, and could have 
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been pursued – if, perhaps, less adequately – without them. Equally, it is a project 
which might find itself confronted by further conceptual opportunities in the future 
with which to develop an even fuller and more adequate expression of its key 
concepts, opportunities which need not come from mathematics. This is the project 
of constructing a non-dialectical conception of difference (a project which can 
already be seen taking form in Deleuze’s review of Hyppolite), and with it a new 
transcendental philosophy: one in which difference, transformation and novelty are 
the conditions of identity, stability and fixity, and not vice versa. 
 
1.1 Problematic Ideas and their differential determination  
Deleuze appeals to the calculus in giving an account of Ideas and their ‘problematic’ 
status. (I have shown the role these ideas play in Deleuze’s early philosophy in 
chapters 1 and 2.) The calculus provides a ‘technical model’ which can facilitate an 
‘exploration’ of problematic Ideas and their distinctive manner of determination – a 
point to which I will return shortly.
4
 
 This discussion takes place in chapter 4 of Difference and Repetition, where 
Deleuze gives an account of the nature of Ideas. In particular, he gives an account of 
their dual determination:  
 
                                                 
4
 ‘The entire Idea is caught up in the mathematico-biological system of different/ciation.  However, 
mathematics and biology intervene here only as technical models for the exploration of the two halves 
of difference, the dialectical half and the aesthetic half, the exposition of the virtual and the process of 
actualisation’ (DR, pp. 284-285/pp. 220-221 [translation modified]). 
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(i) their ‘differentiation’ – i.e. their determination qua ‘virtual’ 
structures, consisting of differential relations and distributions of 
singularities determined by these relations – and  
 
(ii) their ‘differenciation’ – i.e. their ‘expression’ in actual 
phenomena (entities, individuals, systems).   
 
It is in virtue of their differential determination (both at the level of pure virtuality 
and that of their actualisation) that Ideas are supposed to account for the identity and 
persistence of actual entities without simply appealing to the sort of reified mirror 
image of this actual identity that Deleuze claims to discern in ousiological essences 
(and, alternatively, without appealing to an anti-essentialist nominalism that would 
do away with. the extra-‘anthropological’ reality of identity and form altogether). It 
is in order to give a rigorous characterisation of this differential determination of 
Ideas that Deleuze appeals to differential calculus. 
 First of all, it is perhaps worth noting that the notion of ‘Idea’ with which 
Deleuze is working, whilst it is no doubt intended to evoke Platonic resonances, is 
most explicitly a development of the Kantian or post-Kantian notion – at least as it is 
articulated in the discussion of chapter 4. Deleuze discerns in this Kantian notion of 
Idea certain characteristics which he wants to retain in order to conceptualise the 
virtual, multiply actualisable structures with which he wishes to replace essences or 
possible forms.   
 What is important for Deleuze about Kantian Ideas is, first of all, that they 
are ‘essentially “problematic” ’ – indeed, ‘problems are Ideas’ (DR, p. 218/p. 168). If 
this notion of Ideas as problematic or as problems is important, it is because – as 
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Deleuze has already begun to articulate in his discussion of the ‘postulate of 
modality or solutions’ in chapter 3 of Difference and Repetition (DR, pp. 204-
213/pp. 157-170) – a proper understanding of the difference in kind between 
problems and their solutions (or between concepts of the understanding as rules for 
the production of solution and Ideas of reason as problems that cannot be solved
5
) is 
crucial in order to understand why the re-cognitive economy of representation is not 
the last word on our capacities qua thinking and experiencing beings, but needs to be 
‘grounded’ in a regime of the faculties that exceeds it, that goes beyond its limits.6 
Thus, the system of concepts in terms of which we categorise the world can be seen 
as a ‘solution’ (and, it should be noted, for Deleuze only a solution) to a problem 
posed at the level of Ideas.  
 Insofar as they are problematic, Ideas exhibit three moments of 
determination: they are ‘undetermined with regard to their object, determinable with 
regard to objects of experience, and bearing the ideal of an infinite determination 
with regard to concepts of the understanding’ (DR, p. 220/p. 169 [my emphasis]). It 
is as a model for this tripartite status of the determination of an Idea, and the way in 
which this is to be related to its problematic status, that Deleuze turns to the notion 
of the differential he finds in differential calculus. 
 Deleuze is interested primarily in the notion of the differential, which is 
designated in mathematical notation by the symbol dx. The differential can be 
                                                 
5
 ‘Thus we might say that the absolute whole of appearances is only an idea, since […] it remains a 
problem without any solution’ (Kant 1998, p. A328/B384 [original emphasis]). By this, Kant ‘does 
not mean that Ideas are necessarily false problems and thus insoluble but, on the contrary, that true 
problems are Ideas, and that these Ideas do not disappear with “their” solutions, since they are the 
indispensable condition without which no solution would ever exist’ (DR, p. 219/p. 168). 
6
 See chapter 2 for a fuller discussion of these notions. 
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understood as follows: given a graph of a curve representing the changing ratio 
between two variables, the differential dx is ‘the difference in x values between two 
consecutive values of the variable’ represented by the x-axis of the graph at a given 
point on the curve (Duffy 2013, p. 9).
7
 The peculiarity of this notion of the 
differential is already apparent in this initial definition, insofar as we are dealing with 
a difference between two values of a variable at a point. By way of an initial 
clarification of this peculiarity, it may be noted that this difference between 
consecutive values of a variable at a specific point on a curve is to be conceived as 
infinitesimal, that is, infinitely small or vanishing – although it will prove to be a 
point of contention beyond the limits of the present study what role this notion of the 
infinitesimal should play in a proper understanding of Deleuze’s interest in the 
calculus and its accompanying notion of the differential.
8
 
 These debates aside, for present purposes it is sufficient to note that it is this 
peculiar status of the differential which, first of all, has been at the heart of debates 
concerning the proper interpretation and legitimacy of the calculus; but also which 
allows it to play the role that Deleuze requires it to play in providing a model for the 
‘objectively’ problematic status of Ideas. It does this insofar as dx, in Deleuze’s 
estimation, effectively presents us with the same three moments we discern in the 
Kantian Idea: undetermined, determinable, determination – but crucially, presented 
in such a way that the three moments are intrinsic to the determination of the 
                                                 
7
 Where details of the ideas behind the differential calculus are presented here, my presentation is 
indebted to that of Simon Duffy (2013), which rehearses the themes of a number of earlier papers on 
the subject of Deleuze and mathematics, and Henry Somers-Hall (2010; 2012a, chap. 4). 
8
 See Duffy (2013, pp. 161-7), where he criticises Somers-Hall for having misunderstood Deleuze’s 
attitude towards the infinitesimal, and consequently towards Leibniz’s interpretation of the calculus 
(on which, see Duffy 2013, chap. 1). 
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differential, in a way which Kant, according to Deleuze, has failed to adequately 
capture. By showing how these three moments might be attributed to a single 
structure, the mathematical concept of the differential makes it possible to go beyond 
the limits of Kant’s conception of the Idea, which, according to Deleuze, makes the 
mistake of having ‘incarnated these moments in distinct Ideas’ (DR, p. 221/p. 170).9 
In addition, Kant makes the further mistake, according to Deleuze, of treating ‘two 
of the three moments’ as ‘extrinsic characteristics’: ‘if Ideas are in themselves 
undetermined, they are determinable only in relation to objects of experience, and 
bear the ideal of determination only in relation to concepts of the understanding’ 
(DR, p. 221/p. 170).
10
 
We can see, very briefly, what Deleuze is getting at here if we consider the 
status of the differential, dx. First of all, ‘dx is strictly nothing in relation to x, as dy 
is in relation to y’ (DR, p. 222/p. 171). This notion can be understood in terms of the 
infinitesimal character of the difference, such that the value of dx converges to zero; 
it is in effect treated as null at key stages in the course of the basic algebraic 
manoeuvres involved in the solution of a differential equation. In describing the 
indetermination of the differential in this way, we should be careful to note that, as 
Somers-Hall (2010, p. 568) emphasises, Deleuze will insist that strictly speaking the 
differential should not be conceived as an infinitesimal quantity which approximates 
                                                 
9
 For Kant, according to Deleuze, ‘the [Idea of the] Self is above all undetermined, the [Idea of the] 
World is determinable, and [the Idea of] God is the ideal of determination’ (DR, p. 221/p. 170).   
10
 Deleuze’s insistence on the importance of an ‘intrinsic’ account of the differential determination of 
Ideas is a consequence of his engagement with Salomon Maimon’s critique of ‘the Kantian duality 
between concepts and intuition’ and of the schematism as an attempted solution to the difficulties 
raised by this duality (DR, p. 224/p. 173). See chapter 1 for discussion of this aspect of Deleuze’s 
early philosophy. 
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zero, but as ‘strictly nothing’ in relation to the variable (DR, p. 222/p. 171). This is 
important if we are ‘to take the symbol dx seriously’ (DR, p. 221/p. 170), which is to 
say, not to take it as a matter of approximation or even as the useful utilisation of a 
move which is strictly speaking an error (albeit one of ‘infinitely small magnitude’) 
(DR, p. 229/p. 177). Recalling the Kantian notion of the Idea, this would be to treat 
the differential in a manner analogous to treating the problematic character of the 
Idea as a matter of subjective deficiency, rather than as an objective structure in its 
own right.   
If the differential is nonetheless not nothing from the perspective of the 
differential calculus, it is insofar as it is reciprocally determined by its relation to 
another differential. We see that whilst the individual differential dx is at certain 
points in the mathematical procedure of differentiation treated as equivalent to zero 
and thus eliminable, the fraction 
𝑑𝑦
𝑑𝑥
 is not eliminable in this manner, and plays a non-
null role in the solution of a differential equation. Although ‘[i]n relation to x, dx is 
completely undetermined, as dy is to y, […] they are perfectly determinable in 
relation to one another’, which is to say that they become reciprocally determinable 
in the context of their relation in a way that they simply are not in isolation (DR, p. 
223/p. 172). This sort of reciprocal determinability is in stark contrast to what we see 
in the case of fractions the terms of which are simple quantities: ‘The relation 
𝑑𝑦
𝑑𝑥
 is 
not like a fraction which is established between particular quanta in intuition, but 
neither is it a general relation between variable algebraic magnitudes or quantities. 
Each term exists absolutely only in its relation to the other: it is no longer necessary, 
or even possible, to indicate an independent variable’ (DR, p. 223/p. 172). 
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 Finally, the differential exhibits an ideal of complete determination, insofar 
as it makes possible a solution of the differential equation, and thus a determination 
of the value of the degree of variation of the ratio between two variables at any given 
point on the curve.  In other words, through its reciprocal determination, the 
differential allows for the determination of ‘the values of a relation’ itself, i.e. the 
value of the instantaneous rate of change between two variables (DR, p. 228/p. 174). 
Thus, the peculiar status of the differential as ‘an ideal difference’ allows it to be at 
once undetermined in itself, determinable in the context of its relation to another 
differential, and the key to the determination of a value for that relation itself (DR, p. 
227/p. 175).  
 Ideas, Deleuze wants to say, are differential structures in a sense that can be 
helpfully informed by the above outlined understanding of the status of the 
differential in differential calculus. Ideas are structures the terms of which are 
undetermined in themselves, yet reciprocally determined in the context of the 
structure by their differential relations to one another, and which are capable of being 
expressed in ‘actual’ (non-ideal) terms and relations which are determinate and thus 
no longer present this differential (undetermined yet reciprocally determined) 
character. The differential character of the ideal structure that is expressed is 
‘covered’ by the determinate values (qualities, magnitudes) which express it.  It is in 
this respect that Deleuze wants to characterise the differential as ‘problematic’: it 
disappears from the solution whilst having been a vital determining component at the 
level of the composition of the problem in relation to which this solution is a 
solution.  
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1.2 Lautman and the dialectic of problems 
We have seen above how Deleuze tries to draw out a correspondence between the 
notion of the differential as it emerges in differential calculus and a notion of Ideas 
as problematic inspired by Kant, such that the peculiar status of the differential might 
illuminate the problematic status of Ideas, and their differential structure, in contrast 
to the ‘propositional’ character of the conceptualisations in which they are expressed. 
But how does Deleuze position his own philosophical appropriation of the 
mathematical concept of the differential in relation to its mathematical origins?   
What is interesting here is Deleuze’s insistence on a certain ambiguity 
surrounding the notion of the differential: ‘the differential calculus belongs entirely 
to mathematics, even at the very moment when it finds its sense in the revelation of a 
dialectic which points beyond mathematics’ (DR, p. 232/p. 179). In this respect, it 
seems that Deleuze wants to insist both on the concept of the differential being 
entirely proper to its native mathematical domain and on its having an inherent 
philosophical significance that exceeds that register. How should we understand his 
insistence on this point? 
 In order to understand the perspective from which Deleuze makes these 
pronouncements, we need to note his indebtedness to the thought of Albert Lautman, 
and in particular to a distinction drawn from the latter’s work between the scientific 
(specifically mathematical) fields in which theories are articulated and the 
philosophical ‘dialectic’ which endeavours to discern the ideal reality which 
structures and conditions these theories’ construction. 
 The crucial idea that Deleuze will take from Lautman is that ‘[t]he problem is 
at once both transcendent and immanent in relation to its solutions’ (DR, p. 212/p. 
163). ‘A problem does not exist outside its solutions’, hence its immanence; yet 
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‘[f]ar from disappearing, it insists and persists in these solutions which cover it’, 
hence its transcendence (DR, p. 212/p. 163 [translation modified]). In fact, Deleuze 
takes from Lautman a threefold characterisation of the problem, in terms of ‘its 
difference in kind from solutions; its transcendence in relation to the solutions that it 
engenders on the basis of its own determinant conditions; and its immanence in the 
solutions which cover it, the problem being the better resolved the more it is 
determined’ (DR 232/178-9 [original emphasis]). It is in virtue of this transcendence 
and this difference in kind from its solutions that Lautman, and with him Deleuze, 
considers that a problem might be an object of inquiry in its own right, the object of 
an exposition as a determined ideal structure, as opposed to the determination of a 
problem being conflated with the specification of its solution.
11
 
It is this inquiry into problems as such and in their own right – as Ideas – that 
Lautman and consequently Deleuze characterise as ‘dialectic’. ‘Nowhere better than 
in the admirable work of Albert Lautman’, Deleuze states, 
 
has it been shown how problems are first Platonic Ideas or ideal liaisons between 
dialectical notions, relative to “possible [éventuelles] situations of the existent”; but 
also how they are realised within the real relations constitutive of the desired 
solution within a mathematical, physical or other field. It is in this sense, according 
to Lautman, that science always participates in a dialectic which points beyond it – 
in other words, in a meta-mathematical and extra-propositional power – even though 
the liaisons of this dialectic are incarnated only in effective scientific propositions 
and theories.
12
 
(DR, pp. 212-213/pp. 163-164 [original emphasis; translation modified]) 
 
He then maps out a set of distinctions: 
 
                                                 
11
 Although ‘[a] problem is determined at the same time as it is solved’, ‘its determination is not the 
same as its solution’ (DR, p. 212/p. 163). 
12
 The section in inverted commas is a paraphrase of Lautman (2011): ‘as “posed questions”, [Ideas] 
only constitute a problematic relative to the possible situations of entities’ (p. 204). 
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If it is true […] that it is problems which are dialectical in principle, and their 
solutions which are scientific, we must distinguish completely between the 
following: the problem as transcendental instance; the symbolic field in which the 
immanent movement of the problem expresses its conditions; the field of scientific 
solvability [résolubilité] in which the problem is incarnated, and in terms of which 
the preceding symbolism is defined. 
(DR, p. 213/p. 164) 
 
Here we see that the scientific (including mathematical) field in which a problem is 
solved is but one aspect of the being and the movement of this problem conceived as 
an Idea.  It is the role of dialectic as ‘a general theory of problems’ to encompass 
these various elements and relate them to one another (DR, p. 213/p. 164). 
 The significance of these remarks by Deleuze is clearer when they are set 
against their Lautmanian background. Lautman (2011) takes his philosophy of 
mathematics to be avowedly ‘Platonist’, in the sense that it is built around the idea 
that ‘in the development of mathematics, a reality is asserted that mathematical 
philosophy has as a function to recognize and describe’ (p. 87). Lautman (2011) 
distances his position from the sort of position ‘mathematicians have become 
accustomed to summarily designate under the name Platonism’, namely ‘any 
philosophy for which the existence of a mathematical entity is taken as assured’ (p. 
190). Rather, his interest is in an essentially structural reality of Ideas lying, as it 
were, ‘behind’ mathematical entities. The idea here is not simply to posit an ideal 
double of the realm of (already themselves ideal) mathematical entities, the 
usefulness of which would be questionable (indeed, Deleuze would certainly 
question it). Rather, it is necessary to bear in mind that Lautman’s concern is to 
account for the way in which modern mathematical thought has been driven forward 
by the discovery of ways to merge or hybridise areas of mathematics that had 
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previously been thought of as distinct.
13
 Lautman posits ideal structures, of which 
mathematical entities are incarnations, in order to explain this blurring of boundaries 
between subfields that had been demarcated from one another by the types of 
mathematical entities studied. The thought is that apparently distinct types of 
mathematical entities in diverse subfields of mathematics are alternative incarnations 
of shared structures, the divergences between these different incarnations being 
explained by the divergent conditions of their incarnation (i.e. the distinctive 
characteristics of the mathematical subfield in which they are incarnated). It is only 
in positing such ideal structures as in some sense objective, Lautman (2011) 
contends, that we can do justice to mathematics as a field of inquiry ‘in which the 
mind encounters an objectivity that is imposed on it’ (p. 28).14 
 Lautman (2011) presents a possible schema for the division of labour 
between a particular scientific field and a philosophy which, whilst distinct from it, 
is nonetheless intimately concerned with its conceptual and theoretical output. 
Insofar as the movement of mathematical thought, of its concept construction and 
theorising, is driven forward and ordered by ‘the extra-mathematical intuition of the 
exigency of a logical problem’, that is, of ideal structures which present themselves 
only problematically, there is room for a move to explore the sources of such 
                                                 
13
 Some examples we find in Lautman’s work are ‘algebraic topology, differential geometry, 
algebraic geometry and analytic number theory’ (Zalamea 2011, p. xxviii). 
14
 It is in this ‘Platonist’ understanding of the source of the objectivity proper to mathematical theories 
that Lautman (2011, pp. 87-92) sees his own position as superior both to the logicism of Russell and 
the Vienna Circle on the one hand and to the psychologism of Brunschvicg on the other. Interestingly, 
Lautman also sees his position as the legitimate, ‘structuralist’ interpretation of the 
‘metamathematics’ proposed by Hilbert’s Programme, in contrast to the reductive, ‘formalist’ 
interpretation offered by Carnap et al. (see Duffy 2013, pp. 117-120; on Hilbert’s Programme more 
generally, see Zach 2015). 
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exigency in the ideal structural reality of problems themselves (pp. 188-189). It may 
seem implausible to suggest that science and mathematics are not concerned with 
problems; and indeed, I have noted in the previous chapter some examples of 
scientific engagements with problems or Ideas which Deleuze discusses in 
Difference and Repetition. It is thus important to clarify how Deleuze understands 
Lautman’s position and his own here.  
‘Problems are always dialectical’; ‘[w]hat is mathematical (or physical, 
biological, psychical or sociological) are the solutions’ (DR, p. 232/p. 179 [original 
emphasis]). On this Deleuze insists. He is willing to admit that a scientific field 
‘does not include only solutions to problems’, but he suggests that we understand the 
presence of problems in scientific fields not as the presentation of problems in 
themselves and in their own right, but as ‘the expression of problems relative to the 
field of solvability which they define, and define by virtue of their dialectical order’ 
(DR, p. 232/p. 179 [my emphasis]).
15
 Thus, it is ‘by virtue of their immanence’ to a 
given scientific field that problems find their expression – but in virtue of their 
transcendence that they are not exhaustively determined by this expression, such that 
they might be considered in their own right, independent of any particular scientific 
field (DR, p. 232/p. 179). 
 
1.3 Calculus as a ‘model’ and the idea of a mathesis universalis 
Deleuze’s discussion of the calculus can be seen to take place at two levels. On the 
one level, there is a direct discussion of debates in what he refers to as ‘[t]he 
interpretation of the differential calculus’ or ‘the “metaphysics” of calculus’ (DR, pp. 
                                                 
15
 This effectively mirrors the status of intensities in scientific thought, which – as I will show in the 
next section – are present, but only in a ‘mixed’ form that obscures their nature. 
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228-229/p. 176). What Deleuze detects here is mathematical thought coming up 
against questions which ‘carry it’ – as he says of literature in a different context – ‘as 
far as the entrance to philosophy itself’ (DR, p. 196/p. 151). This is not to say, 
however, that mathematics can be said to actually take up the mantle of philosophy, 
displacing the latter by showing that problems supposedly proper to it are more 
readily solvable in a mathematical register.
16
 This would be, in effect, to argue for 
the redundancy, in the face of certain conceptual developments in mathematics, of a 
specifically philosophical engagement with the problem in question; and this does 
not seem a plausible characterisation of Deleuze’s aims given his insistence on a 
distinction between the articulation of concepts in a particular mathematical or 
scientific domain and these concepts’ expression of dialectical Ideas which exceed 
the limits of these domains. This leads us to the broader level on which Deleuze 
takes up his engagement with differential calculus: here, there is a shift to an 
exposition of what is described as ‘a wider universal sense’ of differential calculus, 
where the latter becomes a model for exploring the genesis of conceptual fields from 
ideal structures in general, a model for a general theory of problems (DR, pp. 228-
229/p. 176). How is philosophy positioned in relation to mathematics as a scientific 
field on these two levels? 
 Initially, we see Deleuze emphasise how the ‘metaphysical’ implications of 
the calculus arise already at the level of its ‘technical’, which is to say mathematical, 
                                                 
16
 Here I would distance myself from Robin Durie’s (2006) formulation, which emphasises the way in 
which ‘the field of mathematics can yield concepts whose function can reveal the inadequacy of 
traditional philosophical concepts, at the very moment they displace these concepts’ (p. 170 [my 
emphasis]). This formulation returns us to the open question with which DeLanda and Protevi left us 
in the introduction; namely, if Deleuze’s use of scientific concepts is to be understood as showing 
how these concepts can replace philosophical concepts, why the need for a re-appropriation of these 
very concepts as philosophical concepts? 
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use. ‘[F]rom the outset’ – which is to say, already at the level of the question of the 
legitimacy of certain basic algebraic moves involved in the solution of a differential 
equation – we encounter the question: ‘why is it that, from a technical point of view 
[techniquement], the differentials are negligible and must disappear in the result?’ 
(DR, p. 229/p. 177) It is in this respect that, even as it points the way towards 
‘metaphysical’ considerations which, we might suggest, fall outside the remit or at 
least the field of interest of mathematics, ‘[d]ifferential calculus obviously belongs to 
mathematics’, as ‘an entirely mathematical instrument’ (DR, p. 232/p. 179). 
Nonetheless, it is likewise a site of philosophical discovery, in the sense that the 
notion of the differential allows us to articulate a notion of differential determination 
and of the emergence of discontinuous quantities from continuous variation which is 
demonstrably helpful in the construction of a concept of the Idea as an ideal 
differential structure. However, what is essential to emphasise for the purposes of my 
present argument is that whilst differential calculus provides Deleuze with 
conceptual resources which prove to be essential for the full definition of an Idea as 
he wants to conceive it, it is in a key respect contingent that it is differential calculus 
which offers him resources to this end. 
 Thus, Deleuze states that: 
 
The problematic or dialectical Idea is a system of connections between differential 
elements, a system of differential relations between genetic elements. There are 
different orders of Ideas presupposed by one another according to the ideal nature of 
these relations and the elements considered (Ideas of Ideas, etc.). There is as yet 
nothing mathematical in these definitions. Mathematics appears with the field of 
solution in which dialectical Ideas […] are incarnated, and with the expression of 
problems relative to these fields. 
(DR 234-5/181 [my emphasis])  
 
What becomes apparent in this remark is that, whilst differential calculus provides an 
especially concrete and precise example of the expression of an Idea, in the sense 
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that it provides a case where a differential element at the level of the posing of a 
problem both generates and disappears in its solution, the conception of Ideas as 
problematic and differentially determined is not essentially mathematical in its 
content. The formulation of the notion is not derived from the mathematical field 
which is found to exemplify it; the definition of the structure of a problematic is 
independent of the manifestation of this structure in a mathematical context. 
 Furthermore, Deleuze will go so far as to say that differential calculus, as 
strictly ‘mathematical instrument’, ‘does not necessarily represent the most complete 
form of the expression of problems and the constitution of their solutions in relation 
to the order of dialectical Ideas which it incarnates’ (DR, pp. 234-235/p. 181). That 
is, whilst differential calculus is of especial interest due to its proximity to the 
problematic dimension which exceeds its mathematical use, the notion of the 
problematic that Deleuze wants to articulate is not essentially bound to differential 
calculus as a mathematical instrument. If philosophy is to become differential and 
problematic, this is not in order to conform to intellectual demands issuing from 
differential calculus itself and the transformation it represents in our mathematical 
thought; rather, this problematic, differential philosophy will encounter differential 
calculus as an opportunity, a resource to further its own thinking of the nature of 
problematics in general, a stage on which to dramatise this thinking. 
 This brings us to the point at which the notion of differential calculus 
detaches most visibly from its mathematical moorings and enters into a distinctly 
philosophical register. This is the point at which Deleuze will begin to speak of 
differential calculus as having ‘a wider universal sense in which it designates the 
composite whole that includes Problems or dialectical Ideas, the Scientific 
expression of problems, and the Establishment [Instauration] of fields of solution’ 
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(DR, p. 235/p. 181). We can recognise here Deleuze’s Lautmanian conception of the 
dialectic as a general theory of problems, encompassing the various moments of the 
Idea, which makes clear that ‘differential calculus’ in this extended sense belongs 
more to a philosophical dialectic of Ideas than to a mathematical field of problem-
solving. We see this in the fact that, if differential calculus in this broader sense 
provides an account of the structure of any given problematic and the genesis of a 
corresponding ‘field of solvability’, nonetheless there is no question of an 
‘application of mathematics to other domains’ (DR, p. 235/p. 181): 
 
It is rather that each engendered domain, in which dialectical Ideas of this or that 
order are incarnated, possesses its own calculus. […] It is not mathematics which is 
applied to other domains but the dialectic which establishes for its problems, by 
virtue of their order and their conditions, the direct differential calculus 
corresponding or appropriate to the domain under consideration. In this sense there 
is a mathesis universalis corresponding to the universality of the dialectic.
 
(DR, p. 235/p. 181) 
 
We see here a slippage whereby we move from references to differential calculus in 
what is clearly its mathematical sense to references to differential calculus in which 
the term would appear to have been extracted from its mathematical context and 
redeployed in what could be called a philosophical register, in any case in an extra-
mathematical register. There is a change of register whereby ‘differential calculus’ 
comes to have far broader, or at least quite different, scope than it has had when used 
to refer to ‘an entirely mathematical instrument’ (DR, p. 232/p. 179). Differential 
calculus can now be taken to serve as a model for the structure of Ideas as 
‘differentials of thought’, a model for an ‘algebra of pure thought’, an ‘alphabet of 
what it means to think’ (DR, p. 235/pp. 181-182).  
Deleuze calls upon us to understand this extended usage as the application of 
a ‘model’: 
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The entire Idea is caught up in the mathematico-biological system of 
different/ciation. However, mathematics and biology intervene here only as 
technical models for the exploration of the two halves of difference, the dialectical 
half and the aesthetic half, the exposition of the virtual and the process of 
actualisation. 
(DR, p. 285/pp. 220-221 [my emphasis; translation modified]) 
 
In this notion that the movement from Ideas to concepts in mathematics might 
function as a model for the insistence of ideal structures as the condition of concept 
construction in any domain, Deleuze picks up a further idea from Lautman. Lautman 
(2011) suggests that ‘[m]athematics […] plays with respect to other domains of 
incarnation, physical reality, social reality, human reality, the role of model in which 
the way that things come into existence is observed’ (p. 203). Thus, as Duffy (2012, 
p. 130) notes, Deleuze’s appeal to the notion of the differential and to the differential 
calculus can be seen as following through on Lautman’s unrealised suggestion of the 
possibility of taking mathematics as a model for the ideal genesis of form in other 
domains. It remains to be seen, however, precisely what Deleuze has in mind when 
he talks about scientific concepts providing a ‘model’ for philosophical concepts. I 
will return to this point in the final section of this chapter. 
 What I have sought to highlight here is how, in the course of Deleuze’s 
engagement with differential calculus, we move more and more definitively from a 
mathematical to a philosophical register: beginning with the task of extracting the 
philosophical meaning from the technical application of the calculus, we end with a 
near total transposition of the concept into a philosophical register, where its 
essential connection to the mathematical domain has been loosened to the point 
where it becomes (at the very least) an open question whether the term ‘differential 
calculus’ is used in some sense metaphorically, and where the ties that bind the 
concept of the Idea as differential to the mathematics of the differential have come to 
  
176 
 
seem increasingly contingent. In the final section of this chapter, I will suggest that 
we can indeed understand these scientific concepts as metaphors, in the sense that 
they illuminate the philosophical concepts in question at the same time as there is a 
change in the sense of these concepts as they are redeployed in a new problematic 
context. 
 As such, while the details of Deleuze’s formulation of his notion of the Idea 
are clearly dependent upon his engagement with differential calculus, it seems to me 
incorrect to suggest that that notion is an attempt to respond to challenges arising 
from the calculus itself (except in the restricted sense in which Deleuze participates 
in debates in the philosophy of mathematics concerning how to best interpret the 
calculus – a debate which, though it clearly affects his understanding and thus 
appropriation of the concept of the differential, is not his primary concern). Deleuze 
is inspired and empowered by his appropriation of mathematical conceptual 
resources, but it is an appropriation of those resources to a project quite independent 
of them. 
 If mathematics provides Deleuze with a particularly fruitful source of 
conceptual material, however, this does perhaps reflect something about 
mathematics itself. In his account of the way in which twentieth-century physics 
breaks with the intuitive categories of pre-scientific common sense, Gaston 
Bachelard points to mathematics as being of crucial importance for this break. 
Mathematics is important for Bachelard because it is cut off from the constraints 
placed on the empirical sciences by the demands of experiment and observation. As 
Mary Tiles (1984) puts Bachelard’s point, ‘mathematics provides the realm within 
which the scientist can daydream’ (p. 65). As I already suggested in chapter 2, it is 
perhaps possible to conceive the capacity of mathematics to loose thought from its 
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moorings in representation and grasp problems as such as dependent on this sort of 
disconnection between pure mathematics and the demands of fidelity to 
experimentally conditioned observations of the empirical world. This does not 
negate the fact that Deleuze’s appropriations of mathematical concepts take these 
concepts in directions not envisaged or required by their mathematical use – but it 
does perhaps go some way towards explaining why mathematics in particular should 
prove such a fruitful source of creative conceptual constructions for the philosopher 
to redeploy.  
 
2 Deleuze’s engagement with physical concepts: classical 
thermodynamics 
In the defence by DeLanda and those influenced by him of the notion of an essential 
affinity between Deleuze’s philosophy and complexity science, an important place 
has been given to non-linear or non-equilibrium thermodynamics. Where classical or 
linear thermodynamics, in the words of Prigogine and Stengers (1986), ‘failed to 
allow us to go beyond the paradox of the opposition between Darwin and Carnot, 
between the appearance of organised natural forms and the physical tendency 
towards disorganisation’ (pp. 211-212), non-linear thermodynamics ‘allows us to 
specify which systems are capable of escaping from the type of order which governs 
equilibrium, and at what threshold, what distance from equilibrium, what value of 
the imposed constraint fluctuations come to be capable of leading the system towards 
behaviour wholly different from the usual behaviour of [linear] thermodynamic 
systems’, namely the emergence rather than dissipation of organisation in a system 
(p. 213). If classical thermodynamics announces the physical phenomenon of 
entropy, the inevitability of increasing disorganisation, non-linear thermodynamics 
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works to understand the way in which organisation nonetheless emerges and, for a 
time, persists, how systems are able to manifest order against the tendency towards 
disorder.   
Deleuze has been credited with offering the ontology that gives full meaning 
to these scientific developments (see the introduction to the present thesis), but how 
plausible is this in the light of his engagement with thermodynamics in the text of 
Difference and Repetition?   
The first point to note is that Deleuze’s discussion, insofar as it is an explicit 
engagement with thermodynamics as a branch of the physical sciences, is restricted 
to classical thermodynamics. One important explanatory factor here is chronological: 
work on non-equilibrium thermodynamic systems was only beginning in earnest 
around the time of the publication of Difference and Repetition, having been a 
distinctly germinal field throughout the majority of the period of that work’s 
composition. Indeed, the work of Ilya Prigogine, for which the latter received his 
Nobel prize, and which he and Isabelle Stengers would suggest manifested an 
important affinity with Deleuze’s philosophy – thus planting the seed from which 
DeLanda’s interpretative strategy would grow – was not published until the early 
1970s. Consequently, references to key early figures in the development of non-
equilibrium thermodynamics are not to be found in the bibliography of Difference 
and Repetition, nor is there any reference to such figures, approving or otherwise, 
within the body of the text. There are, however, references to figures emblematic of 
the development of classical thermodynamics (Curie, Carnot, Boltzmann).   
 The second point to note is that these references are generally speaking 
critical: Deleuze’s discussion of thermodynamics in chapter 5 of Difference and 
Repetition takes the form of a critique, particularly of the notion of entropy. It is 
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important to emphasise, however, that this critique is not straightforwardly a 
criticism, an attempt at disproof. It is rather a critique in something analogous to the 
Kantian sense of the term: a delimitation of legitimate and illegitimate usage, an 
attempt at a clarification of the manner in which a notion can be used without 
engendering distortion; hence, an attempt to avert or expose transcendental illusion 
engendered by the misapplication or overextension of a concept. How should we 
understand the implications of this critique for Deleuze’s conception of his 
philosophy’s relation to science, and in particular to thermodynamics? 
 
2.1 Individuation and intensive difference 
First, a brief sketch of the ground covered in the relevant chapter of Difference and 
Repetition. Deleuze opens chapter 5 with the claim that difference is ‘[t]he reason of 
the sensible, the condition of that which appears’ (DR, p. 287/p. 222). What is 
‘given’ in sensible intuition is a manifold of sensible qualities arrayed in a spatially-
extended field. Difference, Deleuze wants to claim, is ‘that by which the given is 
given as diverse’ (DR, p. 286/p. 222). This is the case insofar as ‘[e]verything which 
happens and everything which appears is correlated with orders of differences: 
differences of level, temperature, pressure, tension, potential, difference of intensity’ 
(DR, p. 286/p. 222 [original emphasis]). Indeed, this notion of ‘“difference of 
intensity” is a tautology’, inasmuch as ‘[i]ntensity is the form of difference in so far 
as this is the reason of the sensible’ (DR, p. 287/p. 222). The upshot of all this is that 
Deleuze will come to conceive ‘intensity as a transcendental principle’ (DR, p. 
298/p. 231). It is from the ground of differential intensity (intensive difference) that 
sensible diversity, the play of qualities and extensions from which the resemblances 
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and equivalences that will go to make up the conceptualised, representational world 
of identities, can be extracted. 
 Through this account of intensity, Deleuze aims to clarify the emergence of 
actual individuals from the pre-individual relations which constitute virtual (or 
potential) ideal structures (i.e. Ideas). This is the process of ‘individuation’, ‘by 
which intensity determines differential relations to become actualised’ (DR, p. 317/p. 
246). Given ‘[a]n “objective” problematic field’, ‘[i]ndividuation emerges like the 
act of solving such a problem, or – what amounts to the same thing – like the 
actualisation of a potential’ (DR, p. 317/p. 246). Recalling the account of the Idea 
given in chapter 4 of Difference and Repetition, whereby the Idea is split between its 
virtual determination and its determination through actualisation, chapter 5 can be 
seen as taking up the latter half of the Idea’s determination. More specifically, 
chapter 5’s discussion of intensity and individuation should be seen as complicating 
the notion of ‘actualisation’ by splitting it into the dual notions of ‘individuation’ and 
‘differenciation’, the former being the genesis of an individual and the latter the 
categorisation whereby it becomes a particular relative to a set of general types.
17
 
 Here, Deleuze takes up two philosophical debates with a long history, 
concerning individuation on the one hand and the nature of intensive magnitudes on 
                                                 
17
 There is ‘a difference in kind between individuation and differenciation in general’; indeed, ‘[t]he 
determination of qualities and species [i.e. differenciation] presupposes individuals to be qualified, 
while extensive parts are relative to an individual and not the reverse’ (DR, p. 318/p. 247). Hence, 
‘individuation precedes differenciation in principle’, and ‘every differenciation presupposes a prior 
intense field of individuation’ (DR, p. 318/p. 247). Levi Bryant (2008, chap. 8) gives an illuminating 
account of the importance of this distinction in Deleuze’s philosophy. 
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the other.
18
 The connection he draws between the two develops out of his reading of 
the work of his contemporary, the philosopher Gilbert Simondon.
19
 
 What is most important for Deleuze in this discussion – bearing in mind the 
distinction made between problems and their solutions in chapter 4 of Difference and 
Repetition – is to argue that a proper understanding of actualisation requires us not to 
eliminate this problematic dimension manifested by intensities, that ‘[t]he act of 
individuation consists not in suppressing the problem’, but in expressing it in a 
manner in which, admittedly, it is no longer apparent as problematic (DR, p. 317/p. 
246). 
 
2.2 Entropy as ‘image of thought’ 
The initial introduction of thermodynamics into this discussion comes in the form of 
a difficulty. Deleuze wants to treat intensive difference as ‘transcendental’, in the 
sense that intensive differences would be the genetic conditions of the qualities and 
extensities encountered in the physical world by our cognitive capacities.  The idea 
of a correlation of any given physical magnitude or quality with some order of 
difference in intensity, Deleuze suggests, can be found in both ‘Carnot’s principle’ 
(i.e. Nicolas Carnot’s early formulation of the Second Law of Thermodynamics) and 
‘Curie’s principle’ (i.e. Pierre Curie’s Dissymmetry Principle), and hence would 
seem to be a key feature of classical thermodynamics. And yet, ‘we encounter severe 
                                                 
18
 On debates concerning individuation in the history of philosophy (which belong primarily to the 
medieval and early modern periods), see Cross (2014). On the history of philosophical debates 
concerning intensive magnitudes (which, again, are a largely medieval affair and early modern), see 
Mader (2014). 
19
 See DI, p. 120 ff./p. 86 ff. See also Bowden (2012). 
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difficulties when we attempt to consider Carnot’s or Curie’s principles as local 
manifestations of a transcendental principle’ (DR, p. 287/p. 223). These principles do 
not lend themselves to the notion of intensity as transcendental, insofar as the 
phenomenon of entropy which they assert to be an inevitable tendency of any 
thermodynamic system seems to imply a tendency towards the elimination of 
intensive differences.   
Deleuze will suggest that what these principles of classical thermodynamics 
primarily indicate are the limitations of our capacity to know intensity: 
 
We know only forms of energy which are already localised and distributed in 
extensity [l’étendue], or extensities [étendues] already qualified by forms of energy. 
[…] It turns out that, in experience, intension (intensity [intensité]) is inseparable 
from an extension (extension [extensité]) which relates it to the extensum (extensity). 
In these conditions, intensity itself is subordinated to the qualities which fill 
extensity […] In short, we know intensity only as already developed with an 
extensity, and as covered over by qualities. 
(DR, pp. 287-288/p. 223 [translation modified]) 
 
It is as a consequence of this limitation of knowledge – such that, at the level of 
cognitive representation there is no pure intensity, but only an intensity related to 
sensible qualities arrayed in a spatially extended field – that we have a ‘tendency to 
consider intensive quantity as a badly grounded empirical concept [un concept 
empirique … mal fondé], an impure mixture of a sensible quality and extensity’ (DR, 
p. 288/p. 223 [my emphasis]).
20
 ‘This is the most general content of the principles of 
Carnot, Curie, Le Chatelier, et al.: difference is the sufficient reason of change only 
to the extent that the change tends to negate difference’ (DR, p. 288/p. 223). These 
principles effectively ‘rationalise’ or codify the way in which knowledge or 
cognition is constructed on the condition of the obfuscation of the ‘intensive’ 
                                                 
20
 In speaking of the concept of intensive quantity as badly grounded, Deleuze is alluding to 
Bergson’s (2001, chap. 1) critique of the notion (see DR, pp. 308-309/pp. 239-240). 
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movement of problems. The cognitive mode of thought and experience can operate 
only by the formation of a certain structure that excludes this movement, or hides it 
from view.
21
 
 What Deleuze is referring to in this notion of a difference which engenders a 
change only insofar as that change negates difference is entropy, which we might 
loosely define as the tendency of thermodynamic systems to become more 
disordered, tending towards a state of equilibrium, a state without differences of 
potential in which, consequently, there will be no change without influence from 
outside the system. As I have already noted, Deleuze’s remarks vis-à-vis classical 
thermodynamics effectively take the form of a critique (in a quasi-Kantian sense) of 
entropy. It is now apparent how this is the case: it is the principles which define the 
entropic tendencies of thermodynamic systems which Deleuze takes to obscure the 
transcendental character of intensity and cause it to appear as an empirical concept, 
and a poorly ‘grounded’ one at that. But he will clarify further: in addition to the 
tendency of the notion of entropy to render intensity ‘merely’ empirical, there is also 
a tendency, or we should perhaps say a temptation, to raise entropy itself to the level 
of a transcendental principle. It is the convergence of these two tendencies that leads 
Deleuze to label entropy – or, to be more precise, a certain treatment of the notion of 
entropy, entropy viewed from a certain perspective – ‘a transcendental physical 
illusion’ (DR, p. 294/p. 228). Establishing the proper limits of the notion of entropy 
will thus call for ‘a certain distribution of the empirical and the transcendental’, that 
is to say a re-distribution, so that the transcendental character of intensity can 
                                                 
21
 I have discussed in chapter 2 how Deleuze conceives cognition to be limited by its representational 
structure, limits that thought and experience become properly philosophical only by overcoming. 
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become apparent, along with the restriction of the notion of entropy to its empirical 
use (DR, p. 174/p. 133). 
 It is in relation to this notion of an illegitimate ‘transcendentalisation’ of 
entropy that Deleuze’s remarks concerning thermodynamics and ‘good sense’ should 
be understood. Good sense (as I have shown in chapter 2) is the operation of our 
cognitive faculties which ‘determin[es] the indeterminate object as this or that’, in 
other words, the operation of categorisation and specification whereby indeterminate 
particulars as determined by being assigned to general types (DR, p. 291/p. 226). 
This operation, Deleuze continues, ‘grounds prediction’, insofar as it is only in terms 
of their belonging to general types that past experiences of particulars can be taken 
to pertain to the future behaviour of other particulars, i.e. particulars of the same type 
(DR, p. 291/p. 225). In chapter 3 of Difference and Repetition (‘The Image of 
Thought’), Deleuze gives an account of the mind’s tendency to ‘absolutise’ the de 
facto parameters of its ‘ordinary’ situation, of everyday thought and perception 
(which Deleuze suggests, following Kant, is basically cognitive in function), in a 
manner which obfuscates the genesis of cognition from an activity of non-cognitive 
thinking. (Again, these are themes which have been addressed in more detail in the 
previous chapter of this thesis.) Good sense, then, is Deleuze’s term for part of the 
framework of cognitive thought and perception insofar as it has been illegitimately 
absolutised into an ‘image of thought’.   
Bearing these points in mind, in chapter 5 of Difference and Repetition, 
Deleuze claims that we see ‘a strange alliance at the end of the nineteenth century 
between science, good sense and philosophy’ (DR, p. 288/p. 223). Classical 
thermodynamics, with its ‘themes of a reduction of difference, a uniformisation of 
diversity, and an equalisation of inequality’, ‘was the powerful furnace of that alloy’ 
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(DR, p. 288/p. 223). In this respect, then, Deleuze seems to be suggesting that 
classical thermodynamic thought participates in the construction of an image of 
thought which obfuscates a proper grasp of the transcendental.
22
 
It is important to be clear about the precise nature of Deleuze’s critique here. 
This is not, strictly speaking, a criticism of thermodynamics as a subfield of physical 
science. ‘[I]t is not science that is in question’, Deleuze insists, insofar as science 
‘remains indifferent to the extension of Carnot’s principle’ (DR, p. 289/p. 224). The 
‘extension’ in question here is that which transposes the notion of entropy from an 
empirical, scientific register into that of a transcendental principle, and thus makes 
of it the basis of an image of thought. It is in this latter respect that Deleuze takes the 
alliance of classical thermodynamics and good sense to signify a ‘new sense’ of 
‘[t]he words “the real is rational” ’, insofar as, having raised thermodynamics to the 
level of a principle of good sense, it would now be possible to show that ‘diversity 
tended to be reduced in Nature no less than in reason’ (DR, p. 289/p. 224).23 Hence 
the appearance of something like a ‘natural’ accord between thought’s tendency to 
seek to realise truth and conceptual order in an accurate, final representation of 
reality and nature’s purported tendency towards stability or equilibrium. We see here 
                                                 
22
 A clear example of this sort of overextension of the notion of entropy is Freud’s (2001) notion of 
the death drive in ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’, where the principles of classical thermodynamics 
are amplified beyond their proper scientific remit into something approaching a psychoanalytic 
Weltbild. 
23
 Deleuze alludes here to Hegel’s notorious phrase from the preface to the Outlines of the Philosophy 
of Right: ‘What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational [Was vernünftig ist, das ist 
wirklich; und das was wirklich ist, das ist vernünftig]’ (Hegel 2008, p. 14 [original emphasis]). See 
Stephen Houlgate’s explanatory note (Hegel 2008, pp. 326-327) for a brief defence of Hegel against 
the apparent quietism or conservatism of this formulation – in the light of which Deleuze’s oblique 
anti-Hegelian allusion seems rather opportunistic. 
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parallel principles of increasing predictability and a projected end-point at which 
problematic or intensive elements have been altogether eliminated both physically 
and in thought. 
It is important to emphasise once again in considering these comments that 
what they make clear is not, primarily, a fundamental hostility on Deleuze’s part 
towards classical thermodynamics, but rather a hostility towards the ‘themes’, the 
thematic, of thermodynamics and the way in which these are raised to the level of an 
image of thought. It is against this background, then, that Deleuze’s remark should 
be understood, namely that good sense ‘is the ideology of the middle classes’ – 
insofar as they ‘recognise themselves in equality as an abstract product’, and dream 
‘less of acting than of foreseeing [prévoir], […] of allowing free rein to action which 
goes from the unpredictable to the predictable [de l’imprévisible au prévisible]’, of 
being ‘prescient [prévoyant]’ – and that this ideology ‘is thermodynamic’ (DR, p. 
290/p. 225 [my emphasis]). In describing good sense qua ideology as 
‘thermodynamic’, it should be clear that Deleuze has rather definitively left the 
scientific register in order to employ the term in a looser sense. In this respect, this 
discussion of thermodynamics as a thematic capable of being extricated from its 
scientific milieu and redeployed at the level of a characterisation of an ideology or a 
way of understanding what it means to think rationally is analogous in its handling 
of scientific concepts to Deleuze’s earlier discussion of differential calculus. While 
the cases are not wholly the same, owing to the different roles played by differential 
calculus and by classical thermodynamics, there is an analogous slippage in which 
Deleuze moves from a discussion of some scientific concept to the extrication of that 
concept, or at least the term designating it, from its scientific context; at which point 
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it comes loose of its moorings and begins to drift as a characterisation of something 
beyond the limits of its initial remit. 
What can be concluded from these passages regarding Deleuze’s 
understanding of the relation between philosophy and (classical) thermodynamics? 
We can summarise with two points: Firstly, we see Deleuze reinforcing the 
distinction between a problematic (or equally ‘intensive’) differential dimension and 
the covering over of this dimension in its solution or ‘expression’, a distinction that I 
have already shown that he draws in relation to differential calculus. Secondly, 
Deleuze can once again be seen gradually extricating scientific concepts from their 
scientific register in order to deploy them in characterisations clearly (and at times 
explicitly) lying beyond the limits of an ‘application’ of the precise scientific term. 
The conclusion to be drawn, I take it, from both of these points is that there is a clear 
– indeed, a fairly deliberate and explicit – line of differentiation in Deleuze’s 
treatment of thermodynamics between a scientific and a philosophical register, 
accompanied by a certain conception of the possibility of moving from the one to the 
other in a way which can be either legitimate or illegitimate (i.e. which either 
contributes to philosophy’s critical purpose or consists in the construction of an 
image of thought). 
 
2.3 Anticipating nonlinear thermodynamics? 
Those wishing to interpret Deleuze as providing a renewal of ontology in line with 
the developments in our conception of physical reality facilitated by nonlinear 
thermodynamics might take from the above discussion a validation of their 
perspective, insofar as Deleuze’s critique of linear thermodynamics could be seen to 
anticipate the developments of nonlinear thermodynamics. This is the sort of 
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contention made by Prigogine and Stengers (1986), who see Deleuze as amongst 
those philosophers who ‘have “preceded” science’ in its discovery of the need to 
break with certain epistemic and metaphysical presuppositions proper to ‘classical’ 
physics (p. 292).   
This, however, seems to me ultimately not a helpful way to conceive 
Deleuze’s engagement with thermodynamics. First of all, because such an approach 
leads back to the concerns raised in the introduction to this thesis. Namely, if the 
significance of Deleuze’s philosophy is as a sort of pre-scientific ‘anticipation’ of 
nonlinear thermodynamics, then why, once a science of nonlinear thermodynamics 
has emerged, do we any longer need such a philosophy? The defender of this reading 
owes us an explanation of the specificity of philosophy’s contribution, and why 
therefore the emergence of a science which would replace speculation on the nature 
of the world with empirical inquiry does not signal philosophy’s loss of purpose. 
(Analogously, what use is Democritus’ atomism as a theory about the nature of 
physical reality now that we have the Standard Model?) 
Furthermore, as I have endeavoured to show, Deleuze is not interested in 
criticising classical thermodynamics as a theory of the behaviour of physical 
systems, but rather as a way of thinking amplified into the guiding principles of a 
‘worldview’. A point which contributes to the conclusion I want to make, which is 
that Deleuze’s interest in these scientific conceptual resources is tangential to 
scientific questions of how most adequately to represent or model physical reality. 
Consequently, this consideration of Deleuze’s specific engagements with scientific 
concepts in his early work returns us to the same conclusion I reached both through 
the contextualisation of Deleuze’s early work in chapter 1 and the consideration of 
his conception of the limits of cognition and the role of philosophy as critique-
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creation in chapter 2: namely, that Deleuze’s concerns are simply not the concerns of 
the sciences, nor is he concerned to bolster or support the latter in some way. 
Philosophy’s task is simply other than that of science. 
 
3 Metaphor, meaning and problems 
It seems that these scientific contexts have changed their meaning in the course of 
their appropriation into Deleuze’s philosophy. But this is hardly surprising for two 
reasons: firstly, Deleuze himself argues that the meaning or sense of a concept is 
determined by the problematic context in which it is deployed, such that it should be 
expected that these concepts take on new meanings when redeployed in the context 
of a new problematic, namely Deleuze’s search for a concept of difference; secondly, 
Deleuze is explicit about the fact that he takes this sort of reconfiguration, or perhaps 
disfiguration, of concepts to be part and parcel of his appropriation of concepts from 
the history of philosophy, so that it can legitimately be asked why concepts 
appropriated from the history of science should themselves be any more ‘faithfully’ 
reproduced. 
 Let us consider each of these points in turn. While Deleuze discusses 
meaning more fully in Logic of Sense, with which I am not concerned here (for 
reasons outlined in the introduction), he also makes some remarks about meaning in 
Difference and Repetition that are illuminating in the present context. 
 When we think about semantic meaning, he contends, ‘[t]wo dimensions 
must be distinguished’: ‘expression’, which is ‘the dimension of sense [sens]’, and 
‘designation’ (DR, p. 199/p. 153). This distinction between sense and designation (or 
reference) is Fregean in origin; although Deleuze does not refer to Frege directly, he 
does refer to Russell and to Carnap in this connection, both of whom are working 
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within a post-Fregean framework (DR, p. 200 n. 1/p. 322 n. 17). Whilst the 
designation of a proposition or concept is determined by the objects to which it 
refers, its sense is determined by the problematic Idea it expresses (DR, p. 199/p. 
153). Indeed, ‘[s]ense is located in the problem itself’; it is ‘constituted in […] that 
set of problems and questions in relation to which the propositions [or concepts] 
serve as elements of response and cases of solution’ (DR, p. 204/p. 157). If the 
meaning of a (seemingly same) concept shifts in the movement from its original 
scientific context to a philosophical context, this is thus because it is redeployed in 
the context of a new problematic, specified by a new set of encounters. Insofar as 
these concepts are extricated from the scientific problems in relation to which they 
were originally formulated and put to use in relation to the problem of constructing a 
differential ontology, they cannot, by Deleuze’s own lights, strictly speaking be said 
to be the same concepts any longer, as their sense has changed. 
 As I have noted above, Deleuze explicitly embraces this transformation of 
concepts insofar as it pertains to the history of philosophy. ‘In the history of 
philosophy’, Deleuze states, ‘a commentary should […] bear the maximal 
modification appropriate to a double’ (DR, p. 4/p. xxi). A commentary, to the extent 
that it is philosophical rather than simply historical, should produce, say, ‘a 
philosophically bearded Hegel, a philosophically clean-shaven Marx, in the same 
way as a moustached Mona Lisa’ (DR, p. 4/p. xxi [original emphasis]). Insofar as 
philosophy is analogous to painting, according to Deleuze, in being an essentially 
creative activity, ‘it needs that revolution which took art from representation to 
abstraction’ (DR, p. 354/p. 276). In other words, philosophy does not seek to 
faithfully reproduce that which it discusses, but to portray it in a new way which 
succeeds in expressing something of the original but which also renders it 
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unrecognisable and strange. In this connection, Deleuze (2008a) refers approvingly 
to Proust’s ‘protest against an art of observation and description’ and ‘objectivist 
literature’, according to which the purpose of art is an accurate depiction (p. 22). 
 This rejection of a simple reproduction of philosophical resources, this 
insistence that a properly philosophical redeployment of conceptual resources from 
the history of philosophy will be creative in the sense that it mutates and remakes 
these concepts is in keeping with the ideas outlined above about changes in meaning 
tied to the deployment of concepts in new problematic contexts. Deleuze 
emphasises, however, that this disfigurement of concepts does not produce 
something wholly unrelated to the original. This is still a work of ‘commentary’, a 
quasi-artistic depiction. It is not, therefore, wholly arbitrary that these particular 
resources have been chosen, and some semblance of their original sense remains. In 
‘Letter to a Harsh Critic’, in which Deleuze looks back on his early work from the 
perspective of the early 1970s, he makes the following (oft-noted) remarks: 
  
[In my early work on the history of philosophy,] I saw myself as taking an author 
from behind and giving him a child that would be his own offspring, yet monstrous. 
It was really important for it to be his own child, because the author had to actually 
say all I had him saying. But the child was bound to be monstrous too, because it 
resulted from all sorts of shifting, slipping, dislocations, and hidden emissions that I 
really enjoyed. 
(Deleuze 1995, p. 6 [my emphasis]) 
 
As is clear from the highlighted phrase, something of the original remains, precisely 
in order that it should be able to illuminate or bring something out in the new context 
in which it is applied.
24
 It seems appropriate, despite Deleuze’s distaste for the term, 
                                                 
24
 Deleuze’s remarks on simulacra are no doubt relevant here too, simulacra manifesting – in Gregory 
Flaxman’s (2012) apt phrase – ‘a similarity that only appears to be faithful’ (p. 165). For an 
illuminating discussion of Deleuze’s understanding of the creativity of philosophical thought and its 
relation to his reading of Plato’s Sophist, see Flaxman (2012, chaps 3 and 4). 
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to refer to this effect, whereby the confluence of two spheres of semantic meaning 
evokes a new meaning, as one of metaphor. 
 It is in relation to these ideas, then, that Deleuze’s use of scientific concepts 
should be viewed. If these concepts provide ‘models’ for Deleuze’s own concepts, it 
is insofar as they are metaphors: these concepts are deployed in a new context which 
transforms their sense, at the same time as in the midst of this disfiguration they 
maintain enough of their original meaning to allow them to be illuminating and non-
arbitrary. In this respect, Deleuze’s use of the history of science mirrors his use of 
the history of philosophy.  
 
Conclusion 
To draw the present chapter to a close, I will briefly restate the general thrust of the 
remarks made above, and point the way to the discussion to be undertaken in the 
next chapter.   
 This thesis has set out from concerns regarding the plausibility of a certain 
reading of Deleuze for capturing what is going on in this philosopher’s early work. 
This reading sees Deleuze as responding to a need for the renewal of some of 
philosophy’s most basic concepts in order to take account of the developments in our 
empirical and conceptual understanding of reality made possible by the sciences. 
 In the present chapter, I have sought to foreground some difficulties for this 
reading by emphasising the way in which Deleuze’s engagements with mathematical 
and physical conceptual resources seem to indicate not so much an affinity between 
his philosophy and the purposes of the scientific fields in question as an 
appropriation of those concepts into the context of a quite different set of concerns 
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and problems. Clearly, Deleuze sees in these conceptual resources powerful tools 
which philosophy can draw upon; but, it would seem, for its own ends. 
 The conclusions I have reached so far in the course of this thesis indicate the 
way in which Deleuze differentiates between philosophy and science. In the next 
chapter, I want to consider a different aspect of this differentiation, namely the 
motivations behind Deleuze’s philosophical concern with ‘immanence’.  
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Chapter 4 
Monism, Naturalism and Univocity 
Immanence in Modern Science and Deleuzian 
Philosophy 
 
 
 
Introduction 
In this thesis, I have been working to determine what kind of relation exists between 
philosophy and the sciences in Deleuze’s early thought. My starting point has been 
the work of certain theorists who have pointed to Deleuze as the inspiration for a 
reappraisal of modern science by philosophers in the continental tradition, resulting 
in a renewed positive attitude towards natural science and a greater proximity 
between continental philosophy and the sciences. I have sought to place Deleuze’s 
role in this narrative in question by considering some of the ways in which a closer 
examination of Deleuze’s early work puts the idea of an affinity between philosophy 
and science in that work in question. 
 So far in the course of the present thesis, setting out from certain concerns 
regarding what I have termed the ‘scientistic’ reading of Deleuze, pertaining to how 
properly to delineate between philosophy and science in Deleuze’s early thought, I 
have worked to articulate the discontinuity which I have argued exists between 
philosophy and science in Deleuze’s work from the early 1950s through to the late 
1960s. Thus, I have argued that: 
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(i) Whilst Deleuze belongs to a (‘structuralist’) philosophical tendency that 
seeks to reappraise philosophy’s relation to the sciences and that 
appropriates scientific conceptual resources, he insists on the specificity 
of philosophy in relation to other disciplines. Furthermore, whilst 
rejecting the phenomenological conception of philosophy as an 
excavation of the implicit structure of ‘lived experience’, he embraces 
the idea of a central role for sub-conceptual experience in philosophy, 
and ties the dynamics of conceptual change to conceptual thought’s 
relation to the sensible field, thus distancing himself from more 
straightforward supporters of philosophy’s affinity with scientific culture 
(chap. 1); 
(ii) Philosophy, for Deleuze, is both ‘critical’ and ‘creative’ in senses which 
place it outside the limits imposed on thought by the exigencies of 
scientific knowledge, the epistemic and pragmatic functions of which 
ultimately bind the sciences to certain aspects of representation. 
Philosophy’s more uncompromisingly critical and creative stance is tied 
to the fact that its task is ‘ethical’ rather than epistemic or pragmatic 
(chap. 2); 
(iii) Whilst Deleuze draws on conceptual resources from mathematics and the 
natural sciences, the status of these concepts is profoundly changed by 
their transmission from a scientific to a philosophical register (by a 
movement which I have suggested it is appropriate to terms metaphor). 
Deleuze is not concerned to draw out the philosophical significance of 
specific scientific developments, so much as he utilises these 
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developments as tools in furthering an independent, philosophical project 
(chap. 3). 
 
What I have been concerned to do in the course of the preceding three chapters, then, 
is to correct the scientistic reading’s exaggeration of the continuity between 
philosophy and science in Deleuze’s thought by articulating the distance that exists 
between philosophy’s concerns and those of science in Deleuze’s early work. 
 In the present chapter I want to look at one of the fundamental themes of 
Deleuze’s early philosophical project – immanence – and consider how this might be 
seen to relate to fundamental motivations, conditions and assumptions of modern 
science. I will argue, however, that the sense of immanence that is operative in 
Deleuze’s early philosophy is difficult to square with senses of immanence that we 
might plausibly associate with science. 
 
1 Immanence and science 
Amongst the complex web of themes and concepts characteristic of Deleuze’s 
philosophy, one which may suggest particularly forcefully some affinity with 
modern science is immanence.
1
 
                                                 
1
 Miguel de Beistegui (2004, esp. chaps 7-9) is perhaps the scholar who has explored in most detail 
this connection between Deleuze’s ontology of immanence and the metaphysical implications of 
modern science. While the present chapter will therefore function in some ways as a response to that 
work, I will approach these themes from a different angle, insofar as I will orientate my discussion of 
Deleuze’s concept of immanence in relation to contemporary Anglophone debates concerning the 
metaphysical implications of natural science rather than in relation to the sort of Heidegger-inspired 
account of modern science operative in de Beistegui’s work. 
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 Some clarification of terms is already in order here.  We should first note that 
‘immanence’ is a term used in contrast with ‘transcendence’. Primarily theological 
notions (at least in the sense most pertinent to their use here), ‘immanent’ and 
‘transcendent’ are contrasting qualifications of the nature of God’s relation to the 
earthly sphere. The immanent world, then, is this world, the world in which we, 
created beings, find ourselves; God, or whatever else, is transcendent in virtue of 
existing beyond or outside this domain. As it stands, these notions are fairly lacking 
in content. Without further qualification, they are effectively tantamount to the terms 
‘here’ and ‘there’, where the ‘distance’ between here and there is taken to be 
particularly dramatic. But as I will make clear in what follows, just how we delineate 
between here and there, between our domain of existence and what is supposed to lie 
outside it, is an important part of the debate about what it would even mean to have 
an explanation of immanent reality that makes no appeal to a transcendent reality. 
 The term ‘modern science’ is notoriously slippery. I do not intend, in what 
follows, to commit myself to any particular historical account of the origins or 
development of science, as this would be a hugely ambitious project far beyond the 
limited parameters of the present thesis. What I mean to indicate by the term 
‘modern science’ is simply the diverse set of ideas and practices generally associated 
in contemporary language with the term ‘science’, from the sixteenth century 
onwards.   
It must be emphasised that making claims about ‘modern science’ in this 
way, where this term is intended to range over a strikingly broad range of ideas and 
practices in diverse milieux and across a historiographically unwieldy stretch of 
time, is something we should approach with a fair degree of reticence. The history of 
science is complex and, perhaps due to the unquestionably central role science has 
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played in various important but disputed shifts in theoretical perspective from the 
early modern period onwards, prone to ‘mythologisation’.2 However, the main 
weight of my argument in what follows will not so much be on capturing an accurate 
picture of science itself, as on giving a fair assessment of some philosophical ideas 
about the significance of science. I am thus operating at one remove, as it were, from 
the historiographical questions themselves. 
 Modern science, one might argue, has been a powerful tool in providing us 
with explanations of the reality in which we find ourselves – immanent reality – that 
make no essential appeal to anything transcending it. This is not to claim that the 
reality that science seeks to explain is not in some way dependent upon another 
reality, be it divine or transcendental. Nor, as will become significant in what 
follows, is it to claim that science alone is in a position to exclude transcendent 
entities. It is rather to claim that scientific explanations do not themselves make 
reference to entities belonging to a transcendent reality, and seemingly have no need 
to do so. In providing us with such explanations, science has, according to some, 
helped to render the transcendent theoretically – and perhaps also morally – obsolete. 
Indeed, some would argue that the rise and onward march of modern science bears a 
large part of the responsibility for driving the broader cultural shift of secularisation, 
which has led many of us to a point where we no longer see or even understand the 
need felt by many others for something transcending this worldly sphere. 
                                                 
2
 By which I do not mean that this history is falsified, but rather imaginatively but selectively 
narrativised for rhetorical effect. I draw here on the notion of ‘mythic history’ developed by Eric 
Schliesser (2013b), which plays an interesting role in the account he gives of some of the non-
cognitive aspects of the history of philosophy (Schliesser 2013a, pp. 213-214). 
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 It is hard to assess this idea of the significance of modern science without 
some more substantive account of what delineates this world, the immanent world, 
from its outside. This is because, as I noted above, the terms ‘immanent’ and 
‘transcendent’ on their own mean little more than ‘here’ and ‘there’. We need to give 
some characterisation of what sort of things are not the sort of things one finds 
‘here’.  
Supernatural entities are prime candidates for a position on the ‘not here’ side 
of the boundary. But what does it mean to be ‘super-natural’? Above or outside 
nature. But if ‘nature’ is just the name for immanent reality as explained by science, 
then to say that scientific explanation makes no reference to supernatural entities 
risks triviality, as being supernatural would then seem to consist simply in being the 
sort of entity that finds no place in scientific explanation. Something more 
substantive seems to be needed.   
 In substantiating what is meant by the transcendent or the supernatural in 
claiming that scientific explanations are explanations of immanent reality on its own 
terms, the most common and least controversial exemplars of the sort of thing 
excluded from such explanations (least controversial amongst secular philosophers – 
not at all in society more generally) are God (or gods), angels, demons and other 
such posits of traditional theistic religion.   
It is in this sense of the transcendent or the supernatural – as the divine – that 
Charles Taylor has highlighted the connection between modern science and 
immanence. The distinction between ‘the immanent and the transcendent’ (and 
correspondingly ‘the natural and the supernatural’) depends, Taylor (2007) argues, 
on a ‘hiving off of an independent, free-standing level, that of “nature”, which may 
or may not be in interaction with something further or beyond’ (pp. 13-14). Such a 
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move, he continues, is ‘a crucial bit of modern theorizing, which in turn corresponds 
to a constitutive dimension of modern experience’ (Taylor 2007, p. 14). By stating 
that this distinction is distinctly ‘modern’, Taylor (2007) means to indicate that 
marking such a distinction in such a ‘hard-and-fast’ manner is ‘something we 
(Westerners, Latin Christians) alone have done’, facilitated by ‘[t]he great invention 
of the West’: ‘that of an immanent order in Nature, whose working could be 
systematically understood and explained on its own terms, leaving open the question 
whether this whole order had a deeper significance, and whether, if it did, we should 
infer a transcendent Creator beyond it’ (p. 15). In its distinctively modern form, 
Taylor (2007) argues, ‘[t]his notion of the “immanent” involved denying – or at least 
isolating and problematizing – any form of interpenetration between the things of 
Nature, on one hand, and “the supernatural” on the other, be this understood in terms 
of the one transcendent God, or of Gods or spirits, or magic forces, or whatever’ (pp. 
15-16). In this respect, he suggests, such a distinction is largely alien to the 
philosophy of Antiquity: though ‘this idea had its forerunners in ancient times, with 
the Epicureans, for instance’, ‘[y]ou couldn’t foist this on Plato, […] not because you 
can’t distinguish the Ideas from the things in the flux which “copy” them, but 
precisely because these changing realities can only be understood through the Ideas’ 
(Taylor 2007, p. 15); nor on ‘Aristotle, whose God played a crucial role, as pole of 
attraction, in the cosmos’ (p. 780 n. 17). Thus, according to Taylor, in its modern 
sense, the distinction between immanence and transcendence is grounded in the 
possibility of conceiving the autonomy of the former with respect to the latter. It is 
an immanent order in this sense that scientific explanation seems to be able to 
provide. 
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It is not my intention at this point to assess the legitimacy of this narrative. In 
what follows, I will suggest that there are reasons that we might wish to temper any 
such narrative,
3
 as this will be relevant for the question of what sort of affinity might 
be seen to exist between Deleuze’s philosophy of immanence and modern science. 
Nevertheless, such a narrative is one reason that one might initially see a connection 
between Deleuze’s philosophy and modern science, that is, between Deleuze’s call 
for a rejection of transcendence, and the autonomy of immanence and corresponding 
obsolescence of transcendence purportedly brought about by modern science. 
I have suggested that it is plausible to claim that the order science allows us 
to discern in the immanent world makes no reference to anything transcendent, 
where the model of the transcendent is provided by the divine as conceived by 
traditional theism. This possibility of the autonomy of immanent order has to some 
philosophers and scientists seemed to lead inevitably to the exclusion of 
transcendence altogether, to what Taylor terms the ‘closure’ of immanence. 
However, it is not a given that science alone is enough to demand such closure; nor, 
indeed, is it a given that science alone requires any such closure. 
 In the context of contemporary debates surrounding the ‘culture wars’ 
between science and religion, heated polemics have arisen against the idea that 
modern natural science alone entails closed immanence – the latter understood 
primarily in terms of the exclusion of divine agency. While the tone of these debates 
is no doubt often polemical, this is not to say that solid arguments are not being 
meted out. To take a particularly potent example, Taylor (2007) makes a convincing 
case, on the basis of a broadly phenomenological consideration of the role religious 
                                                 
3
 Among them, the reasons Taylor himself gives for questioning the idea that science alone provides 
reason enough to exclude transcendence. 
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belief has in the experience of the believer, for the view that whilst the 
pronouncements of modern natural science alone can indeed be understood to falsify 
certain factual claims made in the stories of religious scripture, claims that have at 
times in the history of religion played important roles in belief and practice, it is only 
in conjunction with a set of broader philosophical commitments – importantly, 
certain moral commitments – that science is in a position to contribute to motivating 
an exclusion of the supernatural from our ontological commitments. Thus, Taylor 
(2007) argues that while ‘the new science gave a clear theoretical form to the idea of 
an immanent order which could be understood on its own, without reference to 
interventions from outside’, insofar as ‘the rise of post-Galilean natural science […] 
finally yielded our familiar picture of the natural, “physical” universe as governed by 
exceptionless laws, which may reflect the wisdom and benevolence of the creator, 
but don’t require in order to be understood […] any reference to a good aimed at’,  
this ‘immanent frame’ ‘permits closure, without demanding it’ (pp. 542-544). While 
‘[t]he immanent order can […] slough off the transcendent’, it is still possible ‘to 
live it as open to something beyond’ without rejecting any scientific claims about the 
way things are in immanent reality (Taylor 2007, pp. 543-544 [my emphasis]).   
Equally debateable is whether science requires any such exclusion of the 
transcendent, or whether this is rather beyond its proper purview. One might argue 
that trying to draw such conclusions from scientific evidence constitutes a violation 
of the epistemic attitude characteristic of modern science. For a case in which such 
an argument has been made, consider the early modern controversy between 
Newtonians and Spinozism, where the cautious, sober epistemic attitude modern 
science solicits the scientist to adopt was seen by those inspired by Newton to tell 
against drawing the sort of sweeping rationalistic conclusions associated with 
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Spinoza. Here, the epistemic attitude held responsible for the success of science was 
seen as polemically pitted against the ‘enthusiasm’ of advocates of atheism and 
heterodoxy (see Schliesser 2011 and 2012; Taylor 2007, pp. 331-332). 
 Given these considerations, I think we would be advised to work on the 
assumption that a commitment to closed or exclusive immanence is a philosophical 
project in excess of a simple confidence in the truth of scientifically validated claims. 
How exclusive immanence is going to relate to modern science must therefore 
remain at this point an open question (I will consider some different views on how to 
answer this question shortly).   
It should also be noted that one’s verdict on how exclusive immanence 
relates to science will have an impact on how one delineates the immanent from the 
transcendent. If science itself is taken as the index for what counts as immanent, this 
is going to have a considerable impact on what kinds of things are excluded from 
immanence. At the same time, there is room for considerable debate on what kinds 
of things are (or can be, or should be) posited by the sciences. 
 
2 Ontological monism 
I will return to these questions and concerns later. Before doing so, however, I 
should bring Deleuze into the picture. How we should the concept of ‘immanence’ in 
Deleuze’s early work be understood? 
 As has been noted by other commentators, the notion of immanence, though 
it is arguably a thread that can be followed through Deleuze’s entire oeuvre, is only 
named as such in his early work in Spinoza and the Problem of Expression.
4
 The 
                                                 
4
 De Beistegui (2010) argues that ‘the thread which […] runs through Deleuze’s work as a whole’ is 
‘best summarised in the concept of “immanence”’ (p. 5). Kerslake (2009) notes that although ‘[i]n 
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concept of immanence is largely absent from Difference and Repetition, although 
themes that are grouped under that concept in Spinoza and the Problem of 
Expression, as well as in later work, are explored there under different names.
5
   
In this regard, two areas of Deleuze’s early philosophy seem particularly 
pertinent: Firstly, the discussion of the thesis of the univocity of being, which is 
carried out in Spinoza and the Problem of Expression and in Difference and 
Repetition.  Although, as noted, ‘immanence’ is not a concept that receives any real 
attention in Difference and Repetition, a connection is drawn in Spinoza and the 
Problem of Expression between the concept of immanence and the thesis of the 
univocity of being. Since the latter will be central to the position articulated in 
Difference and Repetition, this can be seen as an indirect appraisal of the notion of 
immanence. 
The second place where the somewhat submerged theme of immanence is 
discussed in Deleuze’s early work is in his discussion of ‘Naturalism’.6 The notion 
of Naturalism is one that is also only articulated on a small number of occasions in 
                                                                                                                                          
Spinoza and the Problem of Expression (1968), Deleuze presents the notion of immanence […] as 
waiting for Spinoza to liberate it from the transcendence implied in traditional conceptions of 
emanation’, and correspondingly ‘presents Spinoza as reclaiming the thesis of univocity of being’, 
peculiarly, ‘in Difference and Repetition, published in the same year, where eternal return is presented 
as the completed “realization” of the univocity of being […], the concept of immanence is hardly 
discussed’ (210).  
5
 The notion of immanence first appears in Deleuze’s work in his 1953 study of Hume. There, he 
opposes a ‘transcendental critique’ to an ‘empirical’ or more properly speaking empiricist critique, 
where the latter is conducted from ‘a purely immanent point of view’ (Deleuze 1991, p. 87). While 
the broadly Husserlian notion of immanence embraced in the Hume book is not unrelated to 
Deleuze’s subsequent usage – his understanding of empiricism being the common link – the 
exploration of the precise nature of this connection will be left for another occasion. 
6
 I will capitalise ‘Naturalism’ when I am speaking about Deleuze’s usage in order to distinguish this 
usage of the term from other, more contemporary usages also under discussion in this chapter. 
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Deleuze’s early work, namely in his essay on Lucretius and, again, in Spinoza and 
the Problem of Expression.
7
 It is, as with the univocity of being, in this context of a 
discussion of Spinozism that we get a sense of the relation between Naturalism and 
immanence. 
While Deleuze’s discussions of univocity and Naturalism touch on similar 
topics, his discussions of Naturalism highlight some aspects of his philosophical 
orientation which are not as clear in his discussions of univocity and which can have 
a bearing on the relation between his philosophy and natural science. It will therefore 
be valuable to consider both concepts – the univocity of being and Naturalism – in 
order to make a full appraisal of how this early formulation of the core Deleuzian 
concept of immanence relates to ideas of immanence that one might associate with 
modern natural science.   
 
2.1 The univocity of being 
I will first consider Deleuze’s treatment of the thesis of the univocity of being.  
The debate concerning the univocity of being which Deleuze reinvigorates 
(‘repeats’) is primarily a medieval debate, but one with roots in the problems of 
Aristotle’s logic and metaphysics. Although Deleuze formulates a historical narrative 
accounting for the emergence and development of this debate and of the concept of 
the univocity of being, the complexities of this narrative can be bracketed for present 
purposes.
8
 For now, it is sufficient to note that Deleuze enters into the medieval 
                                                 
7
 There is, in addition, a foretaste of certain aspects of this notion of Naturalism in Deleuze’s 1956 
review of Ferdinand Alquié’s Descartes, l’homme et l’œuvre (FAD). 
8
 The history Deleuze provides revolves around (1) the emergence of the Aristotelian problematic of 
the equivocity of being in response to certain Platonic considerations; (2) the development of the 
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debate, and traces what he takes to be its modern conceptual aftermath, in order to 
read these considerations back into the original Aristotelian problematic (and its 
Platonic prehistory). He does this, firstly, with a view to discerning the full 
significance of the problems that emerges from certain aspects of Aristotelian 
metaphysics; and secondly, he does this in order to try to conceive of an alternative 
to the Aristotelian ontological orientation that opens up the space for these problems 
in the first place.
9
 
I will initially give just the broadest and most basic definition of the 
univocity of being, as it is this definition which lends itself most readily to 
comparison with the ideas of immanence often associated with modern science. I 
begin in this manner in order to get a sense of the motivations one might have for 
making this connection. Having done this, however, it will be necessary to return to 
this definition and consider some further facets of univocity as Deleuze conceives it 
                                                                                                                                          
Aristotelian problematic in the medieval period in relation to theological questions regarding the 
nature of God’s transcendence; (3) the emergence of the notion of the univocity of being from 
successive attempts to reconceive some sense of God’s proximity to His creation (a) in the 
Neoplatonism of late antiquity, (b) in the medieval thought of Duns Scotus, (c) in the ‘expressivism’ 
of Renaissance mysticism and finally (d) in the pantheistic monism of Spinoza; and (4) the 
‘realisation’ of the full atheistic, immanentist significance of the univocity of being in more 
contemporary thinkers such as Heidegger (who ultimately fails to provide a coherent formulation) and 
Nietzsche (who, by Deleuze’s estimation, finally succeeds). For a thorough survey of this history, see 
de Beistegui (2004, esp. chap. 1 and chap. 7, §1) and (2010, chap. 2).  
9
 I draw here on de Beistegui (2004): ‘[A]lthough the Aristotelian problematic of the one sense of 
being and its many significations comes subsequently to be equated with the problematic concerning 
God and His creatures, it is with the former that Deleuze is primarily concerned. In other words, 
Deleuze “uses” Scotus to return to the opening, Aristotelian problematic, and specifically to the way 
in which the Aristotelian “solution” [whereby being is said in many ways, but always with reference 
to the notion of οὐσία] arises out of a division of the real into kinds, specific differences, and 
individuated particularities, and in such a way that differences can be identified and isolated only at 
the level of species, thus subordinating the latter to the work of identity or the concept’ (p. 236). 
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in its fully ‘realised’ form, and some consequences of Deleuze’s formulation. This 
final formulation incorporates a number of elements and concerns that, I will argue, 
at the very least raise problems for any association we might want to draw between 
immanence qua univocity of being and the sort of immanence we might associate 
with modern science. (These concerns signal the divergence of interests between 
science and Deleuze’s philosophy that I have been examining throughout this thesis.) 
 The core idea of the univocity of being, then, is that there is only one sense of 
‘being’. Everything that can be said to be must be taken to be in the same sense. As 
Deleuze states, ‘being […] is said in a single and same sense’ of everything of which 
it is said (DR, p. 53/p. 35 [original emphasis]). 
 With what sort of view is this position to be contrasted? Of course, with the 
view that there is more than one sense of being, more than one sense in which things 
can be said to be. This view can be referred to – following Jason Turner’s (2010) 
defence of such a thesis – as ‘ontological pluralism’; the defender of the univocity of 
being can correspondingly be referred to as an ‘ontological monist’.10 Ontological 
pluralism can be thought of as the view – to use Adrian Moore’s (2015) helpful 
formulation – that there are ‘things so different in kind’ that ‘our very talk of the 
“being”’ of one such kind ‘has to be understood differently from our talk of the 
“being”’ of another (p. 2). What sort of motivations might one have for positing such 
radical differences? 
 To point to the most immediate answer Deleuze considers: one might have 
theological motivations for positing such a difference. And indeed, just this sort of 
motivation can be seen in the medieval debates from which Deleuze draws the 
                                                 
10
 See also McDaniel (2009) and (2010). 
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concept of the univocity of being. The idea here is that the difference between the 
being of God and the being of His creatures might be a sufficiently drastic difference 
in kind that the two cannot be said to be in the same sense as one another.   
At its most extreme, this might be formulated as the view that insofar as both 
God and creatures can be described as being or existing, the term ‘being’ is simply 
equivocal, used in two distinct and unrelated senses with respect to these two 
fundamental kinds of entity. It may be that this is what is required in order that ‘the 
transcendence of the divine being be maintained’ (SPE, p. 161/p. 177). This is the 
line of thought that Deleuze suggests is followed to the end in the tradition of 
negative theology: given that all we humans have access to in order to understand 
what it means for something to be is our own existence and the existence of things 
not radically different from us in their kind of being, it is a consequence of God’s 
absolute transcendence that His being be strictly unintelligible for us, and that any 
intuition we might have of that being be ‘ineffable’ using the language we use to talk 
about our own being.
11
  
 This negative-theological stance is, however, an extreme. A more agreeable 
position, and the position against which Deleuze is most concerned to inveigh, posits 
not so much an equivocity of being as an analogy of being. This is the view that, 
although there is more than one sense of ‘being’, there are relations of analogy 
between these senses. Thus, while ‘being’ may be said in more than one sense, it is 
(to again borrow an apt phrase from Moore (2015)) ‘both natural and warranted’ that 
the same term be used for all of these different senses (pp. 14-15). So, to take the 
theological case, the suggestion would be that although God’s transcendence is such 
                                                 
11
 For Deleuze on negative theology and its opposition to ontological monism, see SPE, pp. 44-45/pp. 
53-54, p. 150/p. 165, pp. 156-157/pp. 172-173 and p. 161/p. 178. 
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that we cannot strictly speaking say that He is in the same sense that we can say that 
we and the things we find around us are, it is natural and warranted to speak of 
‘being’ in both instances, since there is something analogous between these different 
ways of being. It is in virtue of this analogy that they are both, precisely, ways of 
being. The unity of being, in virtue of which everything that is can be said to belong 
to the same domain, is a unity of analogy. 
 Whilst the formulation of such a view in terms of an analogy between the 
being of God and the being of His creatures is properly attributable to the 
innovations of Ibn-Sīnā and Aquinas in the eleventh and thirteenth century 
respectively, one can already see in Aristotle a sensitivity to the need for a position 
between equivocity and univocity (or homonymy and synonymy) when it comes to 
‘being’, if we are to be able to carry out the task of ontology and say something 
substantive about being qua being.
12
 The term ‘being’ should be understood as a 
case of ‘paronymy’, according to Aristotle, analogous to the case of ‘health’: 
 
There are many senses in which a thing may be said to ‘be’, but they are related to 
one central point, one definite kind of thing, and are not homonymous. Everything 
which is healthy is related to health, one thing in the sense that it preserves health, 
another in the sense that it produces it, another in the sense that it is a symptom of 
health, another because it is capable of it. […] So, too, there are many senses in 
which a thing is said to be, but all refer to one starting-point […] 
(Aristotle 1984a, p. 1003a) 
 
We might also consider Aristotle’s (1984b, pp. 1097a15-1098b8) treatment of the 
different senses of ‘good’ in the Nicomachean Ethics. ‘Good’, Aristotle argues 
(against Plato), does not have one single sense, but is rather used in many different 
senses depending on what it is that we are describing as good. A good joke is not 
good in the same sense that a good bicycle is good, or a good carpenter, or a good 
                                                 
12
 See de Beistegui (2004, pp. 235-236). 
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meal, and so on. But it seems plausible, nevertheless, to suggest that there is some 
commonality here in relation to which it is natural and warranted that the same term, 
‘good’, be used in each case. The thought behind the analogy of being is that 
something similar is true of ‘being’.  
In the theological context of the medieval debate concerning the equivocity 
or univocity of being, this intermediate position allows God’s transcendence to His 
creatures to be preserved without placing the divine at such a distance from the 
profane that no relationship between the two can remain and nothing can be said 
about the being of beings in general. For Deleuze, however, even this more measured 
attempt to preserve the idea of divine transcendence through a moderated ontological 
pluralism is unacceptable. I will return to the reason why he finds it unacceptable 
subsequently.  For now, it is simply necessary to note that Deleuze embraces a 
thoroughgoing ontological monism, and that an important aspect of the project of his 
early philosophy is to think through all the demands and consequences of such a 
monism. 
 
2.2 Ontological monism and contemporary metaphysical naturalism 
I will now return to my earlier discussion of immanence and science. How do the 
points made in the previous section relate to this discussion?  
The first thing to note is that Deleuze’s ontological monism endorses – 
indeed, can be seen as a statement of – exclusive or closed immanence. I have 
already suggested that it is best not to take for granted that science implies or 
demands any such closure of immanence, whilst nonetheless acknowledging that 
various philosophical orientations might have reasons to associate science with such 
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closure. The question it seems most pertinent to ask, then, is how Deleuze’s 
ontological monism is orientated in relation to such projects.  
 In the contemporary jargon, what I have so far described as the view that 
immanence is exclusive or closed tends to be termed ‘naturalism’, or, more 
specifically, ‘ontological’ or ‘metaphysical naturalism’. I will use the latter term in 
order to avoid to as great an extent as possible any confusion with the term 
‘ontological monism’ which I have been using to describe Deleuze’s endorsement of 
the univocity of being. Metaphysical naturalism could be glossed as the view (to 
make use of Philip Pettit’s (2009) concise formulation) that ‘there are only natural 
things’ (p. 542). While this might sound like a more substantive claim than the claim 
that immanence is closed, this is not the case. As I have already suggested with 
regard to ‘supernatural’, the term ‘natural’, in the context of the claim that there are 
only natural things, is effectively simply the claim that everything that there is, is in 
some sense of fundamentally the same kind. In the absence of any further 
clarification of what this kind is, this is all that is stated. But of course, just as I have 
noted with regard to ‘immanent’, how exactly the notion of ‘natural’ is to be made 
more substantive is a large part of the debate about what naturalism, or closed 
immanence, entails, and what sort of relation it bears to science. 
 Within the logical space of the contemporary Anglophone debate about 
naturalism, the weakest, least controversial position would perhaps be a form of anti-
supernaturalism making little or no reference to science, a simple exclusion of 
supernatural entities.
13
 This would be, in effect, little more than the position as stated 
                                                 
13
 While some philosophers would argue that it is precisely science which has provided the motivation 
to reject such entities, so that this anti-supernaturalism is incoherent without some appeal to the 
authority of science, I have already noted that it is an open question precisely what role science has 
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above, perhaps with some qualification of what counts as transcendent or non- or 
supernatural by stipulating certain kinds of entities that are fairly uncontroversially 
regarded as spurious in a contemporary secular context. Such exemplars would 
certainly include God, but might also include more specific examples such as – to 
point to a list compiled by Mario De Caro (2010) – ‘spiritual entities, Intelligent 
Designers, immaterial and immortal minds, entelechies and prime movers unmoved’ 
(p. 367). Without some stronger constraint on membership of the natural, however, 
we might well question whether such a naturalism qua mere anti-supernaturalism is 
going to be restrictive enough to reflect a sense of the restriction of existence to the 
natural that would have much to do with the sciences. Certainly it seems that a great 
many contemporary philosophers wanting to draw some close association between 
their naturalism and science are keen to push for a more restrictive conception of the 
natural. Furthermore, it might well seem that in the context of contemporary 
mainstream Anglophone philosophy (at least outside the distinctly ‘niche’ enclave of 
philosophers of religion
14
), anti-supernaturalism of this minimal sort seems nigh on 
trivial, in the sense of being a point of easy consensus amongst a largely secular 
community (and not one in which consensus is easy). Most importantly, endorsing 
such a position does not seem to be a mark of a philosophical orientation with any 
                                                                                                                                          
had in the degradation of belief in the supernatural. It has no doubt had some effect, and arguably a 
considerable effect at a broad cultural level, but this does not imply that philosophers adopting the 
anti-supernaturalist view described here must be motivated to do so by science. 
14
 As David Bourget and David Chalmers’ recent exercise in the sociology of philosophy has 
indicated the statistical prevalence of theism amongst the population of professional philosophers of 
religion is decidedly out of sync with the clear dominance of atheism when the views of all 
participants in the survey are taken into account. See <http://philpapers.org/surveys/> for results of 
Bourget and Chalmers’ survey; see also Bourget and Chalmers (2013) for a discussion of the results. 
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great concern to restrict the natural sphere in accordance with the needs or the 
demands of natural-scientific inquiry. 
 This becomes apparent once we start to consider more controversial cases, 
such as (to borrow a list from De Caro (2010) again) ‘values, abstract entities, modal 
concepts, or conscious phenomena’ (p. 367). With regard to these and other such 
philosophically controversial phenomena, naturalistic positions that make appeal to 
science oftentimes do so in order to justify an exclusion of certain kinds of entity 
from the parameters of an exclusively ‘natural’ reality. 
 When I refer to positions that appeal to science to qualify their naturalism, I 
have in mind what I will call ‘scientific naturalism’, the view that our account of 
what falls within the domain of the natural ‘should be shaped by science, and by 
science alone (so that a complete natural science would in principle account for all 
accountable aspects of reality)’ (De Caro 2010, p. 368).   
 It is worth noting that one might accept that everything that is natural is 
explicable by science without accepting that ‘science’ here refers to current science.  
We see this in the thought of those philosophers, such as John Searle (2007), David 
Chalmers (1996) or Galen Strawson (2008), who claim that at some future stage 
natural science will have to find a way to explain consciousness that is neither 
reductive nor eliminative if our scientific understanding of immanent reality is to be 
wholly adequate. However, such positions, insofar as they argue for a reform of 
current science on the basis of beliefs about what kinds of things we have reason to 
posit, are not instances of scientific naturalism in the above sense. This is because 
their view of what there is is not shaped by science alone, but by other commitments, 
such that these other commitments can be taken to guide reform of scientific ideas 
and practice. Such positions might be termed instead ‘liberal naturalisms’ (De Caro 
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2010), since they generally speaking are happy to embrace the entities the existence 
of which is suggested to us by current natural science, but also further entities the 
status of which is less clear.   
Full-blooded scientific naturalism, then, is generally a relatively restrictive 
position. For the scientific naturalist, the appeal of metaphysical naturalism is its 
parsimony and restraint. Not that such a position is restrained in its revisionary 
ambitions. When science alone dictates our account of what there is, a great deal of 
revision of the categories of our so-called ‘folk metaphysics’ is going to be 
necessary.
15
 And it is just such activity with which the great many ‘naturalising X’ 
projects that populate the contemporary philosophical field are occupied; namely, 
trying to discern how ‘intuitive’ positions need to be revised in order to be 
accommodated by a scientific image of the world.  
 
2.3 Deleuze as ‘liberal naturalist’? 
Where, if anywhere, does Deleuze’s ontological monism fit into this picture?  In the 
context of the logical space of naturalistic positions sketched briefly above, Deleuze 
may well strike us as a defender of the inclusiveness of the natural, as some species 
of ‘liberal’ naturalist. This impression is only reinforced by considering the second 
                                                 
15
 The idea of ‘folk metaphysics’ is one that has developed out of a more general idea of ‘folk 
theories’, understood to be ‘untutored people’s (often implicit) theories about various features of the 
world’ (Livengood and Machery 2007, p. 107). This notion of folk theories is generally speaking 
deployed by naturalistic philosophers with the intention of distinguishing between scientific and folk 
theories or concepts. The idea of folk metaphysics is one that has begun to gain purchase in recent 
years due to the growing interest in experimental philosophy and its application of social-scientific 
methods to traditionally philosophical questions. 
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aspect of Deleuze’s early treatment of the theme of immanence, namely his 
Naturalism. Let us briefly outline some pertinent aspects of the latter position.  
We first see hints of the position Deleuze will identify as Naturalism in 1956, 
in the review of his teacher Ferdinand Alquié’s work, Descartes, l’homme et 
l’œuvre, published in the literary review Cahiers du Sud. In this review, Deleuze 
discusses Alquié’s reading of Descartes, and one can see taking form components of 
the Cartesian, mechanistic view of nature that he will criticise in print twelve years 
later in Spinoza and the Problem of Expression. Deleuze was working on the 
secondary doctoral thesis that would be published in 1968 as Spinoza and the 
Problem of Expression already in the mid-1950s, and under the supervision of 
Alquié, who would teach on Spinoza in 1958 and ’59 – so it is plausible that 
Deleuze’s reading of Alquié on Descartes will have been formative for his later 
critique of Cartesianism (see Dosse 2010, p. 110).   
 In the review, Deleuze foregrounds how nature, conceived ‘as a spatial, 
actual and mechanical system’ by Cartesian physics, is thereby ‘deprived of its 
thickness [épaisseur], of its potentialities [virtualités], of its qualities, of its 
spontaneity’ (FAD, p. 474). But nature alone cannot therefore be sufficient, he 
continues, as this ‘thickness’ constitutes the very ‘Being’ of the real. He cites Alquié: 
‘one should not deprive the world of being without discovering elsewhere this being 
the evidence of which is primary in every mind’ (FAD, p. 474). It is in order to 
reintroduce this dynamism into a world seemingly depleted of it that Descartes turns 
to mental and ultimately divine substances: ‘nature will be subordinated to the 
cogito, and the cogito subordinated to God, from whom its being is derived’ (FAD, 
p. 474). In this way, ‘[t]he world rediscovers its substantiality’, but only by 
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appealing to kinds of being that cannot be accommodated by the domain of the 
natural (FAD, p. 474). 
Deleuze does not adopt a particularly critical stance towards Alquié’s 
Cartesianism in the 1956 review, but in 1968, when the thesis he had worked on 
under Alquié’s supervision was published, we see him take his distance from the 
position sketched in the review, characterising the ‘common project’ of ‘the 
Anticartesian reaction’ undertaken by Spinoza and Leibniz as ‘a new “naturalism”’ 
(SPE, p. 207/p. 227).  
This Naturalism is explicitly formulated against the Cartesian understanding 
of the ‘venture of a mathematical mechanical science’ which, Deleuze contends with 
reference to Alquié, ‘dominated the first half of the seventeenth century’ (SPE, p. 
207/p. 227). The effect of Cartesian physics ‘was to devaluate Nature by taking away 
from it any virtuality or potentiality, any immanent power, any inherent being’, an 
effect Cartesian metaphysics sought to mitigate, supplementing inert nature by 
positing ‘Being outside Nature, in a subject which thinks it and a God who creates it’ 
(SPE, p. 207/p. 227). Here we see a reprise of the account of Cartesianism outlined 
in the 1956 review (and with explicit reference made to Alquié). The anti-Cartesian 
Naturalist project, then, ‘is a matter of re-establishing the claims [les droits] of a 
Nature endowed with forces or power [puissance]’, ‘restoring to Nature the force of 
action and passion [pâtir]’ (SPE, p. 207/p. 228). Where Cartesian nature is not 
sufficient without the super- or extra-natural supplement of human and divine 
subjectivity, Naturalism seeks to conceive nature as ‘sufficient unto itself’.16 
                                                 
16
 I take this latter phrase from Deleuze’s 1954 review of Jean Hyppolite’s Logic and Existence 
(Hyppolite 1997, p. 193).  In fact, Deleuze refers not to nature here, but to ‘this world’, although I 
  
217 
 
There are other aspects of Deleuze’s characterisation of Naturalism to which 
I will return later (particularly its ethical dimension). For now, I simply want to note 
that it is easy to read Deleuze as pushing here for a more inclusive naturalism, one 
that does not index ‘naturalness’ to an overly restrictive mechanistic materialism. 
And indeed, various commentators have read Deleuze’s call to incorporate into our 
conception of the natural some conception of ‘power’, ‘force’ or ‘inherent being’ in 
excess of mechanism as some form of ‘vitalism’.17 Though interpreters keen to 
defend Deleuze’s ‘vitalism’ have tended to emphasise that ‘Deleuze is not vitalistic 
in any technical sense of espousing a non-material intelligent guiding force, a “vital 
principle” or “life force” or “entelechy”’, it is nevertheless argued that his vitalistic 
conception of nature eschews ‘“mechanism”, that is, the law-bound repetition of 
physical events’, because it is a consequence of a mechanistic conception of nature 
that ‘creativity [is] shuffled off from dead matter into some spiritual realm’ (Protevi 
2012, pp. 247-249).
18
 If we are to avoid the emergence of this opposition between 
the blind mechanism of matter and the creative spontaneity of the mind that gives it 
meaning, the thought runs, then nature, that is to say, matter itself, must be 
                                                                                                                                          
take it that no significant difference in meaning is implied (Hyppolite 1997, p. 193). ‘[T]here is no 
“beyond” of the world’, he also states (Hyppolite 1997, p. 193).   
17
 This is a term Deleuze himself encourages later in his writings. In 1988, in an interview with 
Raymond Bellour and François Ewald for the literary review Magazine Littéraire, Deleuze (1995) 
suggests that ‘everything I’ve written is vitalistic’ (p. 143). With this remark, no doubt intended as 
much to provoke as to describe, he means to indicate that his work explores ‘the power of nonorganic 
life’, a life that is ‘more than personal’ and which finds expression in the ‘cracks’ wrought by the 
work of art (be it visual, musical or literary – with the implication that philosophy, should it succeed 
in being genuinely ‘vital’ in this ‘nonorganic’ sense, would fall into the category of literary art) 
(Deleuze 1995, p. 143). 
18
 See also Ansell Pearson (1999) and Colebrook (2010). 
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conceived as ‘autonomous, self-constituting, and creative’ (as something akin to ‘the 
natura naturans of Spinoza or the will to power of Nietzsche’) (Protevi 2012, p. 
249). Connecting these themes to Deleuze’s discussion of ‘larval subjects’ in chapter 
2 of Difference and Repetition, Deleuze is likewise read as a panpsychist, with 
mindedness treated as an irreducible feature of all matter – essentially a different 
way of phrasing the same, vitalist thesis (see Protevi 2013, chaps 8 and 9). 
Here we see an attempt to situate Deleuze’s Naturalism clearly in the liberal 
naturalist camp of the contemporary debate about naturalism.
19
 This is not done in a 
way that eschews science, but has more in common with those philosophers who 
proselytise for a reform of science to render it more open to the irreducibility of 
mind, life and creativity.
20
 As I have already noted, however, although such a liberal 
naturalism need display no hostility towards science, it does at least imply a 
metaphysical orientation according to which science is not the only thing shaping our 
account of what there is. This certainly does not seem to be a position motivated by 
the desire to let the claims of current science discipline metaphysical speculation. 
                                                 
19
 Panpsychism being precisely the sort of claim liberal naturalists are eager for a more inclusive 
conception of naturalism to accommodate. See Strawson (2008) and Chalmers (1996). 
20
 I will not take up the question here of the soundness of the reasoning that lies behind the defence of 
this neo-vitalism.  I will simply note my concern that this view that a purely ‘mechanistic’ account 
cannot do justice to mind, life and creativity, so that the latter must instead be thought of as 
irreducible phenomena, risks failing to appreciate the power of Darwinism as an explanatory model 
for how seemingly (or even perhaps really) purposive activity and the proliferating diversity of 
biological forms and functions can arise mechanically in precisely the sense indicated above, namely 
through ‘the law-bound repetition of physical events’ (see Dennett 1995). Thus, the project of 
reconceiving ‘nature’ in such a manner as to salvage ‘creativity’ from the ‘dead matter’ that would 
fate it to either elimination or mystification seems to me grounded in an evasion of a thoroughgoing 
confrontation with the full philosophical significance of Darwinism. For a dissenting view, see Ansell 
Pearson et al. (2010, §6) and Miquel (2010). This is, however, an argument for another occasion. 
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Where have I arrived so far? In trying to discern how Deleuze’s commitment 
to closed immanence might relate to a notion of closed immanence associated by 
some philosophers with modern science, I have begun to situate Deleuze in the 
context of contemporary debates concerning how properly to formulate closed 
immanence (or naturalism) and its relation to science. Considering in outline 
Deleuze’s two early formulations of closed immanence – the univocity of being and 
Naturalism – I have so far suggested that Deleuze’s is a fairly minimal, liberal and 
unrestrictive position, operating with a broad and inclusive conception of the natural. 
This seems to place him in the same camp as those philosophers – liberal naturalists 
– who do not see naturalism as a philosophical consequence of natural science, but 
rather as an independent philosophical commitment with potential consequences for 
natural science. In particular, there seem to be controversial phenomena, often 
controversial because their place in contemporary scientific theorising is unclear, 
which such liberal naturalists maintain independent philosophical reasons for 
positing, with the consequence that they encourage science to find a place for these 
phenomena rather than taking science as requiring the philosopher to find ways to 
eliminate such phenomena. 
Something that should give pause, however, is that the way in which the 
clash between liberal and scientific naturalism is set up in the contemporary debate is 
such as to put in question Deleuze’s alignment with the former pole of the debate. As 
De Caro (2010) notes, a ‘point of general disagreement between scientific and liberal 
naturalists’ is ‘how great a role [to give] to the concepts of the so-called […] 
“manifest image”’ (p. 372). Here, De Caro refers to Wilfrid Sellars’ (1963) 
influential distinction between ‘the manifest and the scientific images of man-in-the-
world’ (pp. 4-5 [original emphasis]), or between the self-image we derive from ‘the 
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framework of sophisticated common sense’ and from that of ‘theoretical science’ 
respectively (p. 19). De Caro (2010) understands liberal naturalism’s attempt to 
maintain a naturalism in which the boundaries of the natural are not determined by 
science as an attempt ‘to vindicate the agential perspective [i.e. the manifest image] 
as a whole, by proving that [its] concepts (or at least most of them) are legitimate, 
necessary, ineliminable, and that they cannot be reduced to scientific concepts’ (p. 
374).  
Although some have read Deleuze’s vitalism or panpsychism as an example 
of just such a project,
21
 in my estimation Deleuze seems a poor match with this genre 
of motivations for liberal naturalism. Furthermore, I want to argue that such readings 
fail to grasp how Deleuze’s concern with ontological monism diverges from the 
dynamic of the contemporary naturalism debate about how metaphysically restrictive 
closed immanence ought to be and what role science has to play in determining the 
nature of this restrictiveness. The latter debate goes back and forth between different 
views about which kinds of entity ought to be privileged or prioritised as starting 
points in relation to which to orientate theorising about what kinds of entities can be 
taken to exist. The scientific naturalist takes the commitments of the natural sciences 
as her guide, while the liberal naturalist does not want to reject the manifest image as 
a privileged starting point for philosophising. The whole dynamic of this debate, 
however, cuts against the view Deleuze is trying to articulate as ontological monism. 
                                                 
21
 John Protevi (2012) seems to place Deleuze in something like this bracket. Another interesting case 
is Ray Brassier (2007, p. 162 ff.; 2008), who condemns Deleuze from the perspective of scientific 
naturalism for his purported anthropocentrism, his vitalism and panpsychism, privileging the manifest 
image over the scientific image. I will note the key problem with Brassier’s reading of Deleuze later, 
as it will become apparent in the course of my examination of why Deleuze does not fit comfortably 
with the sort of liberal naturalism described above.   
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This will become apparent once I have returned to Deleuze’s discussion of the 
univocity of being and explored in more detail (i) his motivations for endorsing 
ontological monism and (ii) the fully developed form of the position that he 
endorses. In the light of this more nuanced understanding of Deleuze’s concerns, it 
will become apparent that, while it is true that Deleuze is not a scientific naturalist, 
nor does he fit comfortably with the sort of motivations that are generally evident 
amongst contemporary liberal naturalists. 
 
3 Ontological monism and differential ontology 
I have noted that Deleuze’s ontological monism seems to some readers to come close 
to a liberal naturalism, or even to a bare anti-supernaturalism which, in a largely 
secular context such as that of the contemporary Anglophone philosophical 
community, risks appearing trivial, or at least uncontroversial. For Deleuze, 
however, ontological monism is far from trivial, as becomes apparent once one 
explores in more detail what he takes to be necessary for ontological monism to be 
fully thought through. Indeed, in a lecture course at Vincennes, Deleuze (1974) will 
go so far as to say that univocity is ‘the strangest thought, the most difficult to think’ 
(no pagination). Following Nietzsche, Deleuze sees transcendence as something that 
permeates our thought, and which will be expelled only with great difficulty and at 
great cost to the ways in which we are accustomed to thinking.
22
  He will go so far as 
to suggest that ontological pluralism has its roots in the structures of thought and 
                                                 
22
 ‘After Buddha was dead, they still showed his shadow in a cave for centuries – a tremendous, 
gruesome shadow. God is dead; but given the way people are, there may still for millennia be caves in 
which they show his shadow. – And we – we must defeat his shadow as well!’ (Nietzsche 2001, 
§108) 
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experience that constitute our identity as subjects of knowledge, such that an 
excision of the extra-natural will require us to give up what seems nearest to us, the 
coherence and persistence of our own selfhood.
23
 It is in this sense that Deleuze 
contends that ‘[m]an did not survive God [l’homme n’y survit pas à Dieu]’ (DR, p. 
1/p. xix).
24
 
 To clarify what Deleuze is driving at here, it is necessary to go back to his 
account of the univocity of being and bring out in more detail his reasoning and 
motivations. I have noted that, whilst he takes his cue from the medieval debate 
concerning the status of God’s being in relation to the being of His creatures, 
Deleuze wants to trace this debate back to its roots in Aristotelian metaphysics. 
Deleuze sees ontological pluralism as a natural consequence of internal problems 
within the Aristotelian metaphysical edifice, and the analogy of being as a patch, that 
is, an attempt to accommodate the unity and universality of being within the 
constraints generated by the system in place. Arriving at ontological monism, and 
thereby finally excluding the transcendent, will thus require us to exit from the 
framework of Aristotelian metaphysics, something which, according to Deleuze, is 
far easier said than done given how deeply such a metaphysical framework sits in 
our thought. 
                                                 
23
 It will be necessary in what follows to bear in mind my discussion in chapter 2, where I explained 
Deleuze’s view of representational structure as both the structure of cognition and constitutive of our 
identity as subjects of cognition. As I will show, Deleuze takes ontological pluralism to be rooted in 
this representational structure.  
24
 Here, Deleuze echoes Foucault’s (2002) influential sentiment from three years prior: ‘Nietzsche 
rediscovered the point at which man and God belong to one another, at which the death of the second 
is synonymous with the disappearance of the first, and at which the promise of the superman signifies 
first and foremost the imminence of the death of man’ (p. 373). 
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 Let us consider how Aristotelian metaphysics generates ontological 
pluralism.
25
 The aspect of Aristotelian metaphysics that interests Deleuze in this 
connection is its division or distribution of reality into a hierarchical structure of 
particular individuals subsumed under species that are in turn subsumed under 
genera.
26
 Deleuze states that this hierarchy can be thought of as a way of conceiving 
‘the manner in which being is distributed among beings [l’être se distribue aux 
étants]’ (DR, p. 365/p. 285), qualifying it as a ‘sedentary distribution’ of being (DR, 
p. 361/p. 282). The problem that generates ontological pluralism as its solution arises 
from the question of where to situate being in such a sedentary distribution. 
 What do I mean by ‘where’ to situate being in a sedentary distribution? 
Being, it seems plausible to say, is the most universal ‘property’ in the sense that it 
can be attributed to everything that is. Consider the aforementioned Aristotelian 
hierarchy, consisting of particulars grouped into species which are in turn grouped 
into genera: insofar as the hierarchy in question is precisely a hierarchy qualifying 
the nature of beings, it seems that ‘being’ must range over all the beings included in 
the hierarchy. Being, then, seems to be the highest genus, and thus the most general 
category (where ‘category’ is a term for the highest, i.e. most general, genera).   
                                                 
25
 It is not important for my purposes here whether Deleuze has presented a textually defensible 
reading of Aristotle. In this respect, ‘Aristotelian metaphysics’ is just a convenient shorthand for a set 
of views that I will define with reference to Deleuze’s presentation, without appealing to Aristotle’s 
texts. 
26
 Again, see chapter 2 of the present thesis, where I relate this structure to Deleuze’s talk of 
‘representation’. 
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However, here problems begin to arise. First of all, considered as the highest 
genus, it seems to be impossible to define what being is.
27
 This is because defining 
what something is in the context of a sedentary distribution involves distinguishing it 
from something else with which it shares its genus but not its species, thus locating it 
in the hierarchy of specific differences. ‘Being’, defined as the highest genus, has no 
genus under which it is subsumed and in relation to which it can be differentiated as 
but one species amongst others. Ontology, as a discourse on being qua being, seems 
therefore to be disbarred. 
Secondly, and perhaps more pressingly, treating being as the highest genus 
also generates problems relating to the being of specific differences. As Somers-Hall 
(2012b) notes, within a sedentary distribution, ‘a difference cannot be the same kind 
of thing as what it differentiates’, because ‘[i]f it were, then the question would arise 
of how we differentiate the difference itself from the class of things it is a difference 
of’ (p. 339). In the case of being qua highest genus, this is problematic if we want to 
say that the differences that divide the genus ‘being’ also are, since this would 
require that these ‘differences […] be of the same type as the genera they 
differentiate’ (Somers-Hall 2012b, p. 339). This, as Deleuze illustrates with 
reference to the definition of a human being as a rational animal, would be ‘as if 
animal was said at one time of the human species, but at another of the difference 
“rational” in constituting another species’ (DR, p. 49/p. 32). In other words, treating 
being as the highest genus seems to disrupt the structure of the hierarchy of 
                                                 
27
 This, as Somers-Hall (2012b, pp. 339-341) notes, is why Heidegger, in attempting to pose the 
Seinsfrage and thereby overcome what he sees as a long history of Seinsvergessenheit, begins with the 
Aristotelian insight that ‘[t]he “universality” of “being” is not that of genus’: ‘“Being” does not 
delimit the highest region of beings so far as they are conceptually articulated according to genus and 
species […] The “universality” of being “surpasses” the universality of genus’ (Heidegger 1996, p. 2). 
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determination sedentary distribution aims to present, as being seems to have to move 
from one level of the hierarchy to another in order for us to attribute it to everything 
in the hierarchy to which we want to attribute it (i.e. also to the differences that 
differentiate the genus being). Thus, ‘Being itself is not a genus […] because 
differences are’ (DR, p. 49/p. 32 [original emphasis]). 
If being is treated as the highest, or most general, genus, then, we not only 
face difficulties with maintaining the hierarchical ordering of specific differences 
that is supposed to determine things to be what they are within a sedentary 
distribution (i.e. determine their being), but it seems that we are left without any way 
to define being itself. How might one respond to these difficulties? Assuming that it 
is unappealing to deny that being is differentiated (i.e. that there are differences),
28
 it 
seems that it is necessary to reject the claim that being is a genus.
29
 How can such a 
denial best be made sense of? 
One way to make sense of it is to see it as a rejection of the notion of being 
altogether. The problems generated by the very notion of a highest genus might be 
seen – in something like a Wittgensteinian spirit – to be symptomatic of generic 
difficulties that inevitably befall any such attempt to try to deploy language in order 
to speak about something as general as ‘being’. Aristotle accepts that being cannot 
be thought of as a highest genus, arguing rather that the hierarchy of sedentary 
distribution peaks with multiple most general genera, the categories. There are thus 
multiple ways of being, but no highest genus of being itself. This is the position I 
                                                 
28
 For a reading of Spinoza as espousing something like this view, see Della Rocca (2012). 
29
 It is of course also possible to deny that it is being that is the highest genus, without denying that 
there is a highest genus. However, this would not only leave us with the difficult question of what 
could possibly be more generally applicable to beings than being, but would ultimately simply push 
these problems associated with the highest genus onto another category. 
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have termed ontological pluralism, and as I have noted above with regard to negative 
theology and the equivocity of being, it can simply be left unqualified in such a way 
that we lose any real sense that the various branches of the hierarchy of sedentary 
distribution form a single reality. If we take this road, however, then the Aristotelian 
account of the being of beings in terms of a nested hierarchy of generalities seems to 
risk losing its grip on its own raison d’être, as this account of how ‘being is 
distributed among beings’ terminates in a dissolution of both the notion of being and 
the idea that there is a single domain of beings amongst which it might have been 
distributed. 
This is how one might arrive at the tempered ontological pluralism we see in 
the notion of the analogy of being. The unity or totality of reality as a single domain 
of beings is preserved by treating the relations between the highest genera or 
categories as ‘relations of analogy’; the unity of being in virtue of which everything 
that is can be thought of as belonging to the same domain is a unity of analogy (DR, 
p. 52/p. 34). What this means (as I have already noted above) is that although ‘being’ 
is said in many senses (i.e. the categories), ‘these uses are related to a central usage, 
or focal meaning’ (Somers-Hall 2012b, p. 340). In Aristotle’s case, ‘[e]verything that 
is is somehow related to the sense of being as οὐσία’ (de Beistegui 2004, p. 236), 
‘designating beings in their presence (or permanence) and essence’ (p. 1). 
What the above consideration of the arguments that lead Deleuze to try to 
think through a coherent ontological monism demonstrate is that ontological 
pluralism of one stripe or another is a natural consequence of a way of ‘distributing 
being’ that is extremely familiar and, according to Deleuze, characteristic of our 
ordinary cognitive activity. Ontological pluralism is not a peculiar or extreme thesis, 
then, but one which follows naturally from the attempt to rigorously codify the 
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structures of our ordinary thought, at least once we confront the internal problems 
such structures generate around the notion of being. This is one sense in which, for 
Deleuze, ontological monism is far from trivial. In what follows, I want to explore a 
second sense in which ontological monism is not trivial, namely its difficulty and the 
demands it places on us to revise the ordinary structures of thought that force us to 
adopt ontological pluralism. 
What needs to be considered now, then, is how Deleuze relates ontological 
monism to the philosophy of difference. The straightforward answer is that he 
identifies being and difference. However, this is going to require a fair amount of 
unpacking before it is remotely illuminating. 
I have already noted that the univocity of being is connected with difference, 
insofar as it can be thought of as the thesis that no two beings are so different that 
they cannot be said to be in the same sense. Furthermore, I have shown that the 
notion of the analogy of being is a response to problems arising from an attempt to 
understand the being of entities – what makes entities the entities that they are – in 
terms of a division of being into a hierarchy of specific and generic differences, 
specifically from a dissatisfaction with the dismissal of the unity of reality as in 
some sense a whole seemingly implied by a bare or unmoderated ontological 
pluralism. Thus, the status of difference and differences seems to be key for thinking 
through ontological monism; and indeed, it is through the concept of difference that 
Deleuze will approach the question of how to formulate the most effective and 
coherent concept of univocal being. 
The way in which he uses this approach can be explicated by considering his 
account of Spinoza’s formulation of ontological monism. Ontological monism, 
Deleuze claims, ‘rest[s] on two fundamental theses’ (DR, p. 387/p. 303). Firstly, 
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while ‘there are indeed forms of being, […] these forms involve no division within 
being or plurality of ontological senses’ (DR, p. 387/p. 303). Deleuze will also 
express this by saying that the ‘real distinction’ between these forms or ways of 
being ‘is a formal, not a numerical distinction’ (DR, p. 388/p. 303).30 Secondly, ‘that 
of which being is said is distributed [réparti] by essentially mobile individuating 
differences which necessarily endow “each one” [i.e. each entity] with a plurality of 
modal significations’ (DR, p. 387/p. 303 [translation modified]). That is, ‘the 
numerical distinction between “beings [étants]” is a modal, not a real distinction’ 
(DR, p. 388/pp. 303-304).
31
 What these two theses express is that though there is 
indeed a plurality of entities and a plurality of ways of being, these differences do 
not imply that being is plural; these are differences (between forms and between 
modalities) within a single and same being.
32
   
 It is in his substance monism that Spinoza expresses his conception of the 
univocity of being: with Spinoza, ‘[u]nivocal being becomes identical with unique, 
universal and infinite substance’ (DR, p. 58/p. 40). For Deleuze, it is crucial that we 
not read substance monism as the elimination of differences. Rather, it is the way 
that these differences (between things, between ways of being and between the 
degrees of intensity with which things express these ways of being) are conceived as 
                                                 
30
 Deleuze clarifies the notion of formal distinction in Spinoza and the Problem of Expression: 
‘Formal distinction is definitely real distinction, expressing as it does the different layers of reality 
that form or constitute a being. […] But it is a minimally real distinction because the two really 
distinct quiddities are coordinate, together making a single being. Real and yet not numerical, such is 
the status of formal distinction’ (SPE, p. 55/p. 64 [original emphasis]). 
31
 ‘[M]odes being in something else’ – as opposed to ‘substance’, which is ‘in itself’ – Deleuze seems 
to use ‘modal distinction’ here to refer to a distinction within one thing (SPE, p. 22/p. 29). 
32
 ‘Detached from all numerical distinction, real distinction is carried into the absolute, and becomes 
capable of expressing the difference within Being’ (SPE, p. 32/p. 39 [translation modified]). 
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expressions of a single substance which, for Deleuze, is the key to the Spinozistic 
formulation of ontological monism.   
Spinoza thus realises the two sides of ontological monism (noted above) by 
displacing the sedentary distribution of being into species and genera with a 
distribution of being into modes and attributes. So, ‘from the beginning of the 
Ethics’, it becomes clear  
 
(i) ‘that the attributes [i.e. the basic forms or ways of being] are irreducible 
to genera or categories because while they are formally distinct they all 
remain […] ontologically one, and introduce no division into the 
substance which is said or expressed through them in a single and same 
sense’ (DR, pp. 387-388/p. 303 [original emphasis]); and  
 
(ii) ‘that the modes [i.e. numerically distinct degrees of intensity] are 
irreducible to species because they are distributed within attributes 
according to individuating differences which […] immediately relate 
them to univocal being’ (DR, p. 388/p. 303 [original emphasis]). 
 
By substituting formal and modal difference for generic and specific difference, 
then, Spinoza is able ‘to understand all differences […], however great, as 
themselves constituting the character of being’ qua singular substance (Moore 2015, 
p. 7). ‘On the Spinozist approach, it is not just that any mention of the being of a 
thing is to be understood as a reference to one particular entity’ (substance), but that 
‘any mention of the multiplicity and diversity of things’, or of the multiplicity and 
diversity of these things’ ways of being, ‘is to be understood as a reference to that 
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entity, whose essence is expressed in the very differences between them’ (Moore 
2015, p. 7). 
A still more complete and coherent formulation of ontological monism is 
possible, however, according to Deleuze, one in which there is no possibility of a 
reconstitution of the sorts of problems that arise from sedentary distribution and the 
consequent ontological pluralism. Deleuze’s aim here is to arrive at a position where 
‘being is no longer thought within an ontological separation between two different 
orders, from a certain dualism in need of subsequent bridging’ (de Beistegui 2004, p. 
239). With Spinozism, the possibility of the reopening of such a separation is not 
once and for all foreclosed, insofar as ‘Spinoza still believes in one privileged 
unified entity’, namely substance, ‘that is prior to all multiplicity, prior to all 
diversity, prior to all difference’ (Moore 2015, p. 8). An ontological inequality seems 
to remain, insofar as ‘substance appears independent of the modes, while the modes 
are dependent on substance, […] as though on something other than themselves’ 
(DR, p. 59/p. 40). Even if it is supposed to be the case that substance is its own cause 
in the same way that it is the cause of its modes, that it is self-causing (causa sui) 
seems to threaten to put substance at too great a distance from the modes.   
Deleuze’s sense that there is a need to push beyond the Spinozist formulation 
of ontological monism, I submit, can be seen as a consequence of his implicit 
acknowledgement of the value of Heidegger’s critique of onto-theology. As Somers-
Hall (2012b) rightly states, ‘the constraints on thinking brought out in Heidegger’s 
analysis of the history of metaphysics’ and corresponding ‘critique of onto-theology’ 
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are ‘definitive of twentieth-century French philosophy’, and consequently ‘a major 
influence on Gilles Deleuze’s philosophy’ (p. 343).33   
Heidegger’s account of metaphysics as onto-theology is complex and makes 
a number of more or less concrete historical claims, but for present purposes it can 
be summarised as follows: in inquiring into the being of entities, metaphysicians 
have tended to pursue this question by determining an entity or kind of entity as an 
exemplar of what it is to be, an exemplarily existing entity, and understood the being 
of all other entities by reference to this eminently existing entity.
34
 The naturalness 
of such a move becomes apparent upon considering the nature of sedentary 
distribution as a distribution of being in accordance with a hierarchy of every 
increasing generality of kinds of entity. Such a structure seems to compel us to try to 
discern a most general kind of entity with which being in general can be identified. 
This is precisely the move one would be inclined to make if, in accordance with the 
requirements of sedentary distribution, one were operating under the assumption that 
differentiation can only be made sense of if the differences in question are subsumed 
under a prior identity, the identity of a superior generality.   
Heidegger’s concern is that conceiving of the task of metaphysics as an 
attempt to discern the highest kind of entity, or the kind of being which exists 
exemplarily, involves a conflation of being (das Sein) and beings or what there is 
(das Seiende) – the difference between which he terms the ‘ontological difference’. 
                                                 
33
 See also Thomson (2005): ‘However controversial this central doctrine of the later Heidegger 
[namely, that occidental metaphysics has taken the form of onto-theology] may be, it now forms a 
taken-for-granted point of philosophical departure for virtually every major practitioner of 
poststructuralism, postmodernism, and deconstruction’; it is ‘an unspoken presupposition of much 
recent continental philosophy’ (p. 10). 
34
 For an illuminating account of Heidegger’s concept of onto-theology, see Thomson (2005, chap. 1). 
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If the ontological difference is neglected then being is all too easily obscured behind 
beings. Onto-theology involves a ‘forgetting’ of the ontological difference, and 
consequently an inability to take being as such as an object of investigation. 
Let us return to Deleuze. Deleuze’s desire to take heed of Heidegger’s 
concerns regarding the onto-theological constitution of metaphysics can be seen as a 
motivation for his move from a Spinozist to a Nietzschean formulation of 
ontological monism. There is a risk that substance, insofar as it is, as I noted above, 
‘one privileged unified entity’ (Moore 2015, p .8) with which being is to be 
identified, still exemplifies an onto-theological model, conceiving of being in terms 
of an exemplarily existent entity.
35
 While Deleuze does his utmost to convince that 
Spinoza’s substance monism escapes the difficulties of sedentary distribution, there 
does seem to be something of the latter configuration remaining in the notion of 
substance as an identity under which all differences are subsumed – and Deleuze’s 
move from Spinozist substance to Nietzschean eternal return should be read as 
acknowledging this.   
What is needed, Deleuze suggests, is that ‘[s]ubstance […] itself be said of 
the modes and only of the modes’ (DR, p. 59/p. 40 [original emphasis]). What this 
involves, in effect, is going directly to the source of the problems with sedentary 
distribution – namely how to understand both the universality of being and the being 
of differences – by identifying being directly with the process of differing by which 
it is distributed as differentiated entities. Things are insofar as they differ, such that 
                                                 
35
 Moore (2015, p. 10) also notes this connection between Deleuze’s ultimate rejection, or perhaps 
rather modification, of Spinozistic ontological monism in Difference and Repetition and his 
Heideggerian sympathies. Knox Peden’s (2014, chaps 6 and 7) reading of Deleuze’s ‘synthesis’ of 
Spinoza and Heidegger is also of interest here. 
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if ‘being’ names what is common to everything that is, then Deleuze’s conceptual 
gambit is to suggest that ‘what is common to all beings […] turns out to be 
difference’ (de Beistegui 2004, p. 235). Univocal being ‘is said of difference itself’ 
(DR, p. 388/p. 304). 
For Deleuze, then, it is not enough to seek a unifying concept of being in 
general that can clarify how all the different ways of being are different ways of 
being. In order to avoid the sort of difficulties that arise from sedentary distribution, 
and the theoretically unsatisfying preservation of the unity of being through a 
tempered ontological pluralism, characterising differences between genera in terms 
of relations of analogy, ‘we must […] understand how these differences themselves 
contribute to the fundamental character of being’ (Moore 2015, p. 4).  
Deleuze clarifies how he understands the notion of difference as being by 
identifying being with (a certain reading of) the Nietzschean notion of eternal return. 
‘[E]ternal return’, Deleuze states, ‘is the univocity of being’ (DR, p. 60/p. 41); we 
can only ‘realise univocity in the form of repetition in the eternal return’ (DR, p. 
388/p. 304 [original emphasis]).
36
 However, this is the case only on condition that 
eternal return is ‘said of that which differs and remains different’(DR, p. 165/p. 126).   
How does Deleuze understand eternal return, and what are the consequences 
of this view of univocal being as eternal return for the status of entities and for the 
status of our theorising about entities?  
                                                 
36
 In turning to eternal return in order to give an account of being that would not be onto-theological, 
Deleuze breaks with Heidegger’s verdict that Nietzsche’s notion of eternal return represents a kind of 
self-terminating apex of onto-theological thinking (see Thomson 2005, pp. 21-22; DR, p. 91/p. 66). 
He thus also rejects Heidegger’s claim that Nietzsche’s notion of pure becoming blocks the possibility 
of ontology, because it undermines any understanding of ‘being as such’ as what ‘remains “the same” 
beneath all change’, even in Heidegger’s re-wrought sense of ‘the same’ (Thomson 2005, p. 27; DR, 
p. 91/p. 66, p. 384/p. 301). 
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Eternal return, Deleuze tells us, is ‘the empty form of time’ (DR, p. 119/p. 
88). It is, in Philip Turetzky’s (1998) apt turn of phrase, time conceived as a 
‘rhythmic pulsation’, a ‘moment’ (though ‘not a temporal present’) ‘that arises again 
and again’, ‘continually differing from itself’ (pp. 112-113). ‘Being comes to be at 
every moment’, ‘[p]ast and future […] emerg[ing] together in each moment of 
becoming’.37 In a strict sense, we might say that, for Deleuze, there is no sameness, 
nothing that persists, in the transience of pure becoming. Yet, eternal return is ‘the 
closest approximation of a world of becoming to a world of being’ (Nietzsche 1968, 
p. 330 [original emphasis]). Eternal return is ‘the most radical form of change, but 
the form of change does not change’ (DR, p. 120/p. 89). This is why eternal return, 
as the perpetual emergence and disappearance of being at every moment, can play 
the role of a sort of reconceived substance: this returning of a moment where beings 
emerge and pass is the closest we get to a persistence in the midst of difference. 
There is something paradoxical about thinking about eternal return as ‘the same of 
the different’ (DR, p. 165/p. 126): ‘The self-reference of the moment [i.e. the 
pulsating moment of becoming that eternally returns] is only possible in its return, 
which separates it from itself and allows it to point to itself’ (Turetzky 1998, p. 114), 
which is, in effect, to say that the identity of the eternal return consists in its differing 
from itself.
38
 This may well be ‘deeply paradoxical’ (Moore 2012, p. 456 n. 11). But 
                                                 
37
 Turetzky (1998): 109. 
38
 Adrian Moore (2015) elaborates on this point in a helpful manner: ‘Nietzschean differing [i.e. 
eternal return] is not an entity at all. It cannot be said to differ from other entities. It cannot be said to 
differ from anything in the way in which entities differ from one another. On the other hand, it can in 
a way be said to differ. For there is a sense in which, in the differing of entities from one another, 
differing itself is ever different. [… In] a break with traditional grammar: it can be said to differ from 
itself’ (p. 19).  
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Deleuze does not take the emergence of such paradoxes to discredit the idea of 
univocal being as eternal return. This paradox points instead to this idea’s exceeding 
the limits of representational thinking on the one hand, and consequently to the 
aforementioned ‘difficulty’ of this thought on the other. 
Having shown how Deleuze’s differential ontological monism functions as a 
response to Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics as onto-theology, it is now easier to 
understand why Deleuze fails to fit comfortably within the terms of the 
contemporary debate concerning naturalism and its relation to the natural sciences. I 
have noted how these debates revolve around questions of how restrictive naturalism 
should be, and what should be the reference point in relation to which this restriction 
is decided. The key point is that the notion of restrictiveness in play here works on 
an onto-theological principle, since the restriction is justified by the election of some 
particular kind of entity as an exemplar of being. It is thus not a question, for 
Deleuze, of whether naturalism should be liberal or restrictive, since the latter debate 
boils down to a question of which kinds of beings should be afforded some 
privileged status as exemplars of reality. 
Hans Fink (2006) gives a clear account of this aspect of the contemporary 
debate, highlighting the fact that ‘restricted conceptions of nature can come in quite 
different, often competing versions’ (p. 204). What I have termed, following Mario 
De Caro, scientific naturalism and liberal naturalism above, Fink (2006) terms 
‘materialist naturalism’ and ‘idealist naturalism’ (p. 205). Both, he makes clear, are 
examples of what he calls restricted naturalism, which seeks to ‘identify nature with 
certain parts or sides of the world’, treating these as really real, or exemplarily 
existent, and explaining away other aspects of reality (Fink 2006, p. 209). On an 
unrestricted conception of naturalism, however, ‘[e]ven the greatest and deepest 
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differences are differences within nature rather than differences between nature and 
something else’ (Fink 2006, p. 210). Deleuze’s account of univocal being as eternal 
return is an attempt to think through the demands of such an unrestricted naturalism. 
It is thus a question of understanding what is demanded of an account of the domain 
of being as a single domain within which all entities can ‘equally’ be said to reside – 
Deleuze’s answer being that what is demanded is a general reversal of the order of 
priority of identity and difference, being and becoming. This position does not seek 
to legislate regarding what entities or kinds of entities there are, but only regarding 
the ontological status of entities or kinds of entities if these are to be thought of as 
being univocally. 
Hence, Deleuze’s account of ontological monism is operating on a different 
level to the contemporary naturalism debate. Where the latter is a debate about what 
kinds of things there are, Deleuze’s thesis concerns what it means for something to 
be at all, and thus what kind of status we are entitled to attribute to any posit of our 
theorising. Here we see again Deleuze’s observance of Heidegger’s critique of the 
onto-theological metaphysics’ forgetting of the ontological difference: Deleuze’s 
ontology is concerned not with beings but with being. 
Insofar as it is a thesis about the sense in which anything that is can be said to 
be, Deleuze’s ontological monism is a thesis with implications for the status of the 
entities and kinds of entities we posit in our theorising. It is here, then, that 
Deleuze’s ontological monism provides the reason for his conception of philosophy 
as concept creation. The idea of arriving at a final conceptual framework that would 
provide us with a correct account of what there is is one that is undermined by 
ontological monism, according to Deleuze’s claim that a fully realised ontological 
monism will understand being as eternal return. All identities are swept away by the 
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transience of becoming just as soon as they are created, and no conceptual 
framework can be anything but an attempt to capture a snapshot of this transience. 
Univocal being exceeds the representational order of concepts. If philosophical 
concepts are able to extricate themselves from this order, it is insofar as the gesture 
of critique that engenders properly philosophical thinking allows these concepts to 
draw their vitality from the expression of the creative becoming of reality itself. 
Deleuze’s metaphilosophy is thus a consequence of his ontology, as it is ontological 
monism that demands a conception of philosophy as critical concept creation. It is 
also this connection that allows us to understand in what sense Deleuze’s is a 
transcendental ontology: being qua transcendental field conditions the production of 
concepts in such a way as to impose constraints on what significance we can 
legitimately take them to have, particularly what sort of relation to the world they 
can have. 
 
Conclusion 
What conclusions can be drawn regarding the relation between Deleuzian 
immanence and the sorts of immanence we might associate with modern science? As 
discussed above, to the extent that modern science can be related to what might be 
termed immanence, it is as an index for what counts as immanent or natural. The 
epistemic privilege of science can be used to justify an ontological constraint on 
what kinds of things ought to be accepted as existent. Deleuze, I have sought to 
argue, is not interested in any such manoeuvre.  
 Deleuzian immanence has a distinctly Kantian flavour, in the sense that a 
commitment to such immanence is a commitment to not regard one’s theorising as 
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capable of reaching beyond certain bounds.
39
 Specifically, we theorise immanently, 
for Deleuze, when we create concepts without believing it to be possible to produce 
a final and complete conceptualisation, and without believing that the reality which 
triggers our theorising is either structured like our conceptualisations or wholly 
formless. As I have shown in chapter 2, this is what it means to not be deceived, led 
into error, by the transcendental illusions that inevitably emerge from our position as 
subjects of representation. 
 Far from his notion of immanence being a response to new demands placed 
on philosophy by the sciences, Deleuze’s post-Kantian philosophical theorising 
produces a set of constraints on the status that can be assigned to any conceptual 
framework, including those produced by science, if a covert appeal to the 
transcendent is to be disbarred.   
 If Deleuze’s motivation is not the impact of the sciences, then what is it? 
Deleuze has two kinds of motivations in pursuing his ontological monism, with all 
its peculiar and paradoxical consequences. First of all, he has a theoretical 
motivation, namely the a priori problems he detects in ontologies based on a 
sedentary distribution of being. Such ontologies either terminate in ontological 
pluralism, foreclosing the possibility of ontology as a discourse on being qua being 
in the first place; or they make some appeal to the analogical unity of being, which 
Deleuze takes to be an unsatisfying, compensatory strategy for trying to avoid 
embracing either a fully worked through account of the single sense of being or the 
                                                 
39
 Christian Kerslake (2004) is thus correct to argue that Deleuzian immanence should not be 
identified with ‘metaphysical materialism’ – the ‘most likely […] form’ taken by the ‘regression to a 
precritical kind of metaphysics […] in the wake of the […] “speculative death of God” wrought by 
Kant’ – but should rather be understood as ‘in the service of a basic post-Kantian framework’ (pp. 
483-484). 
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full consequences of a fragmentation of being into multiple incommensurable 
domains. These are the ideas we have primarily been exploring in the course of this 
chapter.   
On a theoretical front, then, I would argue that Deleuze’s considerations are 
metaphysical in character, which is to say that he is engaged in a priori reasoning 
and argumentation, involving no essential appeal to empirical considerations. This is 
paradigmatic ‘armchair’ philosophising. 
Deleuze’s motivations are not purely theoretical, however: his exploration of 
the demands of thinking ontological monism also has a powerful ethical 
motivation.
40
 Representational philosophy, Deleuze suggests in Difference and 
Repetition, has, at root, a moral motivation.
41
 Behind sedentary distribution, there is 
‘a moral vision of the world’ (DR, p. 166/p. 127). The key to this moralism is the 
onto-theological gesture of electing an exemplary existent and understanding the 
being of all entities in terms of their relation to this privileged entity. We see the 
moralistic significance of this gesture ‘in its purest state’, Deleuze claims, in Plato 
(DR, p. 166/p. 127). In the Platonic theory of Ideas, ‘[t]he function of the notion of 
the model [or Idea] is not to oppose the world of images in its entirety but to select 
the good images […] and eliminate the bad images’, that is, to select and valorise 
those entities with the appropriate relation of mimetic proximity to the ‘originary 
superior identity’ of the Ideas (DR, pp. 165-166/pp. 126-127). Platonism is a search 
                                                 
40
 Contra Levi Bryant, who suggests that it is possible to give a complete account of ‘Deleuze’s 
metaphysics which makes no reference to his ethics’ (Bryant 2008, p. ix). On the relation between 
Deleuze’s commitment to immanence and his ethics, see Smith (2012b, pp. 284-286). 
41
 Deleuze follows Nietzsche on this point: ‘the moral (or immoral) intentions in every philosophy 
constitute the true living seed from which the whole plant has always grown’ (Nietzsche 2002, §6). 
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for purity,
42
 for the greatest possible approximation of all things to those exemplars 
in terms of which their being is defined. The world is envisaged as a hierarchy of 
gradations of perfection based on proximity to certain fixed, transcendent paradigms 
(DR, p. 166/p. 127). 
To this moral vision of the world, Deleuze wants to oppose ‘the ethical vision 
of the world’ that accompanies ontological monism (SPE, chap. 16). This is an ethics 
based around each thing’s cultivation of its own powers, without reference to an 
ideal or model of perfection in relation to which the thing itself would be merely 
derivative, or indeed in relation to which this cultivation could be a failure. As de 
Beistegui (2010) states, for Deleuze, ‘the ethical […] question, [… i]nstead of asking 
what we ought to do, […] asks what we can do’ (p. 107). ‘Ethics is a matter of 
power, not duty’ (de Beistegui 2010, p. 107). I will not explore this ethics of the 
cultivation of power in any further detail here. What is relevant is simply to note the 
role such an ethics plays in motivating Deleuze’s search for a maximally coherent 
account of ontological monism – of what it means to be in a world where no specific 
kind of entity is privileged, where everything is in the same sense. 
In his essay on Lucretius, Deleuze (1961) suggests a certain relation between 
the theoretical and practical dimensions of this project: ‘Everything happens as if 
physics [i.e. theoretical philosophy] was a means subordinated to practice, but 
practice is powerless to realise its end without this means that it would not discover 
alone’ (p. 25). If ethics thus requires ontology as a means to its end, it is insofar as – 
in the Epicurean terms of the essay – ‘practice realises its own end only by 
denouncing false infinity’ (Deleuze 1961, p. 25). What is suggested here, then, is a 
                                                 
42
 See Deleuze (1988), where he points to ‘[t]he obsession with the pure’ as a point of affinity 
between Bergson and Plato (p. 22). 
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model of the division of labour in philosophy whereby it is ultimately practical or 
ethical ends that are pursued, but through the essential mediation of theoretical or 
speculative philosophy, insofar as these ethical ends can only be achieved by a 
critique of the speculative illusions that obfuscate them. Arguably, this ethical 
dimension to Deleuze’s philosophy puts even greater distance between his thought 
and those contemporary naturalists who see their embrace of some form of closed 
immanence as motivated primarily or solely by the epistemic power of the 
sciences.
43
 
These two types of motivations for immanence – the theoretical, a priori 
critique of transcendence and its ethical critique – indicate that Deleuze’s 
engagement with immanence is thoroughly philosophical in character and seems to 
make little reference to the sciences. It is not at all clear that immanence, as Deleuze 
understands it, is a constraint that will seem terribly amenable to scientists, and 
certainly not to contemporary scientific naturalists, whose view it would seem to 
strongly undercut. Deleuze has quite other concerns than producing the ontology of 
contemporary science. 
                                                 
43
 Although there is room to doubt whether scientific naturalism can consistently have a purely 
epistemic motivation, as Taylor (2007, p. 363 ff.) has argued. 
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Conclusion 
Deleuze, Continental Naturalism and the 
Ideal of a Scientific Philosophy 
 
 
 
In the present thesis, I have examined various aspects of the project Deleuze pursues 
in the course of his early work, with a view to demonstrating the separation between 
philosophy and science in operation there, and the limited role of science in his early 
metaphilosophical ruminations. In the following conclusion, I will (i) summarise the 
argument of this thesis; and (ii) indicate its broader significance for (a) Deleuze’s 
role in contemporary narratives regarding the future of ‘continental philosophy’, and 
(b) his possible contribution to mainstream metaphilosophical debates about the 
nature of philosophical practice. 
The question of the role of science for philosophy and the distinction between 
philosophy and the sciences is one that has challenged philosophers for as long as a 
distinction between natural science and philosophy has been apparent. Even prior to 
the broader cultural recognition and institutionalisation of natural science as science 
rather than philosophy, the experimental and mathematical tendencies within natural 
philosophy that would eventually form the basis of modern science as a distinct area 
of intellectual activity would pose a challenge to established modes of philosophical 
practice (see Anstey and Vanzo 2012; Schliesser 2011). They pose a challenge 
because as science emerges out of philosophy, a question arises as to the need for 
such a break and the value of what remains. In a cultural and intellectual 
environment in which the value of scientific research culture is increasingly an 
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assumption, the need for the sciences to break with philosophy in order to fully 
‘become what they are’ is wont to leave us wondering whether what remains in the 
philosophy camp is of any value. Particularly in areas such as metaphysics, which 
seek to tell us something about the fundamental nature of reality, the sciences 
challenge philosophy by providing more methodologically rigorous answers to 
traditional questions.  
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the rise of science seems to cross 
a critical threshold and the sense amongst philosophers that the values of science are 
beginning to hegemonise intellectual culture – to the detriment of philosophy – 
becomes more acute. This results in the proliferation of ‘crisis’ narratives on the one 
hand – but also of positivisms, naturalisms and scientisms on the other. 
 Deleuze, as I have argued throughout this thesis, is neither positivist, 
naturalist nor ‘scientist’. Neither, however, is he prone to adopt the rhetoric of crisis 
in relation to the question of philosophy’s status in an age of science. In 1977, in his 
Dialogues with Claire Parnet, Deleuze is dismissive of other philosophers’ worries 
about the status of philosophy: ‘“What is the position with philosophy? Is it dead? 
Are we going beyond it?” It’s very trying [très pénible]’ (Deleuze and Parnet 2006, 
p. 1). In 1988, in conversation with Raymond Bellour and François Ewald for 
Magazine Littéraire, Deleuze (1995) insists that ‘I’ve never been worried about 
going beyond metaphysics or any death of philosophy. [… T]he only way it’s going 
to die is choking with laughter’ (p. 136). In a letter to Jean-Clet Martin, written in 
1990, Deleuze (2006a) would claim that ‘questions that address “the death of 
philosophy” or “going beyond philosophy” have never inspired me’ (p. 54). And 
finally, in 1991, writing with Félix Guattari, he would repeat this sentiment: ‘the 
death of metaphysics or the overcoming of philosophy has never been a problem for 
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us: it is just tiresome, idle chatter [ce sont d’inutiles, de pénibles radotages]’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1994, p. 9). Despite this refusal to accept that the question of 
philosophy’s specificity is properly associated with an atmosphere of crisis, Deleuze 
is, as I have already indicated in chapter 1, sensitive to the question. This question is 
already posed explicitly as early as the mid-’50s, in one of Deleuze’s early essays on 
Bergson: ‘Here, already, the general orientation of philosophy comes into question, 
for it is not enough to say that philosophy is at the origin of the sciences and that it 
was their mother; rather, now that they are grown up and well established, we must 
ask why there is still philosophy, in what respect science is not sufficient’ (DI, p. 
29/p. 23). In light of this awareness of the challenge posed to philosophy by the 
sciences, Deleuze’s rhetorical refusals of the problematic of philosophy’s demise can 
be seen not so much as a refusal to engage with the question of philosophy’s 
specificity in relation to the sciences as a particularly stark affirmation of the 
importance of maintaining this specificity. 
 Nevertheless, part of the purpose of this thesis has been to bring out a theme 
in Deleuze’s early work which, for all Deleuze’s apparent awareness of its 
importance, remains submerged in the early work, fading into the background behind 
the more pressing concern at that time of distinguishing the new philosophy from the 
old. That is to say, for the Deleuze of Difference and Repetition, the more immediate 
goal would seem to be that of challenging an orthodox model of the history of 
philosophy marked by an exclusive focus on philosophical texts (and indeed, on 
canonical philosophical texts) through an appropriation of conceptual resources from 
across disciplinary boundaries. The externality of science to philosophy is part of the 
strategy here, and the task of distinguishing philosophy from the sciences (although, 
  
245 
 
as I have tried to show, such a distinction can be discerned) is subordinated to the 
task of testing the limits of philosophy as an academic practice.  
I have noted above that commentators interested in Deleuze’s relation to the 
sciences often turn to his and Guattari’s explicit discussions of science in A 
Thousand Plateaus and What Is Philosophy?, but that they are drawn in two 
different directions by these seemingly divergent texts. How might the conclusions I 
have drawn concerning Deleuze’s early work fit into a narrative about his intellectual 
development as a whole, and thus be situated in relation to the stances adopted in 
these texts?  
A Thousand Plateaus is a work in which Deleuze (now writing with Guattari) 
extensively discusses the sciences and makes frequent use of scientific resources. It 
might also plausibly be seen as one of the texts in which Deleuze displays the most 
flagrant disregard for the question of the specificity of philosophy in relation to the 
sciences, and for disciplinary borders generally. Nevertheless, I would suggest that 
these features of A Thousand Plateaus testify not to so much to a break with 
philosophy or with a commitment to philosophy’s specificity on Deleuze’s part, but 
as a continuation and radicalisation of the concern to extricate philosophy from the 
norms of academic orthodoxy already in effect in the early work. As such, A 
Thousand Plateaus does not seem to represent a fundamental deviation from the 
attitudes towards philosophy, science and their relation already formulated in the 
early work. The idea of a split within science, whereby it is essentially bound to the 
representational requirements of cognition at the same time as it tests the limits of 
these requirements by deploying critical-creative thinking towards a cognitive end, 
which I have argued (in chapter 2) is already present in Difference and Repetition, 
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will be taken up and developed more fully and explicitly in A Thousand Plateaus, 
where it becomes the distinction between ‘nomad’ and ‘royal’ science: 
 
Far from drawing creative lines of flight and conjugating traits of positive 
deterritorialization, axiomatics blocks all lines, subordinates them to a punctual 
systems, and halts the geometric and algebraic writing systems that had begun to run 
off in all directions. This happened in relation to the question of indeterminism in 
physics: a “reordering” was undertaken to reconcile it with physical determinism. 
Mathematical writing systems were axiomatized, in other words, restratified, 
resemiotized, and material flows where rephysicalized. It is as much a political as a 
scientific affair: science must not go crazy. Hilbert and de Broglie were as much 
politicians as scientists: they reestablished order. […] Science as such is like 
everything else; madness is as intrinsic to it as reorderings. The same scientists may 
participate in both aspects, having their own madness, police, signifiances, or 
subjectifications, as well as their own abstract machines, all in their capacity as 
scientists. 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2004, pp. 158-159) 
 
Here, the idea is explicitly formulated that science is pulled in two directions: the 
‘madness’ of creative thought and a representational ‘reordering’ which, in the 
context of the Capitalism and Schizophrenia project, has now taken on a political 
dimension. 
 The Capitalism and Schizophrenia project is a definitive gesture of Deleuze’s 
attempt to extricate himself from the academic orthodoxy within which he was 
educated, something that becomes clear from his retrospective statements about his 
early work (see Deleuze 1995, pp. 6-7; 2006a, pp. 63-66). In this respect, it testifies 
to the intellectual atmosphere that also gave birth to the ‘experimental’ University of 
Paris 8 at Vincennes (later Saint Denis), at which Deleuze taught from 1969 until his 
retirement in 1987.
1
 Nevertheless, this academic anti-establishmentarianism did not 
spring into being fully formed on the barracades of May ’68; the limits and breaking 
points of academic discourse are already being stress tested in Deleuze’s early work.  
                                                 
1
 On Paris 8 and Deleuze’s tenure there, see Dosse (2010, chap. 19); see also Soulié (1998). 
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If Deleuze finally addresses explicitly questions of the specificity of 
philosophy in relation to the sciences only in 1991, in the co-authored work What Is 
Philosophy?, it seems to me that this is insofar as the intellectual atmosphere, as well 
as Deleuze’s relation to it, has changed. Now retired, it is no longer a question for 
Deleuze of carving out a heterodox niche at a distance from the norms of more 
orthodox academic philosophy, as it had been earlier in his career. It is perhaps in 
part in this sense that this sort of metaphilosophical reflection is the work of ‘old 
age’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, p. 1). In terms of the intellectual atmosphere more 
generally, Deleuze’s turn from a defence of philosophical avant-gardism against 
academic orthodoxy to an attempt to explicitly assert and articulate the specificity of 
philosophy might be explained in terms of a change in the apparent adversaries of 
philosophy. Whereas previously Deleuze seems to have seen the main threat to 
philosophy as coming from within academic philosophy itself, by the early ’90s he 
seems more worried that the mantle of philosophy will be co-opted by forces that he 
takes to be strictly speaking extra-philosophical – be it the appropriation of the 
concept of ‘concept’ by the marketing industry or the apparent conflation of 
philosophy with a certain image of science by certain Anglo-American currents of 
thought. If Deleuze finally takes the time to cash out a conception of philosophy’s 
distinctiveness, it is perhaps because philosophy no longer seems to him to be its 
own worst enemy. For whatever reason, in these last years of his life, Deleuze finally 
sees fit to address these questions. In doing so, he seeks to render explicit a 
commitment to the specificity of philosophy that, I have tried to show, is already 
present in his early work. 
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1 Deleuze and ‘Continental Naturalism’ 
It is a trope of growing popularity amongst soi-disant continental philosophers in 
English-speaking academe that continental philosophy is entering or has entered a 
new phase characterised by a renewed interest in realism, materialism and 
naturalism. This development is taken to be correlated, at a more general level, with 
a new confidence in metaphysics as a live possibility for philosophy, rather than as a 
dead intellectual inheritance from which we must extricate ourselves with the hope 
of arriving at a ‘post-metaphysical thinking’. Furthermore, this return to speculation 
regarding a reality irreducible to our knowledge of it is supposed to demand, or at 
least be facilitated by, a reassessment of the significance of the empirical 
(particularly natural) sciences for philosophical theorising.
2
 
 The sort of scientistic readings of Deleuze this thesis has sought to 
undermine have contributed to the idea that Deleuze should be heralded as a 
forefather or pioneer of this ‘turn’ in continental philosophy.3 There are two aspects 
to the construal of Deleuze as a precursor to this trend. The first is his engagement 
with the hard sciences, which is supposed to be a model for what it might look like 
for ‘continental’ philosophy to develop a more serious and productive relation to the 
sciences. The second is his supposedly ‘a-critical’ philosophical stance (as argued for 
                                                 
2
 A particularly vocal community of such scholars has coalesced under the banner of ‘speculative 
realism’ (see Bryant et al. 2011), although the trend seems to be broader than this, taking in 
philosophers who would not readily associate themselves with this emerging tendency (as evidenced 
by a recent special issue of the mainstream philosophy journal The Monist on ‘the new realism’).   
3
 See, for example, Bryant et al. (2011, pp. 4-5). Whilst he is writing before the emergence of the 
speculative realism trend, John Mullarkey (2006) makes similar suggestions to the effect that Deleuze 
can be seen as a pioneer of a new phase in the continental tradition marked, amongst other traits, by a 
renewed seriousness and productivity in its engagement with the sciences. 
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by Prigogine and Stengers, but also Alain Badiou and Peter Hallward), a reading 
which seems to point to an affinity between Deleuze and the sort of denunciation of 
Kant recently popularised by the Anglophone reception of Quentin Meillassoux’s 
work.  
The reading of Deleuze articulated here should serve to place in doubt the 
appropriateness of attributing to the early Deleuze such a precursor status. A quite 
different vision of Deleuze than that offered by the scientistic reading has emerged 
from the present examination, and with it – as I will outline below – a quite different 
vision of Deleuze’s pertinence to contemporary philosophical practice. 
 In chapter 1, I examined the context in which Deleuze’s early philosophy 
took form and into which he sought to make a distinctive contribution, namely the 
French intellectual milieu of the 1950s and ’60s. I showed that Deleuze insists on the 
specificity of philosophy in relation to the sciences at a time when this boundary was 
being questioned and rethought. In order to clarify how Deleuze conceives this 
specificity, I looked at how he seeks to position himself in relation to the thought of 
some prominent figures in French academic philosophy at the time who exerted a 
clear influence on the development of his thought – Ferdinand Alquié, Martial 
Guéroult, Jean Hyppolite, Jean Wahl – and showed how he attempts to negotiate a 
distinctive position, transcendental empiricism, in dialogue with the ideas he inherits 
from these thinkers. I concluded that Deleuze seeks to find a synthesis of Guéroult’s 
rationalism and Alquié’s mysticism through a reworking of Hyppolite’s project of an 
ontology of being in its relation to the sensible, extricating such a project from its 
Hegelian form through a conception of empiricism drawn from Wahl. The resulting 
philosophy posits sub-conceptual experience as a genuine limit to conceptual 
thought, but one which, far from constraining conceptual thought, provokes it to acts 
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of conceptual creativity. Despite the reconciliatory intent of this philosophy, I 
suggested that Deleuze’s emphasis on creativity indicates a greater affinity with a 
literary or artistic model of philosophy than with the sort of quasi-scientific model of 
philosophy manifested by Guéroult’s rationalism. 
 On the basis of this tentative suggestion of a certain limitation in any 
potential affinity between Deleuze’s philosophy and scientific modes of thinking, in 
chapter 2, I turned to a more detailed elaboration of Deleuze’s understanding of the 
significance of the specificity of philosophy in relation to science by examining his 
account of philosophy as a conjunction of concept creation and critique, and why this 
critique-creation is non-cognitive. In particular, I argued that, for Deleuze, it is a 
relentless commitment to the movement of critique that is distinctively 
philosophical. It is in this permanent intellectual revolution that the distinctive 
‘vitality’ of philosophical thinking lies, and it is as a cultivation of resistance to the 
fixation of conceptual frameworks that philosophical thinking feeds the vitality of 
the mind as a site of creativity. By contrast, scientific cognition – to the extent that it 
aims at the construction of an increasingly accurate representation of a reality taken 
to exist independently of, and indeed pre-exist, its representation – relies upon such 
fixed frameworks in order to function and progress. This is not to say, as I have 
emphasised, that science can be exhaustively identified with this cognitive 
dimension of thought. Indeed, Deleuze will emphasise that there are moments in the 
history of science at which the sciences too exhibit critical-creative thinking. I also 
indicated the way in which dominant assumptions in the philosophy of science in 
France at this time foreground these creative and critical aspects of scientific 
thought. Nevertheless, the epistemic and pragmatic intent of the scientific enterprise, 
in contrast to the ‘ethical’ intent of philosophy, dooms it to remain torn between 
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these two tendencies; it cannot sever completely its connection to the cognitive 
dimension of thought. 
 In chapter 3, I considered Deleuze’s concrete engagements with concepts 
drawn from mathematics and the hard sciences. It is the presence of these concepts 
in Deleuze’s work which, in important part, has led to the sorts of readings I have 
attempted to put in question, and so it is important to consider how the understanding 
of the relation between philosophy and science articulated in the first two chapters 
impacts on our understanding of these contested passages. My main contention in 
this chapter was that where Deleuze discusses concepts drawn from the exact 
sciences, he does so in a manner which takes explicit critical distance from the 
original contexts in which these concepts are articulated, and which consistently 
points to limitations of the concerns pertinent to these original scientific contexts 
which permitted their distinctive philosophical significance from becoming apparent. 
In this way, Deleuze takes himself to be redeploying these concepts in a transformed 
way, re-engineering them for use in relation to a quite different set of concerns than 
those they were originally formulated to tackle. I suggested that Deleuze’s own ideas 
regarding the relation between problems and meaning can be used to construe these 
transformations in the meaning of these concepts as a work of metaphor. 
Consequently, Deleuze does not take himself to be explicating the significance of 
these notions qua scientific notions. His philosophical project is independent of the 
scientific projects whose concepts he selectively poaches and reworks. 
 In the final chapter, I pulled back again to a more general perspective, in 
order to round off my discussion of the status of science in Deleuze’s early 
philosophy by considering possible affinities between Deleuze’s concept of 
immanence and the significance of the rise of modern science as conceived by 
  
252 
 
certain naturalistically-inclined philosophers. In effect, in this chapter I attempted to 
answer the question of whether Deleuze’s philosophy of immanence, in its early 
incarnation, can be read as a species of philosophical naturalism in a sense that might 
manifest some basic affinity with modern natural science. My conclusion was that 
Deleuze’s commitment to immanence should not be understood as a response to the 
declarations of the natural sciences, as if these constituted some privileged reference 
point, but rather as emanating on the one hand from a priori arguments concerning 
the incoherence of certain metaphysical claims, and on the other from ethical 
commitments. Furthermore, I sought to clarify how Deleuze’s concept of 
immanence, which has a distinctly post-Kantian resonance, ultimately clashes with 
philosophical naturalism, in the sense of a position that would privilege the 
pronouncements of the natural sciences as a guide to and check on (we might say, as 
‘disciplining’) our epistemological and metaphysical commitments. 
 On the basis of these conclusions, I argue that Deleuze is misconstrued by the 
scientistic reading. Consequently, he is in no position to play the role of forebear to 
an attempted naturalistic turn in continental philosophy.   
Deleuze’s dissociation from the idea of a continental naturalism is, in my 
mind, so much the better, and this for two reasons. Firstly, I find myself on the side 
of those, like Simon Glendinning (2006), who are suspicious of the very idea of a 
philosophically substantive division within twentieth century philosophy between 
two traditions, ‘analytic’ and ‘continental’. The reason being, as Glendinning has 
made abundantly clear in his work, that there is insufficient coherence or unity 
within the category of ‘continental philosophy’ to justify its use as the name for a 
distinctive mode of philosophising (see also Vrahimis 2013). ‘Continental 
philosophy’, then, is most plausibly the name for a sociological category, a 
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community within (largely Anglophone) academic philosophy. I take it therefore that 
there is something spurious about the idea of a distinctively ‘continental’ take on 
naturalism, where this would suggest naturalism in a continental style. There is no 
such style. 
Even if we entertain the idea of a continental tradition in philosophy, 
however, the idea of continental naturalism must strike us as a perplexing one. 
‘[O]ne could venture to say’, according to Beth Lord (2009), ‘that the future of 
continental philosophy is naturalism, the point at which the gulf with analytic 
philosophy may finally be bridged’ (p. 4). ‘From this perspective’, she continues, 
‘continental philosophy’s connection to the sciences is potentially of more 
significance than its (historically, supposedly stronger) connection to the arts’ (Lord 
2009, p. 5). Adrian Johnston (2008) echoes this sentiment – if in a more combative, 
less reconciliatory tone – claiming that continental philosophers must turn their 
attention to the ‘insights and ideas’ of the natural sciences, since these are ‘too 
precious to be unreservedly delivered over into the hands of their self-appointed 
Analytic (mis-)representatives’ (pp. 29-29). Such claims, I think, fare poorly when 
contrasted with remarks made by Lee Braver (2007), who claims that the shared 
theme that ‘can best initiate this twenty-first-century rapprochement’ between 
analytic and continental philosophy is ‘anti-realism’, which has been an important 
position in both purported traditions – something which ‘should come as no surprise 
[…], since both traditions trace their lineage back to Kant’ (p. 5). Indeed, as 
Christopher Norris (2013) notes, continental and analytic philosophy ‘have both, in 
their different ways, tended strongly over the past three decades toward various types 
of constructivism, conventionalism, instrumentalism, linguistified (Rortyan) 
pragmatism or fully fledged anti-realism’ (p. 200). That analytic philosophers 
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interested in defending various forms of anti-realism might find insights in the work 
of anti-realist philosophers associated with the continental tradition seems to me 
eminently more plausible than that the continental tradition might provide for its 
own erstwhile representatives a ready source of ideas for the formulation of a new 
realism. 
Similarly, Paul Redding (2009) has suggested that it is precisely the 
continental tradition’s idealism – the thesis that ‘everything into which traditional 
metaphysics inquired and which it took to be ultimately real was, in some sense, 
mind-dependent, and did not have per se existence’, so that philosophy is conceived 
as ‘the investigation of a world that was not “there anyway”, but which had been 
constructed by the human mind throughout its own developmental history’ – that is 
its most significant contribution to the contemporary philosophical scene (p. 2). This 
‘idealism arose as a way of doing philosophy that could coexist without competition 
with science’, and as such ‘could still provide hope for a coherent and plausible 
modern philosophy, […] a third alternative to the scientistic naturalism’ – which 
‘looks [to the idealist] like no more than the expression of a desire to rid our culture 
of philosophy’ – ‘and the opposing, revived orthodox theism of the early twenty-first 
century’ (Redding 2009, p. 179). The value of such an approach is apparent in the 
fact that, despite the supposed correlation between ‘the triumph of the “analytic 
philosophy” of Russell and Moore’ and the ‘eclipse of [Hegelian] idealism’ in the 
English-speaking world (Redding 2009, p. 175),
4
 there has in fact been a ‘Sellarsian 
rehabilitation of an Hegelian position within current analytic philosophy’, and more 
                                                 
4
 Redding (2007) notes the importance of a ‘simple opposition between analytic philosophy and Kant-
derived idealism’ for analytic philosophy’s ‘Russellian creation myth’ (p. 8). See also Hylton (1990). 
  
255 
 
generally a reassessment of any hard and fast exclusion of post-Kantian idealism 
from the concerns of that tradition (p. 15).   
If we are, then, as Lord tentatively suggests, at a point at which the purported 
gulf between analytic and continental philosophy can finally be bridged, it seems to 
me more plausible that this will happen through a reassessment by philosophers 
trained in the analytic tradition of the value of the post-Kantian tradition for thinking 
through idealist and anti-realist positions than through a reassessment by 
Anglophone continental philosophers of the value of objective truth and scientific 
realism. This is because, as Braver (2007) notes, rapprochement is best achieved by 
‘a dialogue between the two branches in which each sifts through the resources of 
the other’ on ‘common topics on which both branches have produced quality work’ 
(pp. 4-5). One commonality between the otherwise often disparate and diffuse 
currents that tend to be grouped under the moniker of continental philosophy is a 
serious attempt to work through the consequences of Kant’s critical project, and 
consequently a foundational connectedness to this project, resulting in a suspicion of 
any insufficiently caveated realism (that is to say, the claim that we have epistemic 
access to reality as it is ‘anyway’, independent of the machinations of our minds). As 
a result, figures associated with this tradition have expended a great deal of time and 
effort on thinking through the demands and consequences of a Kant-inspired anti-
realism. They have expended far less energy, as yet, on thinking through the 
demands and consequences of extricating oneself from such an anti-realism and 
seeking instead to defend ‘a hard-line objectivist realism’ (Norris 2013, p. 181). I 
find myself in agreement with Christopher Norris (2013), who, whilst enthused that 
‘the livelier sections of the continental philosophy community’ at least are beginning 
to grow weary of ‘the kinds of far-out anti-realist, constructivist or socio-linguistic-
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relativist position that had captured the high ground across large swathes of the post-
1970 continentally influenced humanities’ (p. 181), is forced to note that the new 
continental naturalism, ‘in reactive opposition to a regnant anti-realism […] tends to 
adopt a hard-line contrary stance without having yet developed the resources (in 
particular the modal and logico-semantic resources) to fully support its claims’ (p. 
187). This all too easily results in positions which waver ‘between a scientific-realist 
outlook which […] is distinctly under-theorised or lacking philosophical substance 
and, on the other hand, a speculative bent that leans so far in a “radical” (self-
consciously heterodox) direction as to lose touch with any workable variety of 
scientific realism’ (Norris 2013, p. 187). Given these worries, it is, I hope, not 
unreasonable to suggest that, at this stage, philosophers who have previously 
concerned themselves primarily with the interpretation of texts belonging to the 
continental tradition and who now find themselves inclined to adopt some manner of 
scientific realism or philosophical naturalism have more to learn from their analytic 
colleagues than vice versa. This is a straightforward consequence of the fact that 
analytic philosophers have a thirty year head-start on their continental colleagues in 
exploring the stakes of these kinds of positions, as well as that working against the 
background of a tradition so involved with a working through of the Kantian legacy 
leaves one in possession of a number of intellectual habits that pull against the 
requirements of the position one is attempting to articulate and defend. 
 
2 Creativity versus consensus: countering the ideal of ‘normal 
science’ in philosophy 
If the early Deleuze’s significance for contemporary philosophy is not as a bridge 
between the continental tradition and contemporary philosophical naturalism, then 
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what might his role be? In the final section of this conclusion, I want to make a 
suggestion, one which still sees Deleuze as having some relevance for contemporary 
thinking about the relation between philosophy and science, but which is quite 
different to that proffered by DeLanda, Protevi and other scientistic Deleuzians. 
What is the appeal of ‘continental naturalism’? As with DeLanda’s reading of 
Deleuze, the motive often seems to be an attempt to defend the continuing relevance 
of the continental tradition in an Anglophone philosophical context that is at least 
perceived (by many Anglophone continentalists) to be dominated by philosophical 
naturalism. But things are not so simple. Undoubtedly the majority of academic 
philosophers in English-speaking academe today would identify themselves as 
‘analytic’ philosophers, but analytic philosophy is not, and has never been, 
straightforwardly a naturalistic movement. Indeed, it finds its origins, in part, in anti-
naturalistic reactions against the rise of experimental psychology that emerged out of 
the so-called Psychologismus-Streit of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. Furthermore, whilst it is the association of analytic philosophy with logical 
empiricism that often leads continentalists to identify the analytic tradition with 
philosophical naturalism, logical empiricism was strictly speaking more neo-Kantian 
than naturalistic in its metaphilosophical orientation. The dominance of 
philosophical naturalism in its contemporary form is more plausibly seen as an 
aspect of Quine’s legacy, which is to say the legacy of the decline of logical 
empiricism’s influence over English-speaking philosophy. All of which is ultimately 
simply to say that the idea, as Lord (2009) claims, that a ‘turn to naturalism’ amongst 
continental philosophers may be ‘the point at which the gulf with analytic 
philosophy may finally be bridged’, seems to me to be based on a misapprehension 
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of the centrality of naturalism for the analytic tradition (p. 4).
5
 Indeed, with the 
burgeoning of the sub-field of the history of analytic philosophy, (some) analytic 
philosophers too are beginning to awaken to a new conception of their tradition, ‘less 
monolithic […] than it appeared to some during decades when, too often equated 
with a popularized caricature of logical positivism, it was sometimes seen as an 
ideologically rigid movement shrinking from metaphysics and ethics […], restricting 
its subject matter to “language” and/or the study of linguistic meaning, and 
dominating academic philosophy with scientism, naturalism, and relativism that 
trivialized the subject, causing it to withdraw from social engagement’ (Floyd 2009, 
p. 173). 
 This is not to say, however, that analytic philosophy has not had a crucial 
relationship to science, a relationship that has been formative for contemporary 
philosophical practice in an academic context. Analytic philosophy has been 
powerfully affected by a methodological ideal that we might call the ideal of 
‘scientific philosophy’. What I have in mind here is a position less explicit and less 
strong than philosophical naturalism. This is not the view that philosophy must be 
conducted using methods drawn from the empirical or formal sciences (although it 
could easily support such a view), or that the natural sciences should constrain the 
claims made by philosophers, but a looser, more implicit commitment to establishing 
and maintaining a set of disciplinary norms that takes as its model a certain image of 
                                                 
5
 This is perhaps an insight that is easier to come by when one writes from a British perspective than 
when one finds oneself working in North America. It has been noted that analytic philosophers in the 
UK maintain a certain suspicion of the sciences not shared by their eagerly interdisciplinary 
colleagues across the pond (see Baggini 2003).   
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the research practices of the natural sciences.
6
 This is not an attempt to make 
philosophy a ‘handmaiden’ to science, or to adopt scientific methods as the only 
appropriate methods, but a model for what philosophy might look like if it is to be a 
viable, autonomous research discipline. The hope is that through such norms, aimed 
at assuring ‘good professional, specialized, and therefore technical, philosophy’ 
(Engel 1988, p. 3), philosophy might ‘become a genuinely “objective” discipline 
capable (like the exact sciences) of cooperative progress and, in principle, universal 
agreement as well’ (Friedman 2000, p. 158). This is the sort of ambitious humility 
that lies behind the familiar model of academic philosophical practice based around 
‘the brief article, the piecemeal approach, the opportunistic use of results of 
contemporary science, the problem- and solution-oriented thinking’, and so forth 
(Floyd 2009, p. 179).   
 What is at stake here, I would suggest, is an ideal of philosophy as what 
Thomas Kuhn termed ‘normal science’.7 Norris (2013) gives a fitting description of 
the ideal of normal science in the field of philosophy as ‘the idea that philosophy 
could best lay claim to academic respectability by […] determining to tackle only 
those well-defined technical problems that were sure to have some likewise well-
                                                 
6
 Some examples of those who have noted, both approvingly and critically, this tendency of analytic 
philosophy to seek to emulate the norms of research practice proper to the natural sciences are Pascal 
Engel (1988, pp. 2-4), Floyd (2009, p. 179), Norris (2013, p.  1, p. 14, pp. 17-18) and Michael 
Friedman (2000, pp. 156-158), who has conducted a detailed study of the way in which the idea of 
wissenschaftliche Philosophie finds its way into English-speaking philosophy through Carnap’s work 
in particular. See also Friedman (2012) and Richardson (1997). 
7
 The idea that philosophy operates in a manner analogous to Kuhnian normal science is presented in 
a positive light by Matti Eklund (2013). An exemplary contemporary representative of this sort of 
vision of philosophy is Timothy Williamson (2007), whose ‘image of thought’ could not be more 
opposed to that of Deleuze. 
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defined technical answer’ (p. 1). The prominence of this ideal, he suggests, has led to 
an ‘ultra-specialist interest or ultra-professionalised narrowing of focus’, and ‘an 
over-concentration on issues that lend themselves to quasi-scientific formulation’ 
(Norris 2013, p. 1). While the analytic ambition to conduct philosophy to as great an 
extent as possible as a normal science has no doubt contributed to the formation of a 
mode of philosophising capable of functioning as a professionalised research 
discipline in a modern sense, there are questions to be asked about the 
appropriateness of such a model for philosophy. 
 The development of these modes of thinking can be traced back to the 
developments that give rise to this question of the separation between philosophy 
and science in the first place, specifically, what distinctive contribution to our lives is 
philosophy supposed to make that would justify its continued existence as an activity 
distinct from the sciences? Is there a good reason for the de facto separation of 
philosophy and science as academic disciplines, in terms of the distinctiveness of 
philosophy as an intellectual activity? This, as I have discussed in chapter 1, is the 
sort of worry that motivates a great deal of metaphilosophical debate in France from 
the second half of the nineteenth century onwards, and it lies at the heart of questions 
about the nature and position of the borders between philosophy and the sciences 
that permeate the intellectual atmosphere in France at the time of the composition of 
Deleuze’s early work. One reaction to such an atmosphere is the sort of scientific 
philosophy in question here, which seeks to justify philosophy’s legitimacy (without 
necessarily clarifying its specificity) by conforming to a scientific research culture. 
Deleuze belongs to a different school of thought, however, according to which there 
is something valuable and distinctive in philosophical thinking precisely insofar as it 
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is not the sort of thinking that can readily be subjected to the strictures of such a 
culture.  
Why should the application of quasi-scientific norms and ideals of academic 
practice in philosophy worry us? It should worry us if, like Deleuze, we take an 
important part of the value of philosophy to be the creative thinking that occurs when 
such parameters break down – or even the creative thinking that causes them to 
break down. Deleuze presents with an image of philosophy inherently hostile to an 
identification of philosophy with a policing of academic norms of the kind that 
remains all too prominent a feature of the structure of academic philosophy, both at a 
metaphilosophical and at an institutional level.   
 As sociologists of knowledge have frequently noted, it is a feature of any 
intellectual field that a key struggle is that regarding how the limits of the field are 
defined, what counts as included or excluded. Philosophy is no exception, and 
throughout its history philosophical thought has been populated by rival approaches 
each asserting their right to decide the correct methodology for legitimate 
philosophy. This sort of metaphilosophical wrangling has often been intellectually 
productive, but this is a consequence of the survival of a plurality of approaches in 
conflict with one another. The ideal of normal science seeks explicitly to eliminate 
this sort of plurality of conflicting methodological approaches and arrive at a 
consensus regarding norms of good practice that can allow for the formation of a 
coherent research discipline. But if philosophy’s value lies in the conceptual 
creativity that emerges out of the collapse of this kind of consensus, then the ideal of 
normal science is potentially a threat to philosophy.  
Deleuze’s significance for contemporary philosophy, then, is not, contrary to 
the motivations of the scientistic reading of Deleuze, as an early proponent of a 
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continental turn to scientific naturalism, but as a source of alternative ways of 
thinking about what philosophy can be than those offered by an overly narrow 
modelling of philosophical practice on the research practices of the empirical 
sciences. For Deleuze, philosophy is creative, iconoclastic, consensus-breaking, 
producing new meaning rather than condemning ‘nonsense’. This is an altogether 
more anarchic, artistic vision of philosophy, and one that does not lend itself to 
maintenance of a coherent academic community, with shared terminology and public 
criteria for success and failure. Ultimately, the philosopher ends up looking a lot 
more like an artist than a scientist in Deleuze’s early work, and it might be asked to 
what extent academic philosophy is even capable of embracing this image of 
philosophy. Alternatively, perhaps Deleuze’s is a vision of the philosopher that 
cannot be contained by academia, at least not in its contemporary, ‘professionalised’ 
form. Perhaps Deleuze’s early conception of philosophy can only ever be an element 
of the whole picture, a necessary ‘Dionysian’ moment, but one that must be 
tempered by more ‘Apollonian’ impulses if it is to be philosophically productive. 
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